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ABSTRACT
ADOPTED KNOWING: CLAIMING SELF-KNOWLEDGE
IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY
SEPTEMBER 2003
KIMBERLY J. LEIGHTON, BA., SARAH LAWRENCE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
This dissertation claims that the problem of self-knowledge involves a kind of
splitting of the mind or self into a knower and a known, a subject and an object of
knowledge. As modem philosophy becomes concerned with the project of certainty, its
turn toward the self renders this splitting into a kind of aporia : how can the self know
itself (with certainty) when it is at once a subject and an object of its own knowing?
The goal of this dissertation is not to develop a paradigm of self-awareness that avoids
or escapes the limits of self-certainty, per se; rather it considers how we might address
what is constitutively unknowable about the self without recapitulating the limits of the
modem epistemic subject.
Chapter I introduces the problem of self-knowledge and the split self. Chapter 2
analyzes Descartes’ Second Meditation in terms of its presentation of self-knowledge as
self-certainty. Descartes’ res cogitans argument, I claim, reveals not only how
Descartes conceives of the self as a substance, but also how such a conception relies
upon a notion of transparent self-awareness which attempts to resolve the aporia of the
vii
split self. Chapter 3 presents Hume’s critique of the philosophical notion of personal
identity, particularly in terms of its assumption of the self as a substance. Without an
alternative notion of self-awareness, however, Hume’s method of critique-his empirical
epistemology-leaves in place the position of the knowing self capable of transparent
introspection. Chapter 4 focuses on Michel Foucault’s critique of self-knowledge as
knowledge of a substance by an unimpeded knower. Using Foucault’s notion of
“caring” for the self, I consider how claims of self-knowledge have a productive effect
on the self. I critique Foucault’s implicit assumption of and failure to provide an
alternative notion of self-awareness, however. Citing Descartes’ self-reflective
meditations, Chapter 5 explores my own relation to self-knowledge, highlighting by
example how one can address what is constitutively unknowable about the self.
Through explorations of identity through the figure of ‘being adopted’ I argue that we
can begin to unpack both the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of
identity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: CLAIMING SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN
THE AGE OF CERTAINTY
In the Second Meditation, Descartes attempts to provide an argument for how he
can know with certainty. Because he takes as his example of knowing something
beyond a doubt his own self, his notion of what he is must evidence his capacity to
know (himself) with certainty. In short, he must present how it is that his claim
regarding what he is, his self-knowledge, is incorrigible. What is required for such
incorrigibility are three things: ( 1 ) knowledge of the self which (2) can be provided by
Descartes own act of self-reflection as (3) impossible to be otherwise. As I present,
this act of self-reflection, however, entails what I see as a kind of splitting of the self. It
is not with an object outside the self that Descartes’ rationalist project is concerned. He
is not attempting to secure his capacity for making certain judgments about the world
through knowledge of that world, but through knowledge of himself. Nor is he relying
on any previous knowledge or the knowledge of others. Descartes’ foundational project
figures his self-knowledge as a product of his lone self-reflection. Hence, as a knowing
subject, he takes his own self as a known object.
The modem problem of self-knowledge, thus involves a kind of aporia: how
does the self know itself (with certainty) when it is at once a subject and an object of its
own knowing? The answer to this question provides is found in to the third requirement
for the presentation of self-knowledge as incorrigible: To know the self in a way that
secures one’s claims to know as beyond doubt-to have what I call self-certainty--there
must be a way that guarantees that the self s knowledge of itself cannot be otherwise.
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The means through which the self is provided with self-certainty is self-awareness, and,
because the self is split by the act of (rationalist) self-reflection, this self-awareness must
make it possible that the knowledge the self has of itself can overcome any doubt or
uncertainty the split might engender. In other words, the self-awareness required by the
demand for self-certainty in the modem rationalist project must make it possible for the
self to achieve transparent introspection, i.e., to know itself at once as both knower and
known.
The legacy of Cartesianism for contemporary culture has been explored by many
philosophers and social critics. The effects of the mind-body split on notions of self and
self presentation have been analyzed, for example, especially in terms of conceptions of
gender and race in the construction of the modem liberal political subject. Many
theorists and critics have argued that contemporary understandings of the self through
what has come to be called “identity practices” involve a citation of the Cartesian notion
of the nature of the self. Through such practices individuals claim rights, privileges,
and other forms of access—political, cultural, etc.—based on what they claim to be.
Whether based on nationality, cultural or linguistic affiliation, or ethnicity, for example,
this ‘being’ is both represented through and expressed by their identity. Identity
practices reveal not only what a self is; importantly they also articulate a self s claim to
know itself. Usually based on claims about the body— its color, its sex, its biological
origin, its place of birth—identity practices have been analyzed as both limited by and
made possible by a Cartesian-influenced mind-body dualism.
What this dissertation investigates, however, is how the limits of Cartesian
metaphysics not only effect our considerations of the self in terms of its being, but, in its
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demand for self-certainty, cogito thinking or logic also effects our considerations of the
self in terms of its knowing. Descartes’ solitary meditations not only render the self as a
knowable substance
,
but they also present us with a selfwho is a subject capable of
knowing itself with certainty. I suggest that claims of self-knowledge, even those which
attempt to offer an alternative to or critique of the self as a kind of Cartesian substance,
inadvertantly recite the limits of Descartes introspective self-knower when they engage
in practices of self-knowledge as self-certainty. Even claims to self-knowledge through
identity practices which seem to challenge the mind-body dualism, arguing that the
self is a product of relational, social practices and norms, rather than a given or
knowable substance, must involve a critical epistemology in order to avoid reciting the
limits of Cartesianism.
To be effective, a critique of Cartesian metaphysics and its implications must
involve an analysis of this model of introspective self-knowing. Such an analysis
involves examining not only the notion of the self as substance, but also a critique of the
paradigm of self-awareness which facilitates the seifs claim to self certainty. This
paradigm of self-awareness involves at once a positing of the self as an
epistemologically split self and a relationship between these ‘two selves’ whereby any
impediment to the self s claim to self-certainty is removed. As noted, Descartes’
rationalist focus on the self as the sole source of his knowledge renders his practice of
self-reflection as a practice which splits the self into a self who knows and a selfwho is
known. As awareness of or access to the self, self-awareness is thus the epistemological
relationship between these two selves. In order for the knowing or subject-I to claim
self-knowledge that is incorrigible, i.e., to know itself in a way that cannot be otherwise,
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it must be able to be aware of itself completely. What it claims to be must capture
exactly what it is, including all that it is in order to satisfy Descartes’ requirements for
certainty, i.e., clarity and distinctness. There can be no part of itself that the self cannot
know. Thus this relationship between the subject-I and the object-I must be one which
renders any possible threats to certainty-any thing which could shed doubt on the seifs
knowledge of itself-neutral. The idea the self has of itself must thus contain all that the
self can be. There can be no unknowns. Thus, as the epistemological relation between
the ‘two selves,’ self-awareness is figured as transparent, such that the I can seemingly
know itself completely without impediment. What this results in I argue, is the aporia
ofmodem self-knowledge: in order to achieve self-certainty the ‘difference’ between
the knowing or subject-I and the known or object-I must be erased such that the relation
between the I’s is one of identity.
This erasure is achieved, I offer, through the figuration of the known self as
always already including the knowing self-i.e., by conceptualizing what the self is, its
ontology, in terms of how the self knows itself, its (self) epistemology. But, as the
rationalist (Enlightenment) turn towards the self presumes the self to be an active part of
the production of its own knowledge, I claim that the subject-I cannot be contained by
this identity relation between the subject-I and the object-I. The activity of the subject-I
produces the subject-I as a kind of excess, a kind of moreness which resists being
completely knowable, even to itself. As the quest for self-certainty is a legacy of the
Cartesian metaphysics, so too do we inherit the instability present in claims of self-
certainty through self-knowledge. Rather than attempt to overcome this, I think such
instability can be interestingly appropriated for a more productive and effective notion
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of self-awareness. The goal of this dissertation is not to develop a paradigm of self-
awareness that avoids or escapes the limits of self-certainty, per se; rather I want to
consider how there is an unknowable but actively present self that is part of the
production of self-knowledge. How to address this subject-I in a way that encourages
more possible ways of engaging in self-knowing as self-making is my concern. This
shift towards self-knowing as productive of the self comes from, I suggest, a
development of self-knowing that recognizes the contingency of such knowledge, rather
than attempts to reduce or eliminate such contingency. Exploring how the seifs own
point of view is present in and yet constructed by its self-knowledge is the goal of this
project. How to address this knowing-subject in a way that engenders more possibilities
for ways of being and making our selves is the problem it concentrates on solving.
Thus, in addition to what I have laid out above, Chapter 2 analyzes Descartes’
Second Meditation in terms of its presentation of self-knowledge as self-certainty. In
order to generate his criteria of certainty-clarity and distinctness-he must present self-
knowledge as incorrigible. Through his figuring of the self as a thinking thing,
Descartes attempts to argue that his knowledge of his self is certain, as it is an
immediate intuition. I focus in this chapter on Descartes’ res cogitans argument, as I
contend that it reveals not only how Descartes conceives of the self as a substance, but
also how such a conception is used in order to overcome what I see as the split self.
Though engendered by his quest for certainty this split also threatens its successful
outcome. Descartes’ presentation of the wax example, I offer, reveals what is at stake in
the Meditation. Relying upon his method of doubt presented earlier in the text, he
contends that his knowledge of the wax itself comes not from his senses or imagination.
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but from his understanding. His knowledge of the nature of the wax requires the
activity of his mind alone.
While this provides his argument with an example ofhow he knows the nature
of something, I suggest that it also provides him with what he needs to overcome the
split-self of self-knowledge. What is most relevant for his argument is not what is
similar, but what is different about the examples of knowing the wax and knowing the
self. And what is different is that the self is capable of self-reflection and the wax is
not. As Descartes notes, his judgement about the wax may be still contain errors, but
what is certain is that it requires the activity of the mind. What makes knowledge of the
wax uncertain is that it does not offer a way for the self to be certain about itself as a
knowing self. Descartes attempts to render the self transparent to itself such that it can
both know itself as an object of knowing and as a subject of knowing.
Following Hintikka’s famous analysis of the cogito ergo sum argument as a
performative, I evaluate how the sum res cogitans argument seems to also function as a
kind of performative. Interpreting “I am a thinking thing” as “I know myself as a
thinking thing” I suggest that it does seem that we could read the res cogitans as a
performative. But even so, I argue that it fails to achieve the certainty Descartes’
argument requires because it does not meet the requirements of a (successful)
performative: it is not existentially inconsistent to assume the opposite and it seems
necessary to have to repeat the phrase as it only seems to accomplish its performative
force in the moment of articulation. My intent in this chapter is to suggest how it seems
that the certainty that Descartes requires seems to be attempted through this kind of
performative but because he himself locates the activity of the mind as part of the
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production of the knowledge of a nature, he is left with the problem of knowing that
mind. As the burden of Descartes’ ’performative’ involves not establishing what cannot
be otherwise through a positive assertion but instead erasing the presence of what he
cannot seem to know, the presence of the unknown subject-I re-appears when, perhaps,
he is not stating “I am a thinking thing,” and thus the performative fails.
In Chapter 3, 1 present Hume’s critique of the philosophical notion of personal
identity, particularly in terms of its assumption of the self as a substance. As is well
known, Hume contends all of our knowledge is derived from our perceptions, i.e., our
impressions and ideas. In order for a term to be meaningful, we must be able to locate
in ourselves the impression we have of which the idea referred to by the term is a copy.
If there is no impression, then the term is meaningless. He thus critiques the notion of
identity as meaningless, as our investigation of our impressions reveals no impression of
a substance self. Instead Hume tells us, we find only our successive perceptions.
Hume’s critique of personal identity presents us with an alternative notion of the
self which importantly introduces the role that experience plays in the constitution of the
self. While Hume’s epistemology provides him with a method by which he can render
the metaphysical notion of the self as a substance meaningless, this method is also that
which limits the effectiveness of his critique. Throughout the Treatise, Hume urges that
we investigate our impressions, that we examine and evaluate them. But who or what is
this examiner who can so engage with its own perceptions, who can look at its own
experience? Without an alternative notion of self-awareness, I contend, Hume’s method
of critique—his empirical epistemology—leaves in place the position of the knowing self
capable of transparent introspection. While Hume’s critique of the metaphysical self is
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aimed at both the notion of the underlying, unchanging, substance self and the notion of
the self as a transparently available container self, he in effect posits a knowing self
seemingly capable of the kind of introspection he critiques. Without a means of
addressing this knowing subject, without a way of explaining how it is that the self is at
once a product of its perceptions and capable of examining those perceptions, this
subject- 1 remains uninterrogated, placing it both outside of the seifs experience and
beyond the reach of Hume’s critical method.
Part of the reason for this failure is, obviously, his method which relies on a kind
of empirical investigation of the self not too unsimilar to how one might perform other
kinds of scientific explorations at the time. Perceptions are treated by Hume as
empirical data which collected together, into the bundle that he analogizes the self as,
can be examined. What he begins to move toward in his analogies of the self as a
theater and as a commonwealth is the idea that the self is composed of its perceptions,
but that these perceptions so collected interact with one another, affect one another. The
collection is not static nor is what holds them together. Both the content and the form of
the commonwealth for example can change though its identity can remain the same.
These analogies do not, however, fully answer Hume’s own questions regarding the
relationship between the self and its perceptions. He asks several times in the section
“On Personal Identity” what is the connection between them.
I present Hume’s analysis of the passions or impressions of reflection in Book II
as a way to explore this connection and to suggest what its implications might be for a
notion of self-awareness that both critiqued metaphysical claims and resisted sceptical
criticism. In particular I focus on Hume’s section “On Pride and Humility” as here he
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obliquely offers a discussion of the relationship between the ideas of “mine” of and “my
self. Though this discussion fails in the end to provide an answer to the connection
between the self and its perceptions, I suggest that through its analysis of “possession” it
does suggest a way to approach the relation between the perceptions and the self as
constitutive. In short, pride is the result of what Hume calls a “double relationship.”
The two relationships involved, though it isn’t exactly clear what the schematic might
look like, are two ideas and two impressions. The ideas are mine and my self, and the
impressions are something positive like beauty, and pride. What is critical for our
project is that together, these relationships engender the passion of pride which directs
the attention of the self toward itself. This double move at once seems to effect a
notion of the self which does not seem to presuppose what that self is. While it is
unclear what role the pre-given structures of the mind-i.e., its predispositions-play in
terms of constructing if not determining the self, the section on pride suggests that part
of how the self is able to mis-recognize its successive perceptions as perceptions of
identity is through its mis-recognition of its successive perceptions of its self through its
notion of ‘mine-ness.’ While this ‘mine-ness’ seems to be generated in relation to
memory, it is ultimately unclear how Hume can get out of what he calls the “labyrinth”
that is the problem of personal identity.
Focusing on contemporary philosopher Michel Foucault, Chapter 4 continues to
develop not only the notion of the self as relational, but also the importance of the self s
own activity in relation to its self. Like Hume, Foucault critiques the notion of the
substance self. Unlike Hume, he includes in his analysis ways in which we know our
selves that in effect, reproduce the self as a kind of substance. He does not fail to
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recognize the importance of practices of self-knowledge as themselves productive of
what the self can be and his method of analysis-historical criticism-also recognizes the
inaccessibility of the knowing subject. Focusing on Foucault’s later work, I analyze
both Foucault’s notion of ‘care for the self and suggest how it sets the stage for (and
even requires) a notion of self-awareness which can at once allow the self to claim self-
knowledge while also addressing the subject-I which I suggest is constitutively
unknowable.
Throughout his early work, Foucault critiques what he terms “normalizing”
practices which make the self not only intelligible to others but also intelligible to itself.
His historical analyses aim not to explain the origins of an idea or practice, and they
strongly reject a notion of historical investigation which traces the way in which human
beings have been repressed, violated, etc., such that their ‘natural’ states have been
either altered or denied. Rather, it is his project to show how the self has been
‘experienced’ in different historical moments. His most famous work perhaps, the
History ofSexuality Volume I presents not how individuals’ sexualities have been
shaped, damaged, or repressed, but instead it offers how the experience of being an
individual was constituted through the experience of ‘having a sexuality.’ Being a
sexual being, Foucault contends, such that one’s sexuality is considered an important
aspect of one’s self or identity, is an historical construction.
His goal in his later work, as I explore it, is to further his criticisms of the ways
in which institutional forces—through the State, psychiatry, the prison system—construct
the possibilities of what the self can be through what he calls power-knowledges. He
recognizes that what has been absent in his analyses of what he calls technologies of
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domination has been a way of approaching the seifs participation in such technologies.
Where the practices demanded by those systems through which legitimate recognition or
intelligibility are granted meet with those practices by which the self acts on and toward
itself, Foucault calls ‘govemmentality.’ He suggests in his later work that, because the
self is active in its own participation in technologies which produce it, it is capable of
resisting them. By engaging in practices in a conscious manner, such that we recognize
that our activities are constitutive ofwho and what we are, Foucault claims that we
practice a kind of caring for and about ourselves. This notion of care is critical as it is
that which ‘problematizes’ our actions such that we no longer consider them as
‘expressing' some natural self, but as ‘effecting’ or constructing a self, that may perhaps
seem to be ‘natural.’
This awareness of our actions as constitutive is complicated, I contend,
especially in relation to acts of self-knowing. How do we know that our acts make us
who we are if part of how they do so effects how we think about who we are and how
we are made. In other words, Foucault’s turn towards care seems to require a way for
the self to know itself, to be aware of itself as constructed. Certainly, Foucault is deeply
committed to rejecting a Cartesian privileged self who can know itself from a point
outside of itself, outside of its own experiences, practices, etc. This is the real point of
the self s care for the self: its practices are that which make it what it is, as for Foucault,
the self is more like an art object than an essence. Without a critical epistemology,
however, which figures the relation between the subject-I and the object-I in some way
other than transparency, we are again left with the problem of re-instating the subject-I
as at once unknowable and un-addressable. Thus despite his movement towards a
11
technology of the self, Foucault’s earlier critique of self-knowledge as a disciplinary
practice and of ‘desire’ as in effect, a tool of domination, his theory of care comes up
short. He does, I claim, assume a kind of epistemic relation between the self and its
becoming, i.e., self-awareness. Without critical attention to this assumed notion of self-
awareness, however, it is unclear what exactly Foucault is doing with care, leaving the
theory quite hampered.
I offer a reading a what I call ‘caring self-knowledge’ as a way to explore how
the self can, through a problematization of its claims to self-knowledge begin to address
the subject-I which is, because of its constitutive role in the production of the self, not
knowable as an object of certain knowledge. Such a caring self-knowing, I contend,
begins to open up possibilities for the self to know itself in a way that avoids both the
dogmatism and the scepticism of rationalism’s legacy. This caring self-knowledge, I
argue, offers Foucault’s critique a positive way for the self to engage in practices of self-
knowing which such that less subjected by and more an agent of its own knowing
practices. What is critical however, which I develop in the next chapter, is to practice
such caring self-knowing in a way which does not reify a natural identity about the self,
including that natural self that is assumed in such notions as authenticity. We do not
practice caring self-knowing in order to get in any way closer to our authentic selves.
For Foucault, this would be the most undermining practice—personally and politically.
Rather than avoid or overcome the notion of the unknowable of the subject-I, I try to use
this opacity as a way to resist the draw of the authentic and develop a more effective—
politically and aesthetically—notion of self-awareness.
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Citing Descartes practice of self-reflection through meditation, Chapter 5
explores my own relation to my self-knowledge, highlighting by example how it is that
one can address what is constitutively unknowable about the self. The presentation of
my narrative reflects what I consider throughout the dissertation as the split-self of self-
knowledge. The paradigm of this split self comes to me, via the empirical turn of Hume
(and the transcendental turn by Kant, an obvious absence in this project), through the
trope of identity. Aware of the critiques of self-knowledge posed by Foucault, I
endeavor to present a relational notion of self-knowledge that at once allows me to
claim a certain position or even status as a self-knower while it also allows me to
address that which is necessarily unknowable about my self. Despite Foucault’s
resolute rejection of the figure of the “desiring subject” as a subject position which
reduces the self to what he terms a “docile” subject, I nonetheless explore my “desire to
know as a means of making explicit to myself, or problematizing, those practices
which at once legitimize me and deligitimize me as an agent capable of knowing herself
differently.
Thus, I explore the notion of identity in general through the figure of ‘being
adopted’—a figuration that is heavily imbued with the concern for self-knowledge—
I
argue that we can begin to unpack both the ontological and the epistemological
assumptions of identity. As an ontological position, being adopted refers to being a self
whose identity is ‘from’ both one’s biological parents and one’s adopted parents. As an
epistemological position, however, being adopted refers to a self whose identity as
singular and coherent, can never be fully knowable. The meaning of adopted identity is
not reducible to either ‘origin.’ How the adopted self knows her identity is always
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implicated in both so that self-knowledge is always on-going, in process, never fully
available, partial. While the figure of the adopted self is often framed within a narrative
of un-certainty, I claim that refiguring identity in general as adopted pushes us beyond
the rationalist paradigm of certainty. As such, the unknowability of the self becomes
part of the meaning of identity rather than something which undermines the possibility
of self-knowledge.
Identity, analogized as adopted, thus, not only underscores how identity is both
substance and construction; it also offers a critique ofmodem epistemology which I
believe can redress the split-self involved in the problem of self-knowledge. Adopted
knowing reconceives the split or difference between the knowing and known self, not as
something to get over-through dogmatic or skeptical arguments-but as a relation
between different conceptions of self. Through figuring identity as adopted and self-
knowledge as adopted knowing, we can critique not only the mind/body split that is
foundational to the late-modem notion of self, but we can also address the knowing
self/known self split that haunts the problem of self-knowledge. This conceptualization
of identity as “adopted,” I argue, figures the split-self of self-knowledge as conceptually
prior to the mind/body split. Thus, ‘resolving’ this epistemological split, I urge, will
engender a more productive and coherent critique of identity in general and the
mind/body dualism in particular.
I close the dissertation by suggesting how addressing identity as adopted might
engender ways to normatively evaluate acts in terms of their implications for all
individuals’ pursuits of self-knowledge. I include as motivating such an ethical
evaluation, the importance of the desire for self-knowledge in terms of maintaining a
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kind of freedom for the self. The desire to know who we are, I assert, must be
protected. Such protection entails individuals having both the freedom to pursue the
productions-histories, meanings, contentions, stories, etc.-of their identities and the
freedomfrom being identified with a substantive self that leaves them no room for
difference, particularity, or change. The distinction between the knowing-self and the
knower-self, I urge, must be maintained; for it is on the basis of this distinction that we
can argue for a personal notion of self that, in its desirability and (partial) knowability,
can be revered and respected without assigning to it a definite, limited, or universalized
meaning.
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I know that I exist; the question is
what is this T that I know? 1
CHAPTER 2
CARTESIAN METAPHYSICS AND THE PROBLEM OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
Arriving at the correct perception of reality became a crucial issue in the 17th
Century. Intellectual and religious thought, affected by the revolutionary ideas of the
new science as well as the changes in notions of location and place resulting from the
‘age of discovery’ and the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, were in a state of
dramatic flux. As notions of political and religious authority were shifting, so too were
the understandings of the origins of such authority. More dependent on the mind of the
knower himself than on God or the (feudal) lord, knowledge became understood as a
correct correspondence between the thoughts of an individual and the world. How a
thinker approached his own thinking in relation to the world-that is, how he represented
it to himself—affected the accuracy of his thoughts. There was thus a conceptual shift
involved in terms of how knowledge was formed in the mind; no longer mediated
through church or king, the new model involved pursuing knowledge as in some sense
immediate. As thinking was considered to be acts of representing the world to the
individual mind, the thinker gained new responsibility in the production of knowledge.
While the authority of institutional systems were put into question, however, so the
certainty of knowledge based on the authority of the self became an issue. The threat of
a kind of subjectivism loomed, making sceptical critique more powerful. A critical
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concern in the 17th Century was how the individual could know, and how to relate these
knowledge claims to the worlds of science, religion, and industry. Just as new scientific
methods were being developed to test the ‘scientific’ knowledge of the world, so too
were methods being bom to prove that man qua individual could have certainty. Rene
Descartes wanted this certainty about his own thinking. To fight the rise in skeptical
thought, Descartes wanted a foundation of certainty upon which a First Philosophy
could be built.
Descartes' focus on the individual as an authoritative source of its own
knowledge can be found in the opening of the Meditations as well as in his Search for
Method. In this latter text we can see Descartes’ project as intending both to provide
science with a foundational grounding in reason, and to enable the individual thinker to
claim a kind of autonomy through his/her practice of reason. He offers a description of
his project and its promise, writing,
I shall bring to light the true riches of our souls, opening up to each of us
the means whereby we can find within ourselves, without any help from
anyone else, all the knowledge which we may need for the conduct of
life, and the means of using it in order to acquire all the most abstruse
items of knowledge which the human mind is capable of possessing.
(CSM II 400, AT X 496).
Not only does Descartes’ method figure the individual as capable of discovering
such knowledge autonomously, but he also clearly suggests that all individuals as
human beings are so capable. Thus present here are the seeds of Enlightenment
humanism—individual autonomy that is also democratically distributed to all. Through
the correct practice or use of our reason then, we can access “all the knowledge we may
need” as all of this knowledge is available within each one of us.
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There is thus an interesting democratic ideal at work here regarding the
individual s access to knowledge since each individual is endowed with both the same
knowledge and the same means for the discovery of even the most abstruse knowledge.
As that knowledge is present in the individual in a way that he/she can access through
his/her own thought, Descartes’ method must provide a way that the individual can turn
inward, to find within himself the knowledge that is in some sense already there. 2
Descartes work thus reflects an intellectual shift away from external authority
and toward internal authority. Viewing philosophy as scientific, Descartes attempts to
prove both that an accurate representation of the world is possible, and that philosophy
can be used to guarantee such accuracy. In his quest for a foundation of certainty,
Descartes presents in The Meditations
,
both a First Philosophy and a philosophical
method (his method of doubt and the logical argumentation—cogito reasoning—it
engenders) which can become the means for such a foundation. Perhaps because of the
ways in which the self as knower had become a crucial issue in the 17th Century,
Descartes’ own method involves both an examination of the self as knower and a kind
of narrative of his own thinking on the matter. How he comes to his thoughts becomes
part of the thinking (and the exposition) itself. Hence, the self and its relation to its own
knowledge figure importantly in Descartes' analysis.
As Descartes’ goal is to ascertain the certainty of knowledge, to put forth a First
Philosophy upon which other philosophies, as well as science itself, can be grounded, he
needs to show that his philosophy can provide other systems of knowledge with
foundational certainty. His argument thus involves using his method to show that
certainty could be proven as possible. His argument relies upon finding first that about
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which he could have no doubt . 3 Descartes approaches the problem of how he can know,
how he can find a way to have certainty, through the problem of self-knowledge. How
to know himselj with certainty becomes a crucial issue for his larger argument
.
4
The
crux of this issue, however, is not only to discover what he is, but also to find a way to
have such self-knowledge that is certain, that was without a doubt. He thus has to
consider not only what the self is thought to be-a self-evidencing substance-but also
the way in which he has knowledge of this self. In short, this self has to be known (to
itself) immediately, that is, without mediation.
Thus Descartes' project in the Meditations involves using self-knowledge as a
means of providing his philosophy with an example of an idea which can be shown to
be incorrigible. As Descartes wants to conclude that the self can have certain
knowledge through its ideas, he must show that it can have at least one idea which can
be proven as unable to be in error. He attempts to show that the seifs knowledge of
itself, its idea of itself, is such an incorrigible idea. What this demands then is that he
conceive of self-awareness as that which allows the self to be able both to know itself
directly and to know that it knows itself as such. Self-awareness must be that which
enables the self able to know that its idea of itself is true. As such, I offer, self-
awareness cannot be self-reflection as we ordinarily understand it, since self-reflection
is corrigible and Descartes’ foundational project requires a kind of self-awareness which
guarantees its certainty. It must render the idea the self has of itself an idea that cannot
be otherwise.
As we see in the Second Meditation
,
then Descartes turns toward self-knowledge
as his example of knowing something beyond a doubt. As such, he must provide an
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argument which secures that the knowledge he has of himself, “this knowledge of
myself which I possess,” is unmistakably true.( 19/28) Moving from the cogito to the
sum res cogitans
,
Descartes' project involves not only claiming with certainty the
existence of the self
-that I am-but also claiming with certainty the knowledge the self
has of this existence-that I know this T that I am. Thus, a critical feature of Descartes'
project, the problem of self-knowledge becomes a problem concerning not just how the
I can know itself, but also how it can know that its knowledge of itself is certain. In
short, to achieve the certain knowledge he desires, Descartes must make it unmistakable
that the I that he claims to know, his idea of his self, is the I that he is. Achieving this
certainty will provide his project not only with an example of such knowing, the
Archimedian point he is looking for, but it will also provide him with the method of
knowing that by which he can secure certainty in general.
His resolution to the problem of self-certainty thus involves presenting the
ontology of the self to be such that awareness of it on it will evidence its nature
immediately to the mind. What the self is must be such that it is capable of being aware
of its nature without impediment. What it is must make it capable of immediate self-
awareness, such that this awareness results in an idea the self has of itself which cannot
be wrong. Thus, the self s conception of itself as having such an ontology must be
immediately evidential. Descartes attempts to resolve the problem of knowing the self
with certainty by conceiving the nature of the self as pure thinking, res cogitans. By
conceiving of the ontology of the I as a thinking thing (or, as some translate res
cogitans
,
as a conscious thing), Descartes’ knowledge of the ‘I, ’-“the T that I know”-
cannot seemingly be in error.
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Descartes engenders the self s capacity for immediate self-awareness by making
the self a purely rational substance or thinking thing, sum res cogitans. My interest is
not in arguing that the self is not such a substance, per se\ rather, I am interested in how
conceiving of the self as a thinking thing seems to undermine rather than support
Descartes’ need for an incorrigible idea. But rather than satisfying his demand for
certainty, the argument he develops to prove the notion of the self as a thinking thing
seems instead to make such satisfaction impossible. What I would like to focus on in
this chapter is how Descartes reaches what seems to be an impasse in the Second
Meditation, through his presentation of the wax example, he argues that to know the
nature of anything (outside of himself he states), requires the presence of the mind.
Knowing something’s nature cannot be doubted because it comes to us not through the
senses or the imagination but by an act of the mind. Thus any idea of something’s
nature involves the presence of this act of mind. While it could be argued that an idea is
a result of the mind having acted
,
it seems that the idea we have of something’s nature
presumes the presence of this active mind.
The big question of the Second Meditation then is not “is the self a thinking
thing” but does conceiving of the self as a thinking thing satisfy the need in Descartes'
foundational philosophy for an idea which can be shown to be incorrigible and which
can thus generate the criteria for assessing the truth of the idea of our judgments. Does
conceiving of the self as a thinking substance, in other words, engender a way for the
self to be aware of itself immediately, without impediment, without any chance of it
being wrong? What Descartes needs to do in order to have self-knowledge provide self-
certainty, I argue, is to eliminate any possibility that the self s awareness of itself could
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be wrong. Descartes' requirement that self-knowledge be incorrigible requires that self-
awareness be such that any act of self-reflection whereby the self considers itself is an
act of immediate awareness. Self-knowledge can come from introspection, but
introspection must not maintain a difference between a self trying to know itself and a
self which it knows. To satisfy Descartes' need for incorrigibility, the knowledge the
self has of itself through introspection must render not only what it knows as unable to
be in error, but moreover it must renders the relation between the self and itself one of
transparency.
Many commentators have discussed sum res cogitans in terms of the way in
which it engages the mind/body split in Descartes, i.e., how it seems to set up the mind
to be exclusively rational or cognitive as opposed to the body . 5 Others have analyzed it
in terms of the way in which it sets up the mind as transparent to itself. While I am
interested in both of these issues, my focus is on what the transparency of the mind
could be understood as doing or enabling and what the mind/body split might depend
upon; for while the mind/body split or distinction seems to rely upon sum res cogitans
,
I wonder if the sum res cogitans argument doesn’t itself contain a split that is not
reducible to the mind/body split . 6 In other words, as providing immediate self-
awareness, the res cogitans argument seems to be trying to make indistinguishable the
two I’s in Descartes' question, “what is this ‘I’ that I know?” But since there are
possible two I’s here—an I who is knowing and an I who is known, Descartes may be
begging the question to make them indistinguishable.
By rendering the nature of the I thinking thing-ness, Descartes' self-knowledge
can seemingly overcome the conceptual gap that divides this split-I. By making the
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nature of the I thinking, Descartes’ self can know itself with certainty. This split,
however, is a result of the differentiation between the knowing self and the known self,
the self that exists and the self that is known, that seems constituted by the Cartesian
rationalist project itself. This split is necessary
,
I claim, due to the demands of the
Rationalist project itself. While I do not fully develop this critique here, it is my
position that Rationalism engenders a split between the I-subject and the I-object as it
locates the problem of attaining epistemological certainty within the limits of mental
activity alone
.
7 As a splitting of the self, this differentiation engenders the problem of
self-knowledge as a problem, i.e., how can the self know itself if/when it is thematized
through these two figurations of self. How can I know that the ‘I’ I am knowing or
thinking myself to be, is in fact, the self I really am? The (rationalist) framing of the
question—in other words, “what is this ‘I’ that I know?”—already figures the two I’s as
possibly distinct.
Thus, within this paradigm, self-knowledge as knowledge ofmy nature (as a
thinking thing) must be that which can contend with this apparent split . 8 Self-
knowledge must be that which presents the self with knowledge of its own ontology—
what it is—and with the knowledge that this knowledge is correct. I must have
knowledge of myself and this knowledge must be self-evident. It is Descartes'
presentation and supposed resolution of this split through the figure of the seifs nature
as a thinking thing that we examine. By conceiving of the nature of the self as a
thinking thing, Descartes tries to make the knowledge the self has of its self an
immediate intuition, and therefore, clear and distinct. His focus in the Second
Meditation
,
is to present not what he is, per se
,
but to present self-knowledge as an
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immediate intuition such that he can provide his argument an example of a proposition
which is incorrigible. The certainty that such incorrigibility gives him will provide him
with the criteria of clarity and distinctness he needs.
Descartes is trying to make identical the self that he is and the self that he knows
himself to be by making his nature, his essence, be the res cogitans. His resolution to
the problem of self-knowledge implies a model of self-identity between the I who
knows and the I who is known. In short, I can be certain that I am what I know I am by
knowing my nature. Not only then does Descartes substantialize the self, but this turn
towards self-as-thinking-substance also entails an act of self-identity which enables one
to not only achieve self-knowledge, but also to know the self with certainty
.
9
This
certainty seems to establish the ‘I’ as fully known, and the knowing I as capable of
knowing itself without the impediment of doubt . 10 Hence the ‘idea’ I have of myself
can become later (in the Third Meditation ) a clear and distinct idea .
11
What this proves however, is not that I know myself as I am knowing
,
i.e., as a
knower in the act of knowing, but rather, that I know that what I think I am is what I am.
What the identity relation seems to be a relation of then is not the I knowing (the subject
I) and the I known (the object I), but the I known and the idea of the I (the ‘I’) that the
thinking or knowing I has. This suggests that self-knowledge within the Cartesian
rationalist framework entails a kind of ‘blind spot’: if the self does know some thing
about itself with certainty, it does not seem in this framework that it can know itself
while knowing. Two aspects of Descartes' argument seem to engender this blindspot:
his notion of what an idea is and his requirements for certainty. As we shall see, any
idea of something’s nature involves the presence of an active thinking mind; this
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includes the idea of the nature of the self as well. And, as the requirements for certainty
involve clarity and distinctness, it does not seem that the self engaged in the act of
thinking, even when having an idea of itself, is thus present clearly and distinctly. In
other words, the subject I is never able to know itself in a way that satisfies the
conditions of certainty for it is always involved, for Descartes, in the production of any
idea of something and as such can never be identical to it. The producer of the idea, the
self cannot be identical to the idea. And as the subject I is actively part of the
production of the idea of itself, the idea can never fully capture-or grasp, as Descartes
writes-the subject I. Any idea the subject I has of itself-even of it as an active,
thinking subject-entails a productive relation between the subject I and the idea, thus
marking part of the I as not included in (and always outside of) this idea. The idea can
never grasp this active I as that I is always posited as part of the conceiving of the idea—
the idea itself relies upon a distinction between it and the subject I. Therefore they can
never be identical. Thus the subject I cannot have a clear and distinct idea of itself. 13
If it is the case that self-knowledge for Descartes involves a blindspot such that
the self cannot know itself while it is knowing, i.e., as a subject I, then we must ask:
does Descartes' project provide self-knowledge as self-certainty? Does his knowledge
of his object I constitute self-certainty? And if it does (for him at least), then how does
it deal with this blindspot?
14 By conceptualizing the self as a thinking thing Descartes
attempts to know with certainty that the idea he has of his self is in fact what he is.
What he ‘sees’ with certainty is that the I that he is is this T that he has an idea of. This
seeing is made possible, I contend, not because it makes the self completely visible to
itself, but because it renders its own ‘blindspot’ m-visible. The knowing or subject I
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becomes invisible as it knows itself as the object I. The identity relation between the
idea of the object I that the subject I has and the object I (the self known) thus produces
self-transparency through a kind of self-opacity by rendering the unknowable subject I
invisible, hidden behind what seems to be certainty regarding the whole (or not split)
self. While making the I a thinking thing seems to offer the self self-knowledge, this
move in fact makes it impossible that it could know itself as a subject of knowledge.
Descartes' focus in the Second Meditation is on not only the I as it exists but also
on the T as it is conceived of by the I . 15 This focus engenders a kind of split-self which
Descartes must contend with. By conceiving of self-knowledge as knowledge of this
nature, it thus functions as a means of uniting or making an identity relation between the
I and the I. Descartes tries to overcome the split in his sum res cogitans argument
through (a) substantializing the self as a thinking thing, which conceptualizes the nature
of the I as a thinking thing, and (b) constructing the relations between the Fs as ones of
transparency and identity. The metaphysics of the res cogitans claims to accomplish
this because it assumes the self as rational substance is transparent to itself such that it
can be identical to what it knows itself as, what its idea of itself is. It can have self-
knowledge as self-certainty . 16
However, rather than discovering a method whereby the certainty ofjudgments
can be obtained, Descartes' project of developing a First Philosophy engenders a model
of unstable self-identity and hence fails to provide certain self-knowledge . 17 This
unstable self is presented in Descartes' argument as capable of self-knowledge. But its
failure to achieve it is characteristic of the modem subject, whose model of such self-
identity then generates the desire for such knowledge. In other words, since Descartes
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has inadvertently posited the subject as a split-self in search of identity, his project of
achieving certain self-knowledge, which has been taken up by the modem subject, has
caused subjects to desire such certain self-knowledge-and hence identity-to overcome
the split which is constituted by such a project .' 8 Because the split-self in this model of
self-knowledge cannot be overcome, the knowing subject is left choosing between
falsely believing he knows himself through knowing his substance or (forever) seeking
this self-identity (relation) that will secure his knowledge of his thinking- or knowing-I.
Rather than try to resolve the split self of Descartes' project, my goal is to
suggest instead that this split (should) remain aporetic. Rationalist attempts at closing
the gap between the I’s or overcoming the split render a philosophical subject whose
instability is present and yet denied. It is unstable because its achievement of certainty
(and political legitimacy, a point I cannot develop here) is at once required and
impossible as it depends upon a kind of self-knowledge that the subject is unable to
produce. A more productive and coherent philosophy of the subject can be achieved by
announcing and addressing the split-I legacy of rationalism and the epistemological
instability it engenders. By addressing the instabilities of the subject, such a philosophy
of the subject, can offer ways (a) to analyze how the epistemological issues involved in
self-knowledge have both metaphysical as well as political effects, and (b) to begin to
unpack the ways in which these effects have been reiterated in contemporary notions of
and desire for identity .
19 By focusing on the instability of the I (or the anxiety involved
in self-knowledge), in other words, it becomes possible to thematize self-knowledge in
terms of the seifs attempts to overcome its own (constitutive) instability. Thus, I will
suggest how the gap between the split I’s (a gap I see as thematizable through the desire
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to know) might be used differently. Self-knowledge can be claimed without resorting to
an identity-relation between the I’s such as is present in the Cartesian notion of one’s
nature. Furthermore, the aporia of self-knowledge that the Cartesian tradition generates
should be maintained since it is both constitutive of the modem self, and necessary for
theorizing political change and resistance regarding this self. 20
Descartes' Method
The goal of Descartes Meditations is to prove through logical argument that one
can have certainty about one’s knowledge of the world. Through his method of doubt,
whereby he renders uncertain anything he can have a single doubt about, Descartes
discovers that the one thing he can, for the sake of argument, have certainty about is the
fact that he exists. This gives him existential knowledge, as he can assert without doubt
that he exists. But as his project in the Meditations is to provide a foundational First
Philosophy, he needs this indubitable claim to generate an incorrigible proposition
(which in turn, he can use to generate his criteria forjudging true propositions, i.e.,
clarity and distinctness). Such incorrigibility requires not only that he knows that he
exists; but he also must know what it is that he is. Thus he must show how his idea of
himself is impossible to be otherwise, that is, how it is an immediate intuition. Thus
Descartes’ argument rests upon his resolution of the problem of self-knowledge. He
must be able to claim that his idea of his self cannot be wrong. His claim to self-
knowledge must be able to survive his method of doubt, it must be incorrigible, and
moreover, it must be able to provide him with his criteria of certainty.
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One would think that the problem of self-knowledge-involving such questions
as, who the I is who knowing and who is the I (or me) who is being known, and how do
we know they are the same-would be full of opportunities for doubt. It seems a sticky
problem upon which to build an argument for certainty. But, as Descartes’ concern is
really with presenting a logical argument that has no gaps, no possibilities for error,
knowledge of the self is, in fact, perfect for his project. While the problem of self-
knowledge involves the problem of the split between the two selves of knowing, of
distinguishing the knowing from the known self, the resolution to the problem gives him
the logical seamlessness that he seeks. For as he argues throughout his Replies to his
objectors, his is not a syllogistic argument. “And when we become aware that we are
thinking things, he writes in the Second Set ofReplies, “this is a primary notion which
is not derived by means of any syllogism. When someone says ‘I am thinking, therefore
I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism,
but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind.”(100,
140)
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Methodological Doubt
In Meditations Descartes sets out to find a way to resolve what appears to be his
paradox of uncertainty: if he does not have certainty, then how can he decide what is
uncertain? Instead ofjudging what is certain, he begins with a weaker judgment,
namely what is doubtful, this is what is known as his methodological doubt. “Anything
which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly
false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, or, if nothing
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else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty.” (16, 24) Using his
method of doubt he proposes to find either that which is certain, or that there is only the
certainty of uncertainty.
We see in the First Meditation, however, that such a distinction between what is
certain and uncertain when all seems uncertain, is highly problematic. If all is a dream,
or a deception, how can Descartes knowfor certain, that it is so? “As I think about this
more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being
awake can be distinguished from being asleep .”(13, 79) How can he tell that something
is unreal or a deception, if in fact all he knows comes to him through dreams or by the
actions of an evil demon? By what criteria can he make the claim that he does in fact
know something that cannot be a deception, that cannot be untrue? How can he even
know certain from uncertain, if all can be doubted? He needs to find, he suggests, an
Archimedian point, if he to find out what he can know, what he can base his philosophy
on such that he can establish something in the sciences that would be stable and
lasting. ( 17, 18) Finding this point will not only give him something about which he can
be certain such that there is not only uncertainty, but moreover, in a kind of Platonic
move, he can use this point of certainty as that by which he can know certainty, that is,
as that by which he can identify a mark differentiating certain from uncertain. 22
This epistemological Archimedian point, then, is that about which he cannot
have any doubt. He must use the doubting method for, as he is looking for the criterion
by which he can be able to know certain from uncertain, he cannot merely claim or
know something as z^-certain out of belief or from previous experience. Rather than
knowing something is uncertain, then, he must only decide if it is doubtable. He has
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eliminated as possible certainties, thus, any thoughts that come to him from his senses,
any that could be part of a dream, and any that could originate from the hands of a
demonic deceiver. All these thoughts, all this which he has previously thought of as
knowledge, can be doubted.
He thus discovers that there is something “about which doubt is impossible.”(13,
19) While he may in fact be dreaming or being deceived, he cannot doubt that he exists.
He cannot not exist
;
As he thinks thoughts, he exists. Even if he is being deceived,
there is the fact that he exists as deceived. “.
. . I must finally conclude that this
proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or
conceived in my mind.” ( 1 7, 26)
I am a Thinking Thing
As indicated here, Descartes' certainty of his existence is specifically tied to the
activity of thinking. I am sure of the proposition “I exist,” he claims, whenever I “put
forward” the proposition or conceive it; that is, whenever I think it. Many critics have
commented that Descartes' existence could be proven through any act. 23 If I am
walking, I must exist. If I am daring to eat a peach, I must exist. While it could be
countered that one could be dreaming of doing such activities that does not get to the
heart of Descartes' argument. It could be presented, for instance, that even when I am
thinking about my existence I could be dreaming. Descartes would reply that even I am
dreaming, if in this dream I am thinking about myself existing, then I exist. Why is
thinking about his own existence so essential to providing him with certainty? How
does such thinking guarantee certainty about his existence? And is it only when I think
31
about the proposition that I exist that I can know that I exist, or would other thoughts
evidence this claim?
While it might not be doubtable that he exists, what does it mean that he exists?
How can he claim to know, for certain, that he exists, if he does not know what he is
that is existing? He first presents the fact that he exists; he then must show in his
argument that he understands this proposition. “But I do not yet have sufficient
understanding of what this T is, that now necessarily exists ”(17, 25) His senses and
his evil deceiver could cause him to think something was knowledge, was certain, when
it was not. Hence, Descartes needs to be certain that he is not mistaken. While it is
necessary that he exists, he must be sure he is not mistaken in terms of what this
existence is. “So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be
this ‘I’, and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the
most certain and evident of all.” (17, 25).
While he dismisses as doubtable those things he knows through his perceptions
of them-either through false information from his senses, or false thoughts at the hands
of the evil deceiver-his presentation of his doubts about what he is seem to involve a
different kind of possible mistake. He cannot be either his body or his soul as
previously understood, as both of these can be doubted. If he is being deceived by the
‘malicious deceiver,’ then he can doubt that he is his body. If he is dreaming, then he
can doubt that he is (his previous notion of) a soul-defined in terms of the acts involved
in nutrition, movement, and perception—as he has had the experience of doing such
things while dreaming.
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What he cannot doubt, what he cannot separate from who he is, from his being,
is the fact that he is thinking. As he writes,
Thinking? At last I have discovered it-thought; this alone is inseparable
from me. I am, I exist-that is certain. But for how long? For as long as
I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I
should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything
except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing
that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason-
words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that
I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of thing?
As I have just said-a thinking thing.(18, 27)
He has concluded here that he is a thinking thing because he cannot separate
thinking from being, from what he is. As his first claim was that it was necessarily the
case that as he thought so he existed, cogito ergo sum (though he does not propose this
in this form in the Meditations), his second claim here is that as he exists, so he is a
thinking thing, sum res cogitans. He is what he cannot be deceived about. But what
does it mean to be a thinking thing? What is a thinking thing? How does he know
himself as a thinking thing?
Descartes then moves in his argument to show how it is that he cannot be
mistaken about being a thinking thing. His two possible mistakes involve first, that he
could be wrong about what he thinks his self is (how it is distinct), and second, that he
could be wrong about the fact that it is the same self (that it has identity, that it is the
same I in different instances, doing different thinking). How he answers the first
problem raises the spectre of the second, as it problematizes the very issue of how the
self knows itself.
As he cannot doubt that he exists, he must be able to know what he is without
doubt. “I know that I exist,” he writes. “[T]he question is, what is this ‘I’ that I know?”
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(18, 27) There are, it seems, two questions implied here, however. He begins not by
answering the first, “what is this ‘I’?” but “what is this T that I knowT While he states
that he will use his imagination to consider what else he might be, he is also beginning
to present how it is that he knows himself. Although he is concerned with the ontology
of the self, he also must present the what that he knows
,
the what that is this self-
knowledge.
He begins his presentation of what the T is that he knows, by distinguishing that
which is known from that which is imagined. That he knows his being is a thinking
thing is not simply an example of imagining himself as such. What is at stake is not the
difference between thinking and imagining as acts of the mind, per se, but rather the
issue of how and what such acts allow him to know himself to be. He needs to
articulate how his knowledge that he is a thinking thing is not produced by an act of
self-reflection7
4
Hence, he needs to distinguish a kind of self-knowledge that is a
reflecting on the self, such that the self is an object of imagination, and a knowledge of
self that is not. He wants to make clear that the self which he knows is not in fact an
image at all; it is not a representation of himself perceived by himself. 25
Why not let the knowledge one has of oneself be one’s self-image? What is at
stake if our self-knowledge is a product of our imagination? If how he knew his self
were via imagination, he could doubt what he knew, because imagining involves
producing images, and images are doubtable, that is their relationship to that which they
are images of is doubtable. As imagined, they are images of things of which the ‘I’ is
yet unaware, which the I thus invents, and which take the form of corporeal things (in
the mind). On all three points, they can be doubted. Taking these in reverse order then,
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each concern Descartes raises about images makes it clear that self-knowledge cannot
be certain and be an image. As an image takes the form of a corporeal thing, it can, like
knowledge based on the senses, be based on a mistaken perception. As invented, then,
the image cannot not provide us with the Archimedian point we are looking for, for we
cannot know if it is an invention that might in fact be true or not. And, as an image of
something which I do not yet know, that I am unaware of, my being cannot be based on
what I do not know, for again, how could I know whether I am or am not that thing? “If
the ‘I’ is understood strictly as we have been taking it,” Descartes writes, “then it is
quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things whose existence I am as yet
unaware; so it cannot depend on any of the things which I invent in my imagination.
And this very word ‘invent’ shows me my mistake.” (18-19, 27-28)
He concludes that he cannot know his self through his imagination. But this is
not only because these images are doubtable. Descartes writes, “I thus realize that none
of the things that the imagination enables me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge
of myself which I possess, and that the mind must therefore be most carefully diverted
from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible.” (19, 28) I
have added emphasis to Descartes’ use of ‘things’ because it seems that what makes
imagination an unreliable vehicle for self-certainty is the fact that it represents that
which it imagines as a thing, as a kind of object. It is not only that such things are
inventions, and hence not real, but as they are things, they are separable from thinking,
separable from the self. What is clear and indubitable is that imagining is part of
thinking. “For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of my imagination are
real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part ofmy
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thinking. (19, 29) The objects Descartes perceives or imagines he perceives, he truly
seems to be perceiving, but might not be so. It is the act of “‘having a sensory
expenence which is inseparable from the I. The conclusion thus seems to be that what
Descartes knows himself to be he knows not through sensing or imagining. In addition,
this T that he knows is not the content of this thinking about it. It is not, like an image,
an object of his thought which could be false and/or could be separated from his
thinking. What the T is, is not known, in fact, through examining the contents of his
thoughts.
So how does he know it? By his own confession, he “cannot stop thinking”
about how those things which we know through images, which are so easily doubtable,
are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling ‘I’ which cannot be pictured
in the imagination. And yet, it is surely surprising that I should have a more distinct
grasp of things which I realize are doubtful, unknown, and foreign to me, than I have of
that which is true and known-my own self.”(20, 29)26
Descartes presents at this point in his narrative/argument the puzzle of how to
know himself when he has previously argued that the self cannot be known like other
things are known. He is also puzzled here because it seems easier to know things which
are outside of him. As he is himself, that self should be most “true and known,” but it is
not. Why? He suggests that this inability to know himself more distinctly comes from a
kind of epistemological laziness. “But I see what it is: my mind enjoys wandering off
and will not submit to being restrained within the bounds of truth.”(20, 29-30) As the
problem thus, is the habit of thinking, he needs to—as he reminds us often—to change his
thinking.
27
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The Wax Example
In order then, to know his self distinctly, he must know what it is to know
something distinctly. How does he, or people, commonly think of things that are
understood as such, he asks. The problem, as he finds it, is that epistemological laziness
tempts us to see what is not distinct as distinct, what is uncertain as certain, and what is,
finally, false as true. So, we can believe that something is distinctly what it is (and is
what it is over time, i.e., has identity), but be mistaken about its being. His senses, for
example, tell him that the wax in front of him is distinct due to its scent, shape, color,
etc. But when it begins to melt, those features (of its body) are no longer present. “But
does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one
thinks otherwise. So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness?
Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses.”(20, 30)
Descartes uses the example of the wax as a way to discuss not how we know
things distinctly, but how we are mistaken in how we think we do so. Finding out that
we in fact do not know the being of things through our senses suggests two things: first,
that we do not necessarily know bodily objects in some sense better than we know our
selves—we are in fact mistaken in terms of how we have understood such distinctness;
and second, by recognizing the error of our epistemological ways, we can recognize
how well we can distinctly grasp the notion of the self.
Hence, as we are able to admit that the wax is the same, and able to recognize
that the knowledge we had about the wax does not explain that sameness-despite-
change, there must be another way of knowing the wax. The wax itself has a nature
which can be known despite whatever changes the wax may go through. It is not
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dependent on these (second order qualities) of the wax itself. Nor is the knowledge of it
a product of the imagination, as Descartes argues that he cannot imagine all of the
possible changes and as such verify that it is still the same wax. 28 Instead of perceiving
the nature of the wax with the senses or with the imagination, it is, Descartes writes,
“perceived by my mind alone,” he states.(21, 37)
“But what is this wax which is perceived by the mind alone?” (Or “which can be
conceived only by the understanding or the mind” [French version]?) (21,37) Here,
Descartes is inquiring not only about the wax, and its nature, but also about the way in
which the mind can grasp such nature.
. ,[T]he perception I have of it is a case of. . .
purely mental scrutiny.”(21, 37) His perception of the nature of the wax is a perception
not based on empirical knowledge—not on his senses nor on his imagining the object
with features similar those known through the senses. Instead, he is perceiving the
nature of the object, “the wax itself,” in a way which cannot be doubted. While one
might (habitually) mistake the reason or cause of one’s belief as the senses, such as
vision, Descartes claims that what he is really using when he sees what something really
is in itself, is his faculty ofjudgment.(21, 32)29
What is at stake here is that such a nature is not evidenced through the senses,
but through the mind’s perception of it through its judgment. As such, the nature of
something is only perceivable by Descartes through his ‘purely mental activity.’
“[W]hen I distinguish the wax from its outward forms-take the clothes off, as it were,
and consider it naked-then although my judgment may still contain errors, at least my
perception now requires a human mind.”(22, 32) By using the correct method of
thinking—of separating out what can be separated from the wax, by fully “concentrating
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on what the wax is”- Descartes can know the nature of the wax, its inward form,
stripped of the dressings provided by mistaking sensible features for certain knowledge.
This correct method of thinking then, can get a grasp of the nature of a thing.
Does this include the mind or self itself? “What, I ask, is this T which seems to
perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my awareness ofmy own self is not merely much
truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and
evident.”(22, 33) If Descartes can know the nature of the wax, how can he not know the
nature of his self? What is the method by which he knows the wax itself with pure
mental activity? If knowing a nature only requires pure mental activity, then he can
surely know his own self. As the different features of an object do not affect the
grasping of its nature, Descartes seems to hold that the mental activity by which one
grasps the nature of a thing would be the same no matter what the thing: “the result that
I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside
me.”(22, 33) Descartes can thus judge that something exists, that it is, not by his
perception of it, but by his understanding of it. Only the mental act of understanding is
needed to perceive that something exists. Descartes writes:
now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the
faculty of the imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this
perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their
being understood; and in this view I know plainly that I can achieve an
easier and more evident perception of mind than of anything else.(22-23,
34)
Knowing the Thinking I
But isn’t there a problem with the above? If the perception of a nature requires
the human mind then how is Descartes to get a grasp of the mind itself, of its nature? Is
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he splitting the self into the thinking self and this faculty ofjudgment? It does not seem
so. Instead it seems that what Descartes is trying to set up here at this point in the
Meditations is that certain knowledge can come from the mind itself without the senses
or the imagination. The distinctness of something— its being, its existence—can be
known through the understanding. What Descartes has proven then by the end of the
Second Meditation is that as one perceives the existence of something through the
understanding then he should certainly be able to easily and certainly perceive his own
existence. Hence, we are to conclude perhaps, that self-knowledge is not the perception
of the self but of the understanding knowing itself through itself Descartes here seems
to assume it is self-evident that the understanding is part of the self. We begin to sense,
then, the need for the self to be self-evidencing, for it to be transparent to itself. 0 The
foundational certainty of self-knowledge, as the understanding knowing itself through
itself, is a pure intuition.
“I know myself as a thinking thing”
The question of whether Descartes' example of knowledge of the wax is an
adequate analogy for self-knowledge is a tricky one. Perhaps as objects of perception
the wax and the I are similarly perceived. Perhaps the wax example shows, in effect,
that how the self is aware of itself is always indirectly, through an idea, so that the I
knows the self in the same way as it knows the wax, as an idea via the understanding.
And maybe this would be enough if Descartes did not at the end of the Second
Meditation direct his interrogation toward the I (who is the subject) perceiving the wax.
(“What, I ask, is this ‘I’ which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly ?”) And perhaps
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we could even overlook this questioning regarding the subject perceiving the wax if
Descartes did not in the next paragraph conclude: “my awareness of my own self is not
merely much truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more
distinct and evident.” 22,33 The problem of the Second Meditation I think is this: How
can Descartes show that his perception of himself that is through an idea is in fact a
direct, immediate, self-evident intuition? How can he present an idea of his ‘I’ as clear
and distinct? What is at stake?
And how does the wax example fit into this presentation? Clearly the wax
example must serve a purpose in Descartes' argument regarding how the mind is better
known than the body, the point of the meditation according to the chapter title. I want
to consider how the wax example helps Descartes develop the certainty that he seeks
regarding his knowledge of his mind, or self, particularly as that certainty is developed
through the vehicle of self-awareness. 31 I think the wax example offers Descartes a way
to approach (and ‘resolve’) the problematic of self-awareness that defines his project. I
see this problematic as follows: As he is using self-awareness as his medium for
discovering an idea about which he can be absolutely certain, the idea of the/his self that
he has must be able to account for not only the self that he is aware of but also the self
that is being aware. In other words, for the idea of his self to be absolutely certain (i.e.,
clear and distinct) it must be unable to be false. Therefore, there can be no unknown
aspect of the self which could make the idea false. As such, the idea must accomplish a
kind of self-knowledge that is complete as it necessarily includes the subject self that is
aware and the object self that the subject is aware of. This ‘inclusion’ means that the
idea of the self cannot leave open the possibility that the self could be otherwise. It is in
41
fact a kind of logical exclusion or a kind of negation. The idea (as expressed in a claim
that is a performative as we will see below) negates the possibility that there is
something left out, something it cannot reach, something that is not automatically
present and evident and immediate in the idea itself
.
32
It is with intent that I use the word ‘accomplish’ in regards to the idea of the self
I think that what Descartes reaches at the end of the Second Meditation is the
performative that he needs, that gives his claim the certainty required. I think that the
wax example offers him the last piece he needs so that he can revisit the sum res
cogitans argument, and reveal the idea of himself as a thinking thing as clear and
distinct. The wax example thus helps resolve the problem that comes from his reliance
on self-awareness as the medium through which he can find his primary certainty.
The wax example comes up when it does to help re-problematize the presence of
the subject-I after Descartes has presented through his argument of doubt that he is a
thinking thing. I offer that Descartes uses the wax example both to reveal the presence
of both the mind that is required in any perception, and to highlight the T who is doing
the perceiving. Once these parts of perception have been made visible through the wax
example, Descartes can go back to his problem of knowing the self through self-
awareness and (attempt to) resolve it.
I exist and I am a thinking thing
What is at issue for Descartes is how to grasp what it is that he is as a
thinking thing thinking. Methodological doubt has pushed him to claim that all he can
be sure of is that he is a thinking thing, that thinking cannot be separated from him; his
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existence while he is thinking cannot be doubted. It could be that he only exists while
he is thinking, he says; he does not know. “Thought alone is inseparable from me. 1
am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as 1 am thinking. For it could
be that were I totally to cease from thinking, 1 should totally cease to exist.” His belief
that he exists is true whenever “put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”
We can sum up Descartes' argument about the knowing self as follows:
( 1 ) I am thinking
(2) When I am thinking I exist
Therefore
(3) I exist
(4) I know I exist only when I am thinking
(5) If I am thinking I am at least a thinking thing
Therefore (by 1 and 5)
(6) I am at least a thinking thing33
Thus the truth of his claim that he exists is self-evidential. But what of his claim
that this I “which is real and which truly exists” is a thinking thing? (18, 27) While he
necessarily exists, there could be doubt, he poses, about his knowledge of his I, how he
perceives himself. What he has known himself to be before no longer holds up under
methodological doubt. Nor do images he can conjure or “invent” of himself. These, too
can be doubted as they are copies of corporeal things, perceptions of which can be
wrong. “So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this
T, and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the most
certain and evident of all.” ( 1 7, 25) He must be certain of this I, of what it is. This
certainty will be produced not simply by knowing his true self, but also by knowing--
and this his larger project in the Meditations— the method is whereby such
certainty can be achieved. This method entails only admitting what is true: “At present
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I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict
sense only a thing that thinks.” (18, 27)34 And what is true must be that which is
completely known, i.e., which does not include that which he does not know (or cannot
know): “I know that I exist; the question is, what is this ‘I’ that I know? If the T is
understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it
does not depend on things ofwhose existence I am as yet unaware.” (18-19, 27-28,
emphasis added)
What is unknown about Descartes' self? Why can’t his refection on this self-
awareness simply make evident to him what his ‘I’ is? Why doesn’t his assertion that
he is only a thing that thinks satisfy what seem to be the requirements of this method?
Each time Descartes conceives of himself as a thinking thing, he is, of course, thinking.
While he knows that he exists while he is thinking (and therefore, that is a thinking
thing), he does not know that he is essentially a thinking thing. Does he know that he is
a thinking thing while he thinks? He must be a thinking thing, but being sure that he
exists while he is thinking doesn’t necessitate either that he is only or that he is
essentially a thinking thing—especially if it could be argued that there are things about
this ‘I’ that he does not know. And the fact that there is a subject thinking the thought i
am a thinking thing’ indicates that there is a subject-I which might not be fully grasped
in this predicate.
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Thus, there is an 1 thinking about the T that exists, that is a thinking thing.
These two I’s are constitutive of self-reflection. This gap between the knowledge he has
of himself as a thinking thing (which comes from methodological doubt) and the
awareness that he has of himself thinking (that he is a thinking thing) is the conceptual
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distance he must overcome in order for his knowledge of himself to be pure, certain
intuition. He must make sure that the I that he knows himself to be (as a thinking thing)
is the I that he is. The idea he has of himself must be exactly what he is with no doubt,
no possibility for error.
What this entails is knowing the I who he has proven exists, i.e., knowing that
the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing, necessarily entails the I doing the
thinking. “I know that I exist; the question is, what is this T that I know?” How can
he be sure that the I that I know is the I that I am? As he cannot validate his judgment
about what he is by using anything he doesn’t know with certainty, he cannot use his
body or his imagination. These will not get him the proof that he wants, which is a way
to contend with the implicit distinction in self-awareness of an I who is a subject aware
of itself as an object. I thus realize that none of the things that the imagination enables
me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which I possess, and that the
mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things if it is perceive its own
nature as distinctly as possible.” (19, 28) He needs a method which can produce or
“grasp” this knowledge of himself that he has, that renders what he can know through
self-reflection certain. He needs a method which will allow him “to perceive his own
nature as distinctly as possible.” This method must thus be able to make sure that there
is nothing about his T which he does not (cannot) know, so that the mind can perceive
itself clearly and distinctly. 37
There is a sense in which what Descartes is trying to accomplish with the sum
res cogitans argument is to capture in his idea of his self not what the self is at the
moment but what it is in toto. Such completeness would be rendered by knowing that
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the self is (and can only be) what it knows itself as. 38 ??Thus we could perhaps suggest
that Descartes is using the sum res cogitans argument in combination with these
unstated but assumed claims which would continue from our summary of Descartes'
argument on page 21 above: ??
(7) Those properties I can know for certain that a thing has are those which
distinguish it from other things (e.g. its essence).
(8) I can only know for certain those things which I can know completely,
i.e., those which I can clearly distinguish from other things.
Perhaps Descartes intends to establish premises (7) and (8) by the wax example.
Through the wax example Descartes makes it clear that my knowledge of the
nature of the wax presupposes that I possess knowledge of myself and that I (the mind)
must perceive my own nature as distinctly as possible. So, therefore:
(9) I possess knowledge of myself
(10) To know my self with certainty I must perceive my nature as distinctly as
possible
By knowing his nature clearly he will not be mistaken in what it is, and by
knowing it as distinctly as possible, he will be certain that he knows it completely, that
his idea of his T will not include something it is not, nor leave out any part of himself
(as not known) that he is. The idea of his I as clear and distinct must have no
‘unknowns’ about it.
“I must therefore admit,” he writes, “that the nature of this piece of wax is in no
way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by my mind alone.” (21,31) Even
though Descartes touches, feels, sees, etc. the wax, perception of its nature “is a case of
...purely mental scrutiny.” (21,31) We know the nature of something through acts of
mental scrutiny whereby we remove that which things seem to be-we “take the clothes
46
off,” Descartes writes-and consider them “naked.” As naked, we perceive only their
natures such that our judgments of them, our ideas as to what these natures are, “now
require a human mind.” (22,33) How we know a nature is through an act of pure mental
scrutiny. And while “my judgement may still contain errors, at least my perception now
requires a human mind.” (22, 33)
In summary, it would seem that Descartes thinks that the wax example has
revealed the following line of thought:
(11) I know the wax’s nature
( 1 2) Perception of a nature entails the presence of an active (perceiving) mind
Therefore
(13) When I know the wax’s nature, I also know that I know it through the
presence of an active mind
What Descartes needs to do now is to connect this active mind with his knowledge of
his self.
While it seems that what is useful about the wax example is this insight it offers
that knowing its nature is a naked perception which requires the mind, this does not give
us immediate access to knowing the nature of the self, clearly and distinctly. (“But what
am I to say about this mind, or about myself?”) What is shown in terms of how we
know the nature of the wax, in other words, does not give the argument an immediate
answer to the problem of how the mind must act “if it is to perceive its own nature as
distinctly as possible.” (19, 28) What we need still to do is ascertain that the method by
which we know the nature of the mind is such that what we know is certain. In other
words, in knowing the nature of the wax, I also know the nature of myself, but I do not
blow that I know until I can show the method by which I know my nature. So, for
Descartes,
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(14) Self-knowledge, (e.g., “I know that I am x) implies that “I know that Iknow I am x”.
Again, the issue of concern is making sure that there are no unknowns about
either what I am or how I know what I am. He asks, “But what am I to say about this
mind, or about myself?” (22, 33) What is the relation here between the mind that is
present in any perception and myself? Are they the same? Can I thus perceive this
mind? Is the mind that is required in any perception the mind that I know that I am (as a
thinking thing)? If so, then how do I know that mind clearly and distinctly (as a
thinking thing)? Descartes indicates that the way to make sure that there are no
unknowns here (what I think is left to prove for accomplishing his criteria of certainty)
is by addressing the issue of the ‘I doing the perceiving. He raises this concern when
he writes, “What, I ask, is this ‘I’ which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly?” (22,
33)
If his interrogation before was addressing the ‘I’ which he knows exists (via the
cogito), it is now addressing the I who knows that he exists. He must come up with a
way of knowing his ‘I’ such that he grasps the I completely. This means there cannot, as
said above, be unclarity about what he is or indistinction about how he knows what he
is, so that his thinking of himself, his idea of himself, does not fully grasp what he is.
The key here is what he writes next: “Surely my awareness ofmy own self is, not merely
much truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct
and evident.” (22, 33 emphasis added) Why is his awareness of himself truer and more
certain? I offer that it is so because he can, with the tools provided by the wax example,
make the claim that he can through his awareness know his mind with certainty.
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Perceiving the wax might allow him to understand that the mind is required in any
perception, but it cannot produce the answer to the question: “What, I ask, is this ‘I’
which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly?” Our perceptions of things outside of
ourselves do not allow a way to know that our perceptions are clear and distinct because
they leave unanswered this question of who is doing the perceiving. Descartes’ claim
here, then, is that his perception of himself is that which can be “truer and more
certain... [and] more distinct and evident.” Perceiving the wax cannot answer “who is
the perceiver” and therefore, it seems, such perceptions can never be completely certain.
So the question is how does self-awareness accomplish this for Descartes? It
doesn t accomplish it because it produces an idea of the perceiver doing the perceiving
while he is perceiving. 9 I don’t think that this perceiver can be known in certain
terms .
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I think this is the fundamental (and constitutive) paradigm of self-awareness.
(I will discuss this more below.) Trying to perceive the self who is perceiving itself is
an aporetic endeavor. So how does Descartes get around this? He does not state what
this self is that is perceiving the wax or perceiving itself. He asserts that it is more
distinct and evident, but doesn’t then tell us what it is as such. Instead, he continues to
compare the examples stating that if his perception of the wax seemed distinct, then the
perception of his self “even more distinctly.” I argue that (if) self-awareness engenders
a way for Descartes to perceive clearly and distinctly, and thereby have certainty, it does
so not by answering ‘who is the perceiver?’ but by eliminating the question. How is this
question eliminated? He does not, as stated, provide a description of this I who
perceives outside of knowing himself as a thinking thing.
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Self-knowledge as Performative
Descartes can now know that his idea of himself as a thinking thing is what he
is, not because he knows the thing that he is while he is perceiving-for there would still
be an I perceiving that I and so on. Instead he knows his I with certainty because he has
erased this problem altogether. He knows that his idea of himself includes himself as he
thinks or perceives, because (and this is the true definition of certainty) it cannot be
otherwise. We can read Descartes' claim about his self-knowledge as implicitly
entailing a performative. “Surely my awareness ofmy own self is not merely much truer
and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and
evident can be read as meaning the following: Through my awareness of myself I
know myself (with certainty) to be a thinking thing. Though it is nowhere specifically
stated in the text, I think that Descartes reaches certainty about his self-perception
because of the implied performative here. Because his self-knowledge has met the
demands for clarity and distinctness as set out (knowing his nature and knowing the
method by which he knows that nature) this in turn, engenders the performative he
needs: I know myself as a thinking thing. (I shall refer to this as the ‘thinking thing
performative.’) T know myself as a thinking thing’ entails certainty in the sense that
there is no lingering question about who the I is who is doing the knowing or perceiving
because the statement is made true by its utterance.. In other words, as a thinking thing
,
I know myself (to be a thinking thing).
Jaako Hintikka has argues that Descartes’ cogito ergo sum argument functions as
a performative .
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Briefly, he presents Descartes’ claim ‘I think therefore I am” as a self-
validating utterance, the opposite of which is existentially inconsistent. He cannot
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convince us that he does not exist, by saying “I do not exist.” To do so would be self-
defeating. Perhaps the sum res cogitans argument functions in the same way?
Certainly if Hintikka is correct that Descartes’ statements about his existence in the
COglt° ar§ument can be considered (like) utterances, those statements about his being a
thinking thing could be as well
.
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So it seems then that Descartes has achieved the certainty his project demands
by presenting his idea of his self in the form of a performative. Two critical questions
arise here however: Does Descartes’ “I am a thinking thing” really satisfy the
requirements for a performative? And, if so, is that enough to give him the criteria of
certainty clarity and distinctness—that he needs?4 ^ I will address these in reverse
order. The answer to the implied question, what is the res cogitans if it is not a
performative will be suggested at the end.
I think that Descartes’ resolution to the problem of self-knowledge through the
performative “I perceive myself as a thinking thing” fails to provide his argument with
the certainty it requires. As I have described it, the problem of self-knowledge—
especially as it is framed by Descartes’ methodological doubt—engenders a split in the
self. Because self-awareness involves both an I who is aware and an I who is aware of,
the problem of using awareness of oneself as the means to self-knowledge entails
addressing the relation of these I’s. For Descartes to achieve certainty, he must know
that his idea of the I that he perceives—what I have been calling the object-I—is
necessarily and unerringly (all of) what he is, including the I that he is while he is
perceiving his self. He must overcome the epistemological gap between the I’s. While
this could be achieved through a logical deduction of their identity through a syllogism
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or an inference, the strict requirements of Descartes' method deny these options.
Instead he must accomplish identity in some other way. Does recasting “I am a thinking
thing” as the performative "I perceive myself as a thinking thing" accomplish this
identity? I think it does not. Or if it does, it does so at the cost of his criteria of clarity
and distinctness.
If it does achieve or present an identity of the I’s it is through a kind of collapse
or erasure rather than a true identity relation. What the subject-I is through the
performative, is whatever the I knows the object-I to be. Thus, the subject-I is not made
evident in the (idea of the) object-I; its difference from the object-I is made opaque so
that what seems to be a relation of identity, is in fact, a singularity. This means that his
idea of his I is not clear. This lack of a positive account suggests that what the
performative achieves is through a kind of negation. Rather than making the subject-I
knowable by providing us what it is, the res cogitans makes it such that it is not
uncertain. This is not the same thing. The presence of the subject-I as still not
accounted for (and still doubtable) thus lurks at the edges of the claim, “I am a thinking
thing. This means that the performative fails. The res cogitans thus does not provide
certainty as much as it doesn t leave un-certainty visible. This is not the transparency
that Descartes needs, for there is still, I contend, an unaccounted for subject-I which is
present but erased through the “I am a thinking thing” even if it is a performative.
Therefore his idea of himself is not distinct.
The presence of this lurking uncertain subject-I not only indicates how the
perfonnative fails, but it also suggests that it is not a performative at all. Evidence that
the res cogitans is not a performative comes from what seems to be the need to repeat
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the utterance. If “I am a thinking thing” can be read as “I perceive myself a* a thinking
thing (perceives)- then I can be certain of the subject-I only when I am articulating the
utterance. In other words, “I know myself as a thinking thing when lam perceiving
myselfas a thinking thing." While he may only be certain that he exists while he is
thinking (in the cogito), he is only not uncertain of what the I is while he is thinking (in
the res cogitans). The erased or assumed subject-I returns to its position as uncertain
when he is not perceiving his self (as a thinking thing). Certainty thus comes only in the
moment of articulation
.
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This raises the question of existential inconsistency, another requirement of the
performative according to Hintikka is that it would be existentially inconsistent to state
the claim yet deny that the state of affairs it refers to exists. Would it be existentially
inconsistent to say “I do not perceive myself as a perceiving thing (perceives)V It
wouldn’t seem so. Certainly to articulate the claim, “I am not a thinking thing,” is not
self-defeating. But these questions do not quite get at what is at work in the sum res
cogitans argument; for there is a kind of force about it such that in its articulation
something is accomplished. What about, “I do not perceive myself as the thing that I
am'”? This is trickier than the others, but I still think that is not inconceivable. We
might not understand it immediately, but it is not existentially inconsistent in the way
that “I don’t exist” is. What “I do not perceive myself as the thing that I am” obliges,
instead, is a re-consideration of the terms “perceive” and “am.” The statement signals
perhaps an unclear relation between perceiving and being, which in turn, announces (or
even exposes) a tension present in how the I might know itself. But it is not
existentially inconsistent.
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It is this tension in the problem of self-knowledge that Descartes tries to resolve
through the ra cogitans. In order to establish that his idea of himself is clearly and
distinctly certain, he argues that he is a thinking thing. An additional requirement for
being a performative as we have presented it involves a statement being self-verifying.
Is “I am a thinking thing” as “I perceive myself as a thinking thing (perceives)" (or even
our simpler form “I perceive myself as the thing that I am”) self-verifying? I think that
Descartes thinks that it is. His argument relies on an equation of perceiving and being.
While commentators have argued that this equation accomplishes the transparency he
needs, I offer something different. The relation between perceiving and being is
rendered transparent by the erasing of that which is opaque to the I. If I cannot know
what I am when I am perceiving (or thinking), then I will make that subject-I known
through the object-I. So if the res cogitans is self-verifying, it is so because it is “self-
defeating” in the sense that it defeats the presence of the self that it seems it cannot
know. This form of self-verification thus seem to be more of a kind of tautology at best
or the description of a deterministic point of view at worst. In either case, it does not
seem to be a performative, and it does not satisfy the limits of Descartes’ method.
Conclusion
I claim that certain self-knowledge of the sort that Descartes is seeking is
aporetic because there is a way in which the subject-I is unknowable. I think Descartes
is correct, however, in asserting this I is present in the I that I know. His mistake lies in
his attempt to erase the certain presence of this unknowable I—an attempt which
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doesn't even provtde him with the certainty he seeks-in order to make it pass as certain
if not knowable
.
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How do I know myself, how can I know that what I know as myself is myself, if
I cannot in some way distinguish between the self that I am and how I know that self?
Is the self that I am a product of the way I know myself? This has important
consequences if we are to consider that how one might know oneself might be
influenced by social or historical factors. If I know myself (only) as that social-
historical epistemological subject that I am then how can I question those practices, let
alone know them?
Thus the legacy of the Cartesianism for the modem subject (and its self-
knowledge) is a complicated one: on the one hand Cartesian metaphysics offers a
method by which the truth of our perceptions can seemingly be ascertained, on the other
hand this method contains implicit within it an aporia that makes it uncertain. The issue
is that in some very important ways we do know ourselves as ourselves, but we not
know ourselves completely as the assumption of self-knowledge as certain requires.
How can we resolve this problem? The answer is not to assert that there is a self who is
outside of her own thinking about herself. In addition to being impossible, this would
re-enact the logics of Cartesian self-knowing by assuming a kind of certainty that stands
outside of the dialectic of self-knowledge. The answer then lies in going back to
Descartes' ‘resolution’ and trying to find a way to address that which gave his argument
difficulty. By finding a way to approach that which is constitutively unknowable about
the self, I think we can begin to open up a space between the I’s—the ‘I’ I know myself
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to be, and the I doing the knowing-in a way that has eptstemological as well as political
potential.
What I just begin to raise here are the problematics of self-knowledge that will
be addressed in the next three chapters. In those chapters, I develop an argument for
how it might be possible to recognize what seems aporetic about self-knowledge. I
examine how Hume’s skeptical response to Cartesian metaphysics both critiques
Cartesian epistemology and yet seems to rely on it. Despite (and perhaps because of)
his critical analysis and skeptical epistemology, Hume is unable to address the
unknowableness of the I. He does provide us with some useful tools, however, in his
highlighting of the role of other persons in the constitution of the self. I then present the
work of Michel Foucault whose work consistently confronts the issue of self-knowledge
as it pursues the problematics of theorizing the historical subject. His later work
approaches as an ethical concern how the self cares about itself. One question this work
raises is: If what the self is and how the self knows (her world, her reality, her self) is
through its historical construction, then how is freedom possible? I present Foucault’s
development of the ethics of self-knowledge as involving a relation the self has towards
itself. What this ethical relation might involve I present in my chapter on adopted
identity. I offer that what is necessary for an ethical (and more efficaciously agentic)
notion of self-knowledge is the development of a notion of relationality of the self. In
addition to relations with others, this relationality entails a cultivation of relation with
one’s own otherness. I use the aporia of (modem) self-knowledge as first raised by
Descartes as a way to thematize this otherness. Thus ethical self-knowledge involves
developing a relation between self positions we know and self positions we
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(constitutively) cannot know. I end the dissertation with a suggestion regarding how
Cartesian metaphysics of the human subject sets up the problem of self-knowledge in a
way that effects, on the one hand, a sense of being determined by one’s point of view
and, on the other hand, a sense of being free from it .46 I offer my solution to the
problem of self-knowledge as a way to conceive of a self that can use its self-knowledge
as a way to enable its freedom.
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- John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald
Murdoch. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 18, 27. All quotesfrom Descartes works should be considered from the translation by Cottingham,
Stoothoff, Murdoch and (for volume III) Kenny (known as CSM or CSMK as called
for). As is customary, the first page number listed refers to their text, while the second
listed refers to standard twelve-volume edition of Descartes' works translated by Adam
and Tannery (known as AT). I have italicized the AT version for clarity. I shall use in-
text citation where it is clear to do so.
~ Of course, the dynamics here involve a tension between the individual and the
universal which frame the limits of the humanist Individual: rather than knowledge
being produced by each individual qua its particularity, knowledge is universally in all,
and thus all can use Descartes' method of reasoning to attain it. I cannot address this
fully here, but the epistemological dynamics involved here clearly resonate with the way
in which modem political authority and autonomy become constituted through the
individual qua universal subject/individual.
There is, as will be discussed later, much interesting debate about how
Descartes argument for the existence of God (in the Third Meditation ) both relies upon
and dispels the certainty about the self as a thinking thing that he reaches in the Second
Meditation.
4
While Descartes writes in the first person, using what seems to be an
autobiographical voice, his argument of course is not really based on any kind of
personal reflections or introspections. It has become common in contemporary
Descartes scholarship to refer to the figure of the ‘I’ in the Meditations as “the
meditator so as to avoid this confusion. I do not use this convention, however, and, for
simplicity’s sake, discuss Descartes' problem in terms of his knowledge of his self. This
does not reflect any belief on my part in Descartes' project as involving his personal
self-knowledge or quest.
There is controversy about whether or not the mind is exclusively limited to
cognitive activity. Feelings, perceptions, sensations, all seem to involve a relation with
the body that suggests the mind engages in other kinds of activity. See Cottingham,
“Descartes on ‘Thought’” for an argument that thinking is just thinking, but other
activities such as feeling pain, involve the mind in activities that are connected to the
body. John Cottingham, “Descartes on ‘Thought,’” Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July
1978): 208-214.
6
Under “Works on Particular Topics,” Chappell and Doney’s Twenty-five Years
ofDescartes Scholarship, 1960-1984 list 264 references for “Mind, Mental Faculties
and Operations, Mind and Body.” Vere Chappell and Willis Doney, eds., Twenty-five
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^ars of Descartes Scholarship, 1960-1984 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
As I interpret the shift from pre-modem to modem philosophy, the split
between self and world in pre-modem philosophy becomes relocated in the self through
rationalism. This splitting of the self is thus constitutive ofmodem subjectivity. I
develop elsewhere what l am calling a ‘post-rationalist’ notion of the self. Critical to
this post-rationalist paradigm, I contend, is a re-assessment and appropriation or use of
rather than erasure of this constitutive split of the self. As I see it, we cannot escape the
split-I, but (as should become clear by the conclusion of this work) we can thematize the
relation between the I’s differently. I am not refusing the possibilities of the split-I for
self-knowledge, but instead am suggesting that we might get more productive (and
coherent) self-knowledge from a re-evaluation of the relation between the I’s.
g As I develop throughout the larger work, how we ‘contend’ with the legacy of
the split-I is not limited to just one way. There are more options than either
overcoming it or denying it.
This understanding, I think, will allow us to thematize the substance notion of
self as an identity relation between these two conceptions of self. This is what will be
interesting to explore in Hume: how his critique of Descartes involves not just arguing
that there is no substance that is the self, but that there is no personal identity that is the
self. I am trying to get at how identity is already part of Descartes' move to
substantialize the self. What is key here is how in this identity move, the I-subject
collapses into the I-object. The I as it thinks cannot know itself but knows that it is and
that it is thinking and that it is a thinking thing. I think this becomes a model for self-
knowledge-knowing oneself as an object of knowledge and knowing one’s ontology,
but NOT knowing oneself as a knower knowing. The identity relation thus leaves the I
subject outside of the knowing, un-represented.
It has been important to me to find a way to understand the relation between the
notion of self as substance and the constitution of identity. My intuition here is that
making the self a substance alone doesn’t engender a way to be that substance, to know
it, in such a way that is could provide self-knowledge, and hence, agency. Substance
must entail identity (together these make a triad—a monism and a dualism), and the self-
identity relation must remain incomplete, or in some way produce some excess such that
an agent can be constituted who can know his identity, his substance, his essence. This
will tie in to the Foucault chapter and adoption chapter because this excess or ‘hanging
F needs to be conceptualized in a way that resists being an act of identity which closes
the gap between the knowing I and the known I, the substance I and the meta-substance
I. By making trying to close the gap by making the split self a substance, I argue,
Descartes’ metaphysics engenders a present and knowable self and an implicit and
covert knowing self who can assume the position of the universal knower, detached
from its own specificity.
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In another project, I analyze how this conception of nature and the
epistemological agency it entails, is influential to the development of the idea of
objective neutrality. In brief, I argue that self-knowledge as knowledge of one’s nature
evidences one s autonomy from that nature. It does so in accordance with the logic
implied here in Descartes: I can know myself transparently such that what is known is
certain and this engenders a knower who is both identified with the known and (yet)
able to know itself objectively. By knowing one’s nature then, within the context of
moral theory, one could distinguish oneself from one’s subjectivity-i.e., one’s body,
family, social circumstance, and other such influences. As others have claimed, of
course, only particular natures could allow such a claim of moral neutrality. (These
would be those who could claim (the nature of) universal subjectivity. See Iris Marion
Young Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
Thus Descartes' theory of knowledge, “that the only truths which are certain,
undeniable, indubitable, are those revealing the essential nature of things,” is made
evident through this naturalizing of his idea of himself. Don Locke, “Mind, Matter, and
the Meditations,” Mind 90 ( 1 98 1 ): 343-366.
1
2
As the metaphor of vision is heavily relied upon in philosophy’s
representation of cognition, so too is the metaphor of blindness used to represent a
cognitive failure. There is a strong and important movement in philosophy, especially
among philosophers who write on the issues entailed in notions of ‘disability,’ to dis-
associate the vision capacities and cognitive capacities. As I appreciate this critique, I
use blind spot with the awareness of its negative implications because it does also cite
the history whereby such implications are constituted.
1
3
I agree with Amy Morgan Schmitter who claims that this failure serves a
certain function in Descartes' argument. See her “Representation, Self-representation,
and the Passions in Descartes,” The Review of Metaphysics
.
(Dec 1994), 48:2, 331-358.
I consider the aporia of self-knowledge as self-certainty to be constitutive of the modem
self.
14
Descartes' use of terms like ‘intuition’-which in the Latin would be “intueri,”
to look at or inspect—reflect his conceptualization of the understanding as a kind of
inner vision. See John Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1993), 94-96.
15
1 follow James Camey on this point. James Camey, “Cogito
,
Ergo, Sum and
Sum Res CogitansE The Philosophical Review 71 (Oct 1962): 492-496.
16 As we will see, because knowing the ‘nature’ of something for Descartes
involves knowing one’s knowledge of it, knowing the nature of one’s self as thinking
itself is an attempt to eliminate any doubt one could have about such knowledge, i.e.,
that it could be solipsistic.
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I agree with Amy Morgan Schmitter that this failure is necessary in Descartes’project as he can never put the subject I in the position of the object and make it knownor represented completely in a way that will guarantee certainty. Thus the certainty of
self-knowledge (as know,ng the substance of the subject I as a thinking thing) is a, oncea certainty gained through knowing and a certainty gained through not knowtng. This ishe aporta of self-knowledge as self-certainty, and it is constitutive of the modem self I
suggest. Schmitter, ibid.
, ,
* t0 the lmPortance of this desire to know the self in chapter 5, “BeingAdopted. Unlike French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, whose work wediscuss in detail in a later chapter, I contend that desire’s role in the constitution of the
self must be interrogated and problematized because it is so fundamental to the making
of the modem self. While Foucault’s position is that because desire has been that
through which subjectivity has been most effectively controlled through power relations,
it is not a good medium through which to make new or resistant practices of the self.
As his analyses—especially in the History of Sexualitv
-focus on the limiting effects of
sexual desire on subjectivity, he offers instead that we should focus on pleasure rather
than desire. I suggest that exploring our desires regarding self-knowledge can open up
new ways to relate to both our desire to know and our self-knowledge. Because identity
is such an important political tool in contemporary US culture-consider debates around
gay marriage, affirmative action, voting rights and general issues of representation-I
also think that how we desire identity must be interrogated so that we are not
reinscribing those limits of the modem subject in order to gain social and political
legitimacy. For an analysis of modem political philosophy and its relation to the
constitution of political subjects in search of legitimacy see Wendy Brown, States of
Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1995. Brown’s assessment, through an appropriation of the Nietszchean notion
of ressentiment, is rather pessimistic. I am hoping that my view provides a more
positive alternative reading of the possible uses of identity. Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality: Vol. I: An Introduction . Translated by Robert Hurley (New
York: Vintage Books, 1990).
The term ‘identity’ used here has taken on a very important cultural and
political valence in the 20th century. While this usage is not identical to the term as
used in metaphysics, it does retain much of the metaphysical underpinnings. While I
cannot fully develop this here (and I allude to it more in chapter 5) there is an important
connection between the modem subject’s struggle for self-knowledge through the
epistemological framework of self-certainty and the ways in which the late-modern
subject has struggled in relation to the concept of identity. Culturally and politically, an
identity (which one is thought to have, rather than achieve) functions as a token or
symbol of having both having and being able to know (because one has) a unified self or
essence. By presenting one’s self as having an identity, one presents one’s self as
someone capable of achieving certain self-knowledge. As it reflects an ontology that
one both has and knows, identity is that which constitutes one as a certain kind of
legitimate self and knower. Rather than reflecting an actual essence or inner self,
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identity functions productively, as those who are able to claim knowing it thus producethemselves as epistemological subjects who are capable of self-certainty. Again I
cannot develop this fully here, but as I note elsewhere, presenting oneself as so capable
is not a minor issue, either politically or philosophically. Such self-certainty is a critical
component, for example, of the notion that a particular individual is able to claim access
to universal values. The evidencing of self-knowledge evidences the subject as able at
once to produce himself as both a subjective individual who has his own particularity
and an objective Individual who can epistemologically ‘step back’ from himself and
consider his own subjective position. This ‘splitting’ enables the individual to present
himself as not fully determined by his own particularism (a moral condition ascribed to
women, for instance, in much modem moral and political theory) and thus allows him to
present himself as capable of assuming the position of a morally objective agent.
20
It is my aim that these new ways of critiquing the Cartesian substantial subject
avoid assuming cogito logic as part of their critique. I do not want to oppose or analyze
the Cartesian subject by assuming, e.g., an epistemological subject who stands outside
of her own construction, who can claim a position of certainty because she can assume a
position of objectivity in relation to her own identity. Instead, this post-Cartesian (or
post-rationalist) subject claims her identity position aware of her IN-ability to do so
completely, objectively, or with certainty. I develop this later as ‘adopted identity.’ By
moving beyond the demand of certainty that is constitutive of cogito logic, I think that
we can approach the aporia of self-knowledge via Cartesianism itself; in other words, I
think that in Descartes there is already a tension such that self-certainty is reached by
BOTH knowing the self and not knowing the self. How to rescue this position of not
knowing from a logic ofLACK is the primary goal of this dissertation. A post-lack un-
knowing (i.e., uncertainty about the self does not equal lack or ignorance) will help us
engender a kind of ethical knowing regarding self-knowledge.
2
1
There has been much discussion about the topic of how Descartes moves from
cogito ergo sum to res cogitans. I think this quote indicates that the certainty gained
from the cogito argument is necessary for the res cogitans argument. Descartes’ goal is
to push his investigation beyond the certainty of his existence to the certainty of his
judgments. As I present later in this chapter, Descartes achieves the latter through his
elimination (or “escape” is a word he uses in a related context) of the uncertainty of the
subject-I. Hence he needs to add the res cogitans to the cogito ergo sum because the
strength of his certainty, its force, comes from the erasure of that uncertainty, not from
the positive provision of certainty. I also see the cogito and the res cogitans connected
as both ‘intuitions’ are achieved as performatives.
22
“ One can think of Socrates’ argument at the end of the Crito where he refuses
to escape his death sentence, as his friends request. While he might not like this
particular outcome, he has lived his life under Athenian law. To act outside the law, as
if the law does not apply to him, would make it impossible to say what justice was, as
he had, before his sentencing, consented to the laws as if they were just.
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Hobbes, for one found that Descartes' sum res cogitans argument did not
necessarily entail that the self had to be a thinking thing. See the Third Set of
Objections, in CSM II, pp 121-137. This issue of the relation between the cogito
argument and the res cogitans argument will be discussed in more detail later
I use Hintikka’s analysis of the cogito as a performative to present how res
cogitans could be performative as well. I will suggest that it fails to meet Hintikka’s
criteria. He argues that as a performative, the ergo sum can only come from thinking
not any other activity. “The performance through which an existentially inconsistent
’
sentence defeats itself can be an act of thinking of it, but it cannot possibly be an act of
wi ing or feeling. Jaakko Hintikka, “Cogito
,
Ergo Sum : Inference or Performance7” InDescartes: A Collection of Critical Essays , ed. Willis Doney (Notre Dame, IN: Notre
Dame University Press), 130.
- 4
There is a tension present here, as the means by which Descartes presents his
argument is in the form of a narrative. As such, there are many allusions to the fact that
he is reflecting on himself-as he sits and considers his past thoughts, as he takes
inventories of what he previously thought he knew, etc. Hence, there is a way in which
the language of the text continually refers to thinking as self-reflection. This seems to
be a kind of excessive act, as Descartes seems to limit if not control the way in which
language, especially as writing, opens up possibilities for reflection, refraction, and, I
am thinking of Derrida here, r^-signification. See Limited Inc., especially “Signature
Event C ontext for Derrida s understanding of linguistic meaning as made possible by
structures which allow iteration and re-iteration. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993).
25
Ironically, while Descartes constructs his argument so as to avoid the notion
that self-knowledge is representational, that the self he knows is an image (of himself),
Lacan’s reading of the Cartesian cogito involves the way which Descartes cannot escape
the self-as-image construct. Rather than being recognized as image, the I of the cogito
is mis-recognized as transparent, self-evidencing, and self-same. As such, it becomes
the mirror-image which is mistaken for substance. See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror
Stage as Formative of the Function of the ,” in Escrits: A Selection , trans. Alan
Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977), 1-7.
26
The issue of ‘otherness’ at stake here is important to note.
27
Descartes’ writings (in the Meditations and in the Discourse ) are importantly
confessional. The figuration (especially through writing) of the cogito as that which is
known with certainty through a kind of object-less thinking, I am inclined to think via
Derrida and Freud, as in need of constant re-signification. Like a disavowal, the act
must be repeated, and as such, is constituted through its repetition. It is not just the
‘return of the repressed,’ as the need here is not so much prohibitive as it is productive.
It is this split-disavowal-essence logic that that Lacan reads as the legacy of the
Cartesian subject.
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’ This again seems to be an example of Descartes’ Platonism: he cannotimagine all of the possible examples of what the wax can be and therefore know its
nature because he knows all possible features of it. Socrates’ discussion with Meno for
example about the definition of virtue, suggests Plato’s point that no example of the
Idea can define it.
29
He compares this mistake as being “tricked by ordinary ways of talking” (2
1
.
^ow *anSua8e i s at issue, especially in terms of the tensions inherent in Descartes’
literary’ style, shall be explored later. I am thinking about the ways in which, again, the
in Platonic dialogues, there are many discussions about the relationship between
language and knowledge. The Paradox of Inquiry, e.g., seems to involve this problem
of providing final definition. I would think that given Descartes’ goal of setting up a
First Philosophy based on a self-evident First Principle, the way in which linguistic
meaning is constructed is problematic.
30
See Margaret Wilson’s work on what she refers to as “the doctrine of
epistemological transparency.” Margaret Wilson, Descartes (New York: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1982), 50.
3
1
Unlike some commentators, I do not think that self-awareness in the Second
Meditation is transparent. I think that that there is a tension (which is heuristic) in the
problem of self-awareness that reflects the epistemological problems of Cartesian self-
certainty. See Norman Malcolm, “Descartes's Proof that his Essence is Thinking,” ]n_
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays , ed. Willis Doney (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 312-337.
32
It is interesting to connect this to disavowal. Put in Lacan’s and Zizek’s
readings of self here or later in terms of what this disavowal does, how the performative
needs to be re-iterated (cf. Butler) in order for the self-knowledge to be present as the
opaque unknowable thinking-I continuously returns. Descartes writes,
The argument above only yielded (6) “I am at least a thinking thing.” But for
certain knowledge, i.e., to generate his criteria of clarity and distinctness, Descartes has
to show (6') “I am at least a thinking thing and no more than a thinking thing” (to rule
out physical properties and others that he may not know about himself and hence would
be fallible beliefs). He never really succeeds in doing this without begging the question.
34
Descartes discusses this ‘only’ in his replies... he states that he does not mean
that he is only a thinking thing in the sense of exclusively that, but only in the ‘strict’
sense, i.e., that which survives his doubt.
35 Some commentators have noted that it is unclear what ‘I am a thinking thing’
means in terms of the question of essentially a thinking thing or only a thinking thing.
64
^thls d°es not caPture the subject I, perhaps at least-and this seems critical-
t does not leave the thinking I, the subject I, present but unknowable-we will return to
this later for there is important move being made by the performative that seems to
accomplish a kind of erasure of an epistemological opacity than an epistemological
ransparency. Rather than accomplishing a positive epistemology where Descartesknows something with certainty, perhaps what the performative he reaches does is
accomplish a kind of negative epistemology where what cannot be certain is made
unknowable in a way which is not threatening to certainty, and thus is, in some sense,
epistemologically invisible. Hence there is an erasure of what is unknowable as it would
for Descartes' project prohibit certainty. Perhaps we can call this an erased opacity that
then appears as transparency. (There is an implicit and denied recognition of the limit of
reason here that seems a curious and important precursor to the Kantian critical project.
Kant s critique of Cartesianism
.) Of course, Derrida would return, that there is
necessarily a trace of what could not be seen. We will return to this notion of the trace,
and how if we remove the demands for clarity and distinctness required by Cartesian
certainty, we might be able to recognize the way the self is opaque to itself without
losing self-knowledge.
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There is a distinction here between Descartes' knowledge of his self which he
possesses and knowledge of his nature which he has yet to perceive which I think is
critical to our project. As a distinction or dis-articulation at least Descartes' comments
suggest what is at stake in using self-awareness as his vehicle for self-knowledge.
While Descartes possesses knowledge of himself (present tense), there are ways of to
grasp his nature such that he knows it with certainty (future conditional). I think
Descartes verb tenses indicate the tension that is involved in the paradigm of knowing
the self through the event/space of self-awareness. He has knowledge of himself, but he
must be careful with his thinking if he is to perceive his nature in a way that makes that
perception certain. He has already claimed that he is a thinking thing. He follows that
with “What else am I?” and then goes on to present that what he is cannot depend on his
imagination. The I is neither a bodily thing nor an imagined thing. I cannot thus know
the I by knowing what it corresponds to (as an object in the world or an invention ofmy
mind). I have the knowledge of myself, however, as I know that I exist and that I am a
thinking thing. To be certain ofmy knowledge of this I, then, is not simply to possess it
(i.e., to be self-awareness) but to cultivate the mind’s practice of thinking about its
nature in such a way that “perceive[s] its nature as distinctly as possible.”
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Feminists and other critics have written about the way in which the Cartesian
self becomes through cogito reasoning, self-originating or a product of kind of
“ontogenesis.” There are several places in the Meditations and in the Replies where
Descartes raises the issue of his origin. He says that his question concerning himself in
the Meditations “was not what was the cause that originally produced me, but what is
the cause that preserves me at present. In this way I aimed to escape the whole issue of
the succession of causes.” (77, 107) While the ‘cause’ of his idea of himself is not
about his origin, his attempt at “escaping the whole issue” is interesting is it again
makes that which is not knowable (and perhaps would lead to an infinite regress) a non-
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issue. See Susan Bordo, “The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity.” In
Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing , eds
Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo (New Brunswisk, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989)
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That is, it doesn’t ifwe don’t want to consider what the perceiver is is purely
mind so that what is produced as certain knowledge of the I is that is is purely mind and
not body. This reading is not incompatible with my reading. I can argue that the
perceiver perceiving is not knowable except as thinking which is what mind as not body
really seems to mean.
How I think the opacity of the self can be known, or how its unknowability
can be addressed in a productive way is the theme of the last two chapters.
I am of course, indebted to Jaakko Hintikka’s reading of the cogito as a
performative. While my understanding of performatives come from Austin, I think
Hintikka’s reading of the cogito ergo sum argument as a performative is very
productive. In his seminal article, “Cogito
,
Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance”
Hintikka presents the force of the cogito argument as a performative comes from the
fact that it is existentially self-verifying. Whereas existentially inconsistent statements
are self-defeating, he says, “their negations verify themselves when they are expressly
uttered or otherwise expressed.” “I am” is such a sentence, he tells us. “Descartes does
not demonstrate this indubitability [of T am’] by deducing sum from cog//o...[and] the
sentence I am (T exist’) is not by itself logically true, either. Descartes realizes that its
indubitability results from an act of thinking, namely from an attempt to think the
contrary. The function of the word cogito in Descartes' dictum is to refer to the thought-
act through which the existential self-verifiability of T exist’ manifests itself.” Jaakko
Hintikka, “Cogito
,
Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?” In Descartes: A Collection of
Critical Essays
,
ed. Willis Doney (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press), 109-
110 .
4
“
I think that the difference between claims about existential knowledge and
propositional knowledge might undermine this. What is incontrovertible (though
perhaps less relevant), however, is that Descartes does present the res cogitans and the
cogito arguments using the same literary styles, i.e., as a kind of introspective silent
soliloquy.
4
' There is a third question as well. Does Descartes intend to present his
argument as such; does he mean to put it in the form of a performative. I think there is
evidence in the text that the kind of immediacy and indubitability that he wants is
achieved through a kind of performative logic, but I am not going to claim that this is
what he intended.
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Because he relied on the notion of awareness, Descartes does seem to suggest
that he is always perceiving himself, that he cannot be unaware of himself. As always
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aware of himself he is always perceiving himself, therefore he could not fail to do so
This does not lesson the failure of the res cogitans, I think, for it could be argued that
this awareness does not give him what he needs for certainty. If it did, then he would
not need the wax example and the argument for self-certainty that follows it What he is
trying to be certain of is the relation of his idea of his I and the I that he is aware of If
he was ar§uing that awareness simply provided the I to itself self-evidently then we
would have to ask why he goes on to present his argument regarding judgments and the
understanding and we would still be left with uncertainty regarding ideas. In other
words, simply being aware of the self doesn’t guarantee that the idea one has of oneself
is that self. Descartes would have base that certainty on an argument that proved that
‘being aware of the self (or awareness) is the same as ‘having an idea of the self (or
thinking). This is what he is trying to establish so the argument that we are always
aware of ourselves and thus always perceiving ourselves would be assume a circular
logic. See Malcolm on self-awareness.
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Here we begin to sense that how we approach the problem of self-knowledge-
how we resolve it, problematize it, leave it unresolved-has import in relation to the
issues of freedom and determinism. There are many implications which I would like to
address, but cannot do so here. In particular, I think there are three issues concerning
the modem subject that Descartes' ‘resolution’ to the problem of self-knowledge effect:
conception of self-awareness, notions of substance and essence, and the mind-body
distinction. I will come back to these issues in the conclusion after I have developed my
post-Cartesian notion of self-knowledge. I think there are fissures or fault lines in
Descartes' presentation of these due to the furtive presence of the unknowable self. I
think we can crack the issues open once we have fully addressed the hidden I-subject.
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While I cannot fully develop these ideas here, I believe that two poles
regarding perspective are those that define the space of modem moral agency. As many
feminist philosophers have pointed out, what seems crucial in modem philosophical
thought in terms of determining which point of view one gets to have is the ‘proximity’
one has to the body, i.e., that which renders one more ‘uncertain’ of one’s knowledge.
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The controversy concerning identity is
not merely a dispute ofwords . 1
Everything related to us, which produces pleasure
or pain, produces likewise pride or humility 2
CHAPTER 3
HUME S CONCERN WITH THE SELF: PERSONAL IDENTITY
AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-AWARENESS
Introduction
As we saw in the last chapter, Descartes presents in the Meditations not only
how he can know himself, but also what this self-knowledge is and how it can provide
him with the criteria of truth—clarity and distinctness. Descartes attempts to resolve the
problem of self-certainty, of how to be certain that the self he knows himself as, i.e., his
idea of his self, is actually the self that he is, through his substantialization of the self as
a thinking thing. Conceptualized as a thinking thing, Descartes claims his knowledge of
himself is incorrigible. It is incorrigible because, as it is his nature to be a thinking
thing, whenever he is thinking, his nature is made present to him. He thus not only
knows what his nature is, but he also claims to have an infallible method through which
he knows this nature with certainty, as it is made present to him as an immediate
intuition.
If his argument does provide an idea of self that is incorrigible, it does so not by
providing a positive description of what the self is, nor by effectively arguing how the
self can know itself through intuition. Rather, I offer that such an idea of self that could
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not be wrong, that could not be otherwise, is produced by erasing all possible causes of
doubt or fallibility. The key to assuring the incorrigibility of the idea of the self lies in
self-awareness. In order to satisfy the retirements of certamty, self-awareness in
Descartes' model has to be transparent such that the self is epistemologically ava.lable to
itself without impediment. I maintain that the development of such self-transparency
depends upon an erasure; in order for the self to be transparently present to itself such
that it can achieve self-knowledge knowledge that is certain, the presence of the subject-
I who is doing the knowing must be removed as a possible cause of doubt.
The subject-I poses a threat to certainty because the idea of any nature for
Descartes requires the presence and activity of the mind. 3 As the subject-I is always an
active part of the production of the idea of something’s nature, and thus part of but
different from that idea (of a nature), it is unclear what an idea of the self’s nature
grasps. Arriving at certamty through self-knowledge thus requires the removal of this
uncertainty, which Descartes accomplishes by removing this difference between the ‘I’
that is the idea of his nature and the I that is this activity of the mind. That the subject-I
and the wax are not the same is not a problem for Descartes’ project. That the I and the
T might not be the same threatens the certainty of Descartes' self-knowledge. Thus his
project requires that he close this gap between the I s such that they are rendered the
same, or at that least their difference is made imperceptible.
Thus Descartes' epistemological quest for certainty engenders (1) an ontological
notion of the self as a thinking substance and (2) a model of self-awareness that is self-
transparency. This self-awareness allows the self to know itself with certainty as it
‘neutralizes’ the role that the knowing self or subject-I plays in the production of its
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self-knowledge
.
4
In effect, Descartes' substantialization of the self resolves the problem
of self-knowledge as a problem by getting the position of the subject-I out of its own
way.
While Hume’s critique of personal identity in the Treatise clearly attacks the
metaphysical notion of the self as a substance that underlies experience, I suggest that he
fails to critique the subject-I and its relation to self-knowledge, a failure which limits his
project. Hume challenges the philosophical notion of a unifying, coherent, unchanging
substance self, but he fails to address the epistemological relation between the knowing
self and the known self. It is this relation, I contend, which engenders the problem of
self-knowledge as a problem for Descartes’ project. Through his conception of the self
as a substance he attempts to resolve the problem such that the self can have self-
certainty. Without addressing this problematic issue of the knowing I or subject-I,
Hume's critique of the metaphysical notion of self is not only less effective, but it also
splits the self into a knowing I and a known I, thus reproducing the rationalist
framework.
While he offers a notion of the self s ontology
>
that challenges the metaphysical
one-the bundle self rather than the substance self-he doesn’t supply this bundle-self
with a notion of self-awareness, i.e., with an epistemic relationship that the self has with
itself through which self-knowledge is produced. Lacking such a critical model of self-
awareness, Hume inadvertently reproduces the dynamics of self-awareness that is
consistent with the rationalist paradigm, i.e., without an alternative version of self-
awareness, Hume’s epistemology ends up positing a subject-I who is capable of
transparent introspection .
5
This dynamic is what I have been referring to as the split-
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self. Not only does Hume posit this I, but his method of analysis also seems to deny
him a way to contend with this subject-I.
So Hume's dilemma can be stated as follows:
(1 ) The self or mind (the subject-I) can be aware of (know) its own
impressions, as well as the succession of its experiences (i.e., the bundle-
self or object-I)
(2) An impression of x must be locatable for the idea of x to be meaningful
But
(3) There is no impression of a subject-I in experience
Therefore
(4) It is not meaningful and therefore false to claim that a subject-I exists
(5) ( 1 ) cannot be known for certain, since (1) requires that a subject-I exists
Thus Hume must either give up (1), which he does not want to do because he
wants to avoid scepticism, or he must tacitly assume that (3) is false and that the
impression of the object-I (the succession of perceptions, or the bundle self) is actually
also the impression of the subject-I, since the subject-I = the object-I. But in order to
give up (3), Hume needs a different theory of what self-awareness is, one which does
not tacitly assume, like Descartes', that knowledge of the self is incorrigible (that is, that
the subject-I is transparent to itself as the object-I). 6
Confronting the Split-Self of (Self-)Awareness
Hume wants his critique in the Treatise not only to render such Cartesian-
influenced notions as the substantive self “meaningless,” but to do so in a way which
allows him to make a positive contribution. In short, Hume is criticizing both
rationalism’s conclusions and scepticism’s response. For Hume to accomplish this, he
must not only develop a method whereby rationalism’s concepts are demolished, but he
must also make sure that this method does not fall prey to scepticism’s criticisms. The
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key to-and the weakness of, perhaps-his method is his reliance on 'experience.' For
Hume, our ideas are not ‘representations' of things in the world, whose
'correspondence' to those objects can be tested. Nor are tdeas the immediate notions of
such things in the world, present in and immediately avatlable to our minds. Instead,
they are copies of our impressions. What we know of the world are our perceptions of
it, and these perceptions are impressions and ideas. If an idea is meaningful, it must be
the copy of an impression. We must be able to find through our experience what
impression an idea is a copy of-no impression, then no meaningful idea.
While Hume s epistemology thus involves a shift away from the notion that
ideas are transparent representations of objects, his empiricist turn does still seem to rely
upon the notion that we can access such experience
.
7 We must be able to reflect on our
experiences in order to examine our ideas and their corresponding impressions. It is this
reflection, however, which reveals the weakness of Hume's method as he is unable to
theorize the notion of the self as a knowing or observing self (or self-reflecting self) that
such access engenders. If experience is going to be an effective tool with which to
dismantle the Cartesian subject, however, it must not inadvertently reproduce that very
subject. Thus Hume's task in the Treatise is twofold: he must provide an ontology of
the self as non-substantial and he must develop a critical epistemology which allows for
a way to refer to or look at our experience without positing an epistemologically
privileged subject which, though constituted by Hume's method, is outside of its realm
of critique
.
8 As a posited but unaddressable self, this posited subject-I seems to function
quite like a substance self that can stand outside of its perceptions and observe itself.
Without a way to address it, Hume's critique of the substance self is undermined.
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In order to avoid the possibility of reproducing a substance self, Hume must not,
in effect, reproduce what I have been calling the ‘split-self 9 by positing or assuming a
self which is capable of knowing itself or reflecting on itself transparently. Hume’s
critique of personal identity in Book I runs this risk, however. As many commentators
have pointed out, Hume analyzes our ascription of personal identity to our successive
perceptions as a kind of habitual mistake, but he does not answer or adequately address
the question raised therein: if the self is (nothing more than) a succession of
perceptions, then who (or what) is perceiving the self as such? 10 In effect then, the
section on personal identity raises the issues of both what the self is and how we know
or perceive the self.
Thus we can read Hume's critique of personal identity as containing (and
perhaps engendering) a tension: how can we critique the notion of the self as substance
while also presenting a notion of having self-awareness otherwise
,
i.e., non-
dogmatically, such that neither a version of the rationalist positing of self nor a
scepticist negation of self is reproduced. This tension reflects the two related
philosophical notions of the self implicit in Hume's analysis: the thinking thing
substance and the (transparently knowable) container mind. 11 When he writes that
there are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious
of what we call our Self,” I contend he is concerned with the model of epistemological
transparency that such continuous, uninterrupted and complete awareness relies upon.
(251) Thus, the self that Hume is critiquing is both the self these philosophers think we
are conscious of, i.e., the known or object self, and the implied transcendental selfwho
is (objectively, unimpededly) conscious as such, i.e., the knowing or subject self. 12
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Hume critiques the metaphysical notion of the substance self through his
empiricist epistemology. According to this epistemological approach ideas are copies of
impressions such that for an idea to be meaningful we must be able to locate its
impression. Thus the critique of substance self relies upon a way for the self to be able
to assess its own impressions. But if the self is constituted by its perceptions-its
impressions and ideas-then what is it that is doing the assessing? How can I assess my
impressions if I am in part constituted by them? What is the relation between those
perceptions and myself such that I can assess them? There must be a way for Hume in
which perceptions both constitute the self, such that the self is the bundle of its
perceptions, but constitute it in such a way that the self can reflect upon itself. To be
consistent, this self-reflection must avoid positing a self that is not a product of its
perceptions. But what would the relation between a self and its perceptions be such that
it could have such self-reflection? And what kind of self-awareness such acts of self-
reflection constitute? Hume's philosophy cannot directly answer these questions,
though we can benefit from tracing the reasons for this failure.
Critique of Self as Substance
In his A Treatise ofHuman Nature, Hume argues against the notion of an
essential self, a self that precedes experience in the world, a self that is coherent and
unified. According to Hume, the identity of any object, including that of a person, is a
fiction that is acribed to objects due to a kind of mistake. 13 This mistake out of habit,
out of social convention, is one whereby we ascribe to successive multiple perceptions
the idea of a unified whole. While this is a habit which everyday folks make that seems
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to be functional or useful, it is also a practice performed by philosophers. It is with
them that Hume’s sceptical philosophy in Book I is concerned. Hume’s epistemology
specifically challenges the metaphysical conception of self as an underlying substance.
He contends that while philosophers might recognize the self as having continuous
perceptions, they also assume a constant unchanging self as underlying such change.
This substance self functions as the grounding of their certainty. Hume challenges this
notion of self-as-substance asserting that personal identity is itself no more than a
collection of perceptions. We have, he writes, “no idea of substance, distinct from that
of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either
talk or reason concerning it.” (16)
According to Hume s epistemology, every idea must have a corresponding
impression. “Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas but as the first ideas
are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple
ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their corespondent impressions.”
(7) What then is the impression of a unified self? he asks. If there is no corresponding
impression to the idea of personal identity, Hume contends, then the term is
meaningless. For Hume the idea of the self as a substance that unites our impressions
would also entail that we have an impression of that uniting, underlying self. He writes,
self or person, is not any one impression, but that to which our several
impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have reference. If any impression
gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the
same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist
after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable.
(251)
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Nor could the self be all of our impressions at once, as our impressions
themselves
. . succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot,
therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other,” he concludes, “that the
idea of self is deriv d; and consequently there is no such idea.” (252)
It is our experience that tells us that we have no “idea of self, after the manner it
is here explained.” (251) What is interesting here is that Hume says not we have no idea
of self, but we have no idea of self "after the manner it is here [i.e., by philosophers]
explained. The sentence indicates that our experience suggests that the philosophers
are wrong on two counts: there is no impression of the self as having “perfect identity
and simplicity” and there is no idea of self like that which we have. This indicates that
it is not impossible that there could be other ideas of the self that we do have.
Self as a Bundle
Although he tells us that with them he can no longer reason, Hume critiques
those philosophers who contend that they can “upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion”
observe something other than their perceptions when they “enter most intimately in
what they call themselves. (252) He continues presenting the famous bundle analogy:
But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to
affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (252)
14
What we are, are bundles of perceptions and, as such, we are always changing.
This comparison accomplishes two things: (1) As a bundle or collection the self is not
container, per se, as the whole is made by the perceptions themselves. There is no
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inside or outside of the bundle. Because of this (2) there is also no perceiver watch,ng
or looking at the perceptions. Our (epistemological) role as bundles is not separate from
our being the bundles. We are present however, but as part of the production of the
perceptions: “Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions.
Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties
contribute to this change.” (252-253) 15
This image of the rapid change of our perceptions is important, not only because
it suggests how short the duration of a perception is (a blink long perhaps), but also
because the image suggests something about how we produce those changes. We are
nothing but bundles of perceptions, Hume tells us, but we are also part of the
mechanism through which those perceptions change. All we have to do is but move our
eyes and our perceptions, and therefore our selves, are altered. The self-as-bundle
notion makes distinguishing the self perceiving from the self as perceptions problematic
as it seems to challenge the mind-as-container model by dissolving any distinction
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the self. Importantly then, as bundles we seem both to be
made (up) of our bundled perceptions, and to be participants in the production of those
perceptions. There is some way in which the bundles that we are are able to affect the
perceptions we have, if, as Hume suggests, new perceptions result from the mere
movement of our eyes.
In addition to questions about the bundles-What holds the bundle together?
What binds the bundle or collects the perceptions into a collection?—questions arise
here about the relation between this self that we are that seems to affect (or even
engender) our perceptions and those perceptions which, bundled together, seem to
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constitute our selves. What is the relation between our perceptions and our selves such
that both seem to engender the other in this bundle analogy? Ifwe are just bundles, for
instance, how are ‘we’ different from our perceptions of other things? For Hume it
would be ridiculous to say that since I perceive this desk, this computer, this room, I am
these things. But how do I make the distinction between perceptions as perceptions of
things and perceptions that are me? More importantly, perhaps, for Hume's critical
method, is the following problem: if, as Hume presents, the self is a collection or
bundle, and the self is itself constituted by such perceptions such that any flicker of the
eyes changes not only what the self sees but what the self is as a seer, then how can the
self search its ‘own’ impressions, observe its own experiences in order to assess whether
or not an idea is meaningful? If Hume's argument against the idea of the substance self
depends for its effectiveness upon the notion that the self (or some part of it, perhaps) is
able to do an inventory of its impressions, then what is its relation to those impressions,
especially given that the bundle-self seems to be in constant flux? In other words, how
can my impressions even be mine without some sense ofme or at least a way to relate
them to me? How can I have a point of view from which I can assess my impressions if
the self that I am is always changing? Because Hume seems to repeat the rationalist
move of identifying how the self knows with what the self is, he seems to engender an
aporetic notion of self. Seemingly identical to its impressions, the self is also supposed
to be able to know them. From whence does this capacity come? And from whence
does the necessary (if only temporary) differentiation between the self and its
impressions come? Hume seems to presume but not theorize a subject capable of
knowing itself such that it can evaluate its impressions. It must in some sense be able to
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stand apart from the self that is constituted by those perceptions, however. Without
some notion of self-awareness which could allow the self to be able to reflect on its
impressions without being separate from them, Hume's epistemology seems to re-
instantiate a Cartesian subject-I.
Relation of Perceptions to Self: The Problem of Sameness
Certainly, it would be contradictory for Hume to ascnbe to the self a position
from which it could examine its impressions that was in fact outside of its perceptions.
What we need then, for his method of critique to not be undermined by his
epistemology, is a way for the self, as a changing position constituted by its perceptions,
to be able to consider its own perceptions. This must of course, thus be able to address
what we might mean by this notion of possession as well. As these perceptions are also
that which constitute what the self is, perhaps the development of a way that the self can
reflect upon itself(as something which is constituted by its perceptions) as something
which has (its own) perceptions would offer such a means . 16 Hume's critique of the
substance self notion of identity through the analogy of the self as a bundle, however,
seems to fail as it is unable to critique both at once the self as substance and the self as
objective knower. Because it seems to identify the bundle of impressions that we seem
to be able to know that we ‘have’ with the bundle of perceptions that we are, Hume's
analogy must—if it is to satisfy the requirements of his epistemology—posit an implicit
knowing or subject-I. Thus, by making the self be the bundle of perceptions, it seems
we cannot address how the perceptions are ‘mine’ and thus the subject-I which is
presumed as able to know them is also left un-addressable.
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Through the analogy of the bundle, we receive a notion of a self that, as
constituted through its perceptions, is either unable to examine its impressions because
it is constructed through them; or if it is able to examine them, it must be different from
them, it seems, in order to do so. In either case, the critique of the substance self is
weakened: in the first case it is weakened because such a self cannot do the assessment
needed that would show that the idea of the self as a substance as meaningless; and in
the second case, it is weakened because that self seems to assume the position of the
subject-I capable of (objective) introspection, a position Hume is critical of. 17
Implied by Hume's experience-focused epistemology is a reliance on
observation” as a tool with which we can evaluate our concepts. As such, Hume posits
an epistemological structure whereby there is a self who claims to have some kind of
access to his perceptions. While the bundle analogy seems to make the relation between
the bundle and the self one of identity, this access suggests the notion that the self and
the perceptions are not (necessarily) identical. 18 The persistent questions however, are
what is it that differentiates them and how can we know and/or utilize this difference.
Hume’s own description of his self-reflection exhibits this difference: “For my part,
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception of other, of heat of cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,” he
says. (252, emphasis in original) Present here are the dynamics involved in trying to
know what the self is as, even when denouncing the notion of the metaphysical self
there is an I posited who is considering himself, even if he considers he is only his
perceptions. Hume seems to push to the forefront the aporetic nature of this problem as
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he writes, “I never catch myselfat any time without a perception, and never can observe
any thing but the perception.” (252, emphasis in original) 19
Hume raises several things here: while it is clear that ‘when I turn inward’ there
are only perceptions, it is also clear that I cannot perceive any thing that is separate from
those perceptions, including my self having them. How I catch myself, perhaps, is by
catching perceptions, but this seems to leave unexplained what the relationship is
between my self perceiving and my perceptions. Some one else (like Descartes,
perhaps?) might “perceive something simple and continu’d, which he calls himself, tho’
I am certain there is no such principle in me,” Hume tells us. It is a safe assumption, I
think, that Hume is here reconstructing the problem of perception from Descartes'
Meditation. He is thus presenting not only Descartes' (and other Cartesians’) solution to
the problem, but also the problem itself: how can I enter myself? How can I perceive
myself? Even if what I am is my perceptions, who is perceiving them?20
Hume does investigate the relation of the perceptions to the self: “After what
manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?” he asks.
(252, emphasis added) While there is no impression of the self as singular and
identical, according to Hume's epistemological investigation, there is a question of the
relation between the notion of self and the perceptions we commonly speak of as
having. This notion of possession, I claim, is critical to Hume’s presentation of self.
While he overtly asks “what gives us so great a propension to ascribe identity...” (252)
there is also an implicit question regarding ‘owning’ or ‘having’: Why do we (and how
can we) claim our perceptions as ‘ours’? We not only ascribe identities to successive
perceptions, but we also attribute to them qualities including that of possession. 22
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Certainly ifmy perceptions are mine, there must be a relationship between myself and
my perceptions. As I can assess my own perceptions, they must not constitute me in
such a way that I cannot tell the difference between them and me. What might this
difference be, between the self and the perceptions that belong to it?
The Theatre Analogy: The Notion of Difference
The theatre analogy perhaps offers a way out of the problems of the bundle
analogy as it begins to develop a more complicated notion of the relation between a self
and its perceptions. Hume discusses not “mankind” as he does in the bundle analogy,
but explicitly refers to mind here. This again points to his concern with presenting a
notion of self that is not a substance-but something else-and is also not transparently
aware of itself—but aware of itself in some other way. How can the self be aware of its
perceptions? And can it do so differently, i.e., without reproducing the epistemological
limits of the (Cartesian) rationalist paradigm of self-awareness equals transparent self-
knowledge?
As Hume writes, “The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite
variety of postures and situations.” (253) There are two central issues at work in this
comparison: one about the theatre as a kind of mental space or place and one about the
constitution of this space as a theatre. While the mind as a bundle is the bundle itself,
there is no structure that holds the bundle together, it seems. As a theatre, however,
there is such structure. The mind as a theatre has perceptions which pass through it; it is
the place where the perceptions can “make their appearance,” and most importantly
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where they can “mingle" on-goingly, successively. They form “postures and situations”
as they dance across the stage. This stage, however permanent it might seem, is a stage
because of the presence and performance taking place. To be a stage, rather than a
room, or a pier, for instance, there must be certain kinds of activities that take place
there. These activities are the performances of perceptions. Thus there “is properly no
simplicity
>
in [the mind] at one time, nor identity in different
. . They are the successive
perceptions only, that constitute the mind.” (253) While there is the place that is mind,
that is the theatre, it is the perceptions, as performances, which constitute it as such.
We can begin to see how the shift from bundle to theatre opens up ways of
presenting the mind as not a container, and awareness of mind as not presupposing an I
watching itself in some split-self kind of way. The mind as a theatre, like the mind as a
bundle, is made from the perceptions it has, but moreover, there is a way that the “play”
of the perceptions, how they “pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle” in their activity
constitutes the mind. It isn’t merely the presence of perceptions, but their movement
,
their engagement, that is the stuff of mind. Thus, the self is not aware of its perceptions
as a kind of voyeuristic attendant, for a theatre cannot watch itself.
While this analogy makes it clear that the perceptions somehow make the self, it
does not fully answer how the self could know this, could perceive itself as such. The
key seems to be in the way in which the perceptions are active and how their activity
seems to relate to our propensities: the perceptions are active on the stage, and our
mind is ‘receptive’ via our propensities. (These propensities, however, activate the
imagination.) Hume seems to gesture to this aporia of self-awareness as he writes, “nor
have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of
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the materials of which it is compos’d.” (253) This indicates not only our lack in terms
of knowing the what of the mind, but also the inherent problem of how the mind knows
or is aware of itself. We cannot have a notion of this mind (yet) because to do so would
posit a mind that is distinct from its perceptions. The perceptions are always changing,
therefore it seems the mind is too. The mind is constituted by its perceptions therefore
there is not a static concept of mind that would refer to some place. There can be no
notion of this “distant” place for it is always deferred. There is no referent to “mind” as
a thing we can have a notion of separate from these ongoing perceptions.
But what about the audience? What about the conventions that make it a theater
and not something else? And what about the distinction between theatre and ‘real life’?
Certainly in the metaphor of the mind as a theatre is also the notion ofperformance]
how does this notion relate to the way in which we have a tendency, a “natural
propensity.
. .to imagine that simplicity and identity” that is not there? How does the
theatre analogy work to represent not only the mind, but the processes of mind? What
does it suggest that Hume thinks about the relationship between perceptions and objects,
between impressions and ideas?
Both the bundle analogy and the theatre analogy present the self as constituted
by its constantly changing perceptions. What is different about them is (1) while the
bundle model of self seems (problematically) to present a model of the self qua an
individual, the theatre model of the mind is implicitly social; and (2) while we are the
bundles of our perceptions, the mind as a theatre implicitly entails a notion of
performance such that what happens on the stage is in an important way, not ‘real’ or
not ‘true.’ Hence the theatre analogy gives us a glimmer of what might be necessary for
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a notion of self-awareness that could provide something other than the two options of
self-knowledge offered by the bundle analogy: either no self-knowledge or self-
knowledge that reproduces a Cartesian subject-I.
Such an alternative model of self-awareness entails implicitly the notion of the
other in relation to the self. This otherness can be understood in terms of both the self
in relation to other selves (or bundles) and the self in relation to itself as other than or
different from itself. The introduction of a notion of otherness into the constitution of
the self can help us approach the relation of the self to its perceptions, such that we can
develop a notion of self-awareness that does not limit but enhances Hume's critique of
the substance self. The theatre analogy thus provides a notion of difference between our
selves and our perceptions as it includes both the presence of an audience and the
distinction between Teal’ life and performance or ‘art.’ As a theatre, the mind for
Hume is both social and aesthetic. The bundle analogy and the threatre analogy thus
offer two different possible relations between the self and its perceptions. The bundle
entails a relation of identity such that the bundle of perceptions is the self; the theatre
analogy entails a relation of difference such that the perceptions appear on the stage of
our minds. While the theatre analogy suggests a way to distinguish the mind from the
perceptions, it does not explain how they are connected
,
however
.
2 ’
The Imagination
Where perceptions appear in the theatre is on the stage of the imagination for
Hume. How the perceptions—as changing and successive—are mis-recognized as a
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unified and unchanging object is due to the practices of the imagination. In the section,
“Of Personal Identity,” Hume assigns to imagination the role of the ‘mistake’ maker:
That action of the imagination, by which we consider the uninterrupted
and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of
related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much
more effort of thought requr’d in the latter case than in the former. The
relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another,
and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated on continu’d
object. (254)
Because the feelings of these perceptions are similar, because they resemble one
another, the imagination doesn’t make them the same, but it seems to encourage the
mind to experience them in the same way. 24 We have propensities to make this mistake
regarding identity; even when we correct ourselves, says Hume, “we cannot long sustain
our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination.”(254)
This bias of the imagination is the force the imagination has on perceptions in
accordance with its principles. “This resemblance of feeling between the different
perceptions [of identity and diversity] is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and
makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects.”25 (254) It
is not the perceptions or feelings (about them) that engenders the ‘mistake,’ Hume
suggests, but rather their relation of resemblance to one another that does. This relation
is formed by the “gentle force” of the imagination, guided as it is by its universal
principles.(10) For Hume, ideas are copies or faint versions of impressions, and they
can be separated and re-united by the imagination “in what form it pleases.” (10) The
bonds which hold ideas together as they are formed into new complex ideas, do not
make them into new ideas which contain the (old) ideas, or melt them together to form
some new thing that is the new idea; instead they connect them in terms of the way each
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“Mea natUra"y introduces another.”(10) It is the way the imaginat.on connects them,
the way that it travels or moves through the ideas in relation to each other that forms the
new idea. A complex idea is thus a product of associations; the way ideas necessarily
give rise to other ideas in the mind is through their relations which are, in turn, effected
according to principles. These principles of association are three: resemblance,
contiguity, and cause and effect.
These three principles are those which guide imagination in the formation of
relations between ideas. They connect the ideas by engendering ways for the
imagination to move or act between them. These movements, or acts of association,
make “connexions” from the relations. In associations of resemblance, the imagination
runs easily form one idea to any other that resembles it;” in associations of contiguity,
it must “run along the parts of space and time in conceive its objects;” and in
associations of cause and effect, “there is no relation, which produces a stronger
connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another. ..”(11) So the
original ideas have resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect as qualities, but what
connects them into new ideas is the way the imagination follows these qualities in its
acts of association.
Pride and Possession
From the theatre and bundle analogies, then, Hume begins to present not only his
critique of the Cartesian notion of self, but also his positive (yet non-metaphysical)
model of self-awareness. This self-awareness seems to be an awareness that suggests
both a subject and an object that are diverse and/or multiple. What could this self-
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awareness be? And how could it connect to Hume's comment that seems to contradict
his own critique of those philosophers who consider the self transparently knowable:
“T's CTident
’
that the ,dea
-
or rather impression, of ourselves is always intimately
present with us..."? (317) How-and perhaps where-does this intimate presence occur?
One way to approach this suggested model of self-awareness, this intimate presence of
ourselves to ourselves, is to explore how we becomes objects of concern to ourselves
through impressions of reflection. 26 I would like to suggest that the passion of pride
offers a way to see the notion of mine as a relational notion. What this means is that it
does not refer to an object, but rather to a relation. As pride shows us how the
perception of the idea of mine might be constitutive of the ‘me’ it refers, it might in turn
offer a way to think of the relation between the perceptions and the self that is both
different and connected.
Hume begins his analysis of the passions in Book II with the indirect passions,
which “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” as do the direct
passions, “but by the conjunction of other qualities.” (276)27 By nature, for Hume,
human beings have dispositions for certain emotions, such as pride. These dispositions
for certain dispositions Hume calls propensities. 28 And also by nature, this emotion or
impression of reflection produces an idea to which the impression is attached. 29 For
pride and humility, this idea is that of the self. He calls this attached idea the “object”
of the passion.
As the object of the passion, however, the self should not be conceived of or
understood as some strictly identical object. In Book I, Hume completely rejects and
critiques such an idea. He repeats this rejection in Book II: “[t]his object [of pride and
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humility] is self, or that succession ofrelated ideas and impressions, of which we have
an intimate memory and consciousness.” (277, emphasis added) Hume raises the
tension present in the problem of self-awareness here: the self is a succession of related
ideas and impressions and we have “intimate memory and consciousness” of it. What
is our intimate consciousness of a succession of perceptions? Who or what is having
this consciousness and these memories? And what is the relation between the
experience of pride and the (experience of) this consciousness?30
The self as the object of pride seems to be consistent with Hume's earlier critique
of the metaphysical self in Book I. The issue here is not what the self is, but how the
indirect passions might offer a way for us to see how this self becomes an object of
concern. Pnde not only directs our attention to our selves, an action which might seem
to presume an already pre-existing self attending or looking at itself, but it also seems to
engender a whole system of self-awareness. It is on the self, as the object of pride and
humility, that, Hume writes, the view fixes when we are actuated by either of these
passions. (277
,
emphasis added) This actuation occurs not as a result of direct
experience of our selves, or from having some feeling of selfor selfness. The self—as
the object of pride, as the object of our concern—neither causes the passion nor pre-
exists it. Instead it is produced through our associations in conjunction with an
impression. Hume writes, ‘But tho’ that connected succession of perceptions, which we
call self
,
be always the object of these two passions, ‘tis impossible it can be their
CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them.”(277-278) His argument against this,
briefly, is this: as the object of both humility and pride is the self, it is not possible that
the self alone can cause them since they are different. Nor are passions solely caused by
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our nature, or else we would be experiencing them all of the time. Instead these
passions are caused by a double relation. 31
The Double Relation
This double relation is a relation between two ideas and two impressions. How
this double relation introduces the force and presence of difference in a way that also
seems to engender a notion of mine-ness is our concern here. There are two ideas
involved in the passion of pride-the idea which excites it and the idea which is the
object of the passion’s attention, when the passion is excited. “Here then is a passion
plac d betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc’d by it.”
(278) The first idea is that of something being mine, and the second idea, is the idea of
my self. And there are two impressions of pleasure involved as well: a pleasing quality
in the cause or subject and a pleasing quality (taken) in the object (self). Thus, the
‘subject’ which causes pride has two components: the quality which elicits pleasure (or
pain in the case of humility) and the status of the subject (or thing) as being related to
(my) self Hume generalizes this into a principle: “What I discover to be true in some
instances, I suppose to be so in all;.
. .every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities,
produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.” As regards the
subject to which these qualities adhere”: “these subjects are either parts of ourselves or
something nearly related to us.” (285)
What is key here is that the cause, cannot be “our selves,” proper, but must be
parts of ourselves. Whether part of us directly (a body part, e.g.) or part of us indirectly
(something we own, e.g.), the cause of the pleasure that become—through pride—
a
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pleasure we take in our selves, must be related to us. They are properties or
possessions. They are things which are related to us, but clearly not identical to us as
there must be a connection of relation. 32 There are three (inter-related) questions here
which we must address: What is the relation between the idea of mine or “related to
me” and the idea of my self? From whence does this idea of“mine" come? And from
whence does this idea of (my) self come?
How the Double Relation Works
When associations of both impressions and ideas concur on the same object,
Hume tells us, they assist each other and “bestow on the mind a double impulse. The
new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it
must be render’d so much more easy and natural.” (284)” The double impulse involved
in pride, or what Hume calls a “double relation of ideas and impressions,” (286)
involves an impression and an idea on both the subject and object ‘sides.’ On the
subject side, a quality such as beauty is attached to something, e.g., a vase. Let’s call
this quality P (for impression). Through the principles of association this quality
enlivens the imagination to move from it to another impression which resembles it.
Let s call that Pj. The idea of the vase includes the idea of property, so that if it belongs
to me, there is the idea of it being mine. Let’s call this idea D. Because of the
principles of association, this idea enlivens the mind to move from it to another idea,
Dj. On the object side, Hume presents two “original qualities” concerning pride which
are determined by nature. They are: the object of pride (and humility) is always the
self, and the sensation excited in the soul by pride is pleasure (and by humility is pain).
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These properties of the passions he says are "establish VT while those of the cause of the
passions are "suppos ’dr The establish’d properties are established by nature. They are
set like a kind of structure of the mind. The supposed properties of the cause are
“foreign” and more variable. When I behold a beautiful vase that is mine the pleasure
produced by the beauty enlivens the mind to move to another feeling like it. Because
the vase is mine the idea of it as mine enlivens the mind to move to another idea like it.
Already in the mind, according to this schema, are the established properties of pride.
They are there as both already-determined but possible P, and D,. As the mind is
excited, the mind moves from pleasure P to pleasure P, and the idea from D to D,. The
pleasure of the vase’s beauty combined with the idea that it is mine, moves the mind to
actuate the original feelings of pride. They resemble the causal perceptions. The two
impressions and ideas are related. “From this double relation of ideas and impressions,
the passion is deriv’d.” (286) From the two acts of association the connexions between
the ideas and impressions are engendered, and relations of resemblance, which are
assisted by the other pair, occur in the imagination. Together, these form the
dynamics of pride.
Hume s analysis of the passion of pride begins to offer a picture of how the self
can be aware of itself, how it can be of concern to itself, without reproducing the
problems of the rationalist paradigm of self-transparent introspection, including its
susceptibility to scepticism. To avoid the problems of the rationalist paradigm while
still providing a positive model of both self and self-awareness, Hume's model must
avoid both positing a substance self and engendering a subject-I/object-I split. Avoiding
the latter means that he must not posit an I who knows itself outside of its own practices
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of knowing. Because Hume's ep.stemology rel.es on evidence not produced through
knowledge or reason (deduction or inference), but through experience, he must thus
avoid positing an I who is separate from its experience of itself. I think Hume's
presentation of pride gestures toward a way of developing such a 'phenomenological'
approach to self-awareness. It does so by relying on indirection and relational,ty. If his
epistemology is to offer a positive way to be aware of the self, and thus to answer some
of the problems of personal identity raised above, it must answer (or re-d,rect) the old
(metaphysical) questions in a new way. “What is the self that the gaze of the passion is
directed at?” and “what is the nature of this ‘gazing’?” seem to be the critical
questions. 33
From Mine to Myself
The answer to the first question seems to lie in the relation between the passion
of pride and its object. Hume tells us that nature gives us a disposition which produces
the feeling of pride and “to this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz. that of self
which it never fails to produce.” (287) It seems here that the passion of pride produces
the idea of self. But from whence comes this idea of self? It seems it comes from the
passion itself: The organs are so dispos’d as to produce the passion; and the passion,
after its pioduction, naturally produces a certain idea.” (287) But as we learned from the
double relation of pride, the idea of the self which the passion is said to produce, is
enlivened in the imagination by the related idea of “mine” through the principle of
association. If the vase were not mine, I might feel joy upon appreciating its beauty, but
I would not feel pride. In order to feel pride rather than joy, the thing to which the
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quality is attached which causes pleasure must be mine. (291) Hume asserts that “pride
requires the assistance of some foreign object, and that the organs, which produce it,
exert not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement.”
(287) While the structure of pride might be a given, present in a human beings nature,
its activation or excitement requires the presence of a foreigner. So what is this foreign
object? And if it is through pride that the self becomes an object of concern, then does
this foreign object become incorporated into that self?
It would seem that the foreign object is the cause, the beautiful vase. But it is
necessary that the vase be mine. The required “foreign object” excites pride through the
organs (of the human mind), as it “gives the first motion to pride.” (288, emphasis
added)34 What this object thus needs to be is an object which can activate the attention
of the passion and thereby direct it towards the self; for according to its original quality,
pride requires the self as its object. My beautiful vase is the cause of the passion, but,
because it would cause joy not pride if it were not mine, the idea of it as mine sets pride
in motion. But if ‘mine’ means ‘belonging to, property of, or related to my self from
where does this idea of mine come? From where and how do we come by the notion of
mine such that the disposition we have for pride can, once excited, turn toward self?
What is being related when something or someone is said to be related to me?
Mine
It would seem that the notion of mine cannot come from the notion ofmy self, as
it seems the direction of the associations goes the other way: my vase, excites my
disposition toward pride; then pride’s gaze turns toward self. If ‘mine’ comes from the
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same self that is that towards which our attention is directed in the passion of pnde, then
this seems rather circular; for it seems that the idea of mine which in some sense
precedes that of 'my self as mine is part of that which stimulates the passion. 'Mine'
could not come from the self for Hume, as the same things do not encourage relations of
resemblance. Difference is necessary for relations of association. Some commentators
have suggested that what is ‘mine’ is whatever is called mine (by me. It would have to
be called ‘yours’ by someone else.) ‘Mine’ is an ascription, a property ascnbed to
objects which name them as a property of me. What is mine are those things which
have the property of being mine. Thus, mine is a property of me only vis-a-vis the
properties of these other things which are not me. The one thing that cannot be ascribed
as mine is that which cannot be a part of me, i.e., me or my entire self. 33
What is relevant to our concern here, is that ‘mine’ comes from a process of
ascription, where the meaning of the term is produced through a relationship between
objects. For something to be ‘mine’ means that it is at least both not all of me and not
yours. There are thus two implicit notions of difference involved in the relation of
property. The foreigness of ‘mine’ that is the cause of pride is not only the object that is
not me to which mine is attached, but also the presence of these relations of difference
that constitute mine-ness, i.e., not yours and not (identical to) me. These conditions of
difference are necessary but insufficient for something to be ‘mine,’ however. What
pride as a disposition of the mind offers thus, is that if I feel pride about an object then it
is ‘mine’ and it is an object which causes pleasure. Thus the condition of feeling pride
(or shame) is also necessary for determining that something is mine . 36 As ‘mine’ is the
idea which, through principles of association shifts the attention of the mind from mine
95
to -my self,’ ‘mine’ must bear or encourage some relation to ‘myself in order for this
association to be made.
Me tor My Self)
As the object of pnde, the self is something which is produced through the
double associative relations in the mind that move the mind from impression/idea duo
of beautiful(pleasure)/mine to that ofpride(pleasure)/me.
‘Myself,’ as an object of
pnde, is produced by these associative moves which engender relations in the
imagination. The self does not seem to precede these associations, except as a
requirement posited by human nature. This requirement, however, functions more like
a place holder than a demand for a certain substance. What the self is does not seem
defined by it, though what can cause the passion, what can excite it such that we are so
actuated, is affected or limited by the requirement that self is pride’s object. The
original qualities are that self is the object of pride and that pleasure is the sensation it
excites in the soul (a term which can be understood as imagination or mind for Hume).
(288) Taken together, these qualities seem to proscribe the structure but not specifically
the content of the roles or parts defined therein. Instead it seems that the emotion of
pride and the object of pride are ‘fleshed out’ through the activities set into motion
when pride is (and we are) “actuated:”:
Tis evident we never shou’d be possest of that passion, were there not a
disposition of mind proper for it; and ‘tis as evident, that the passion
always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think our own qualities
and circumstances. (287)
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While, Hume’s double relation of the passion of pride seems to refer to the
relations of ideas and the relations of impressions, there is also a sense in which the
double relation seems to refer to relations between the cause and the effect of the
passion and the cause and effect of the object of the passion. The disposition of the
mind ’causes’ our passion, in the sense that we would never possess such a passion
without the disposition to do so; and the excitement of the passion turns us toward our
selves, “makes us think" about our selves. So, is the self ‘caused’ by my beautiful vase
or is it an effect of the passion of pride? If it is an effect of the passion, is the cause of
that effect the original qualities or of the activity of the passion, once it is stimulated by
a “foreign object”? It is unclear then what the relation is between the external object
and the ‘internal’ structure. Annette Baier contends that the ‘natural’ structure of pride
in effect determines what it is that can cause it. Taking owning a fine house as her
example she writes,
The idea-object of pride (originally or a priori determined) pre-selects the
idea-cause or pride, and the original feeling of pride pre-selects the
quality of the cause, the separate pleasure the house [or other fine thing]
must give, whether or not it is mine. So in the causal sequence getting us
from the subject case, namely my house, with its pleasure-giving quality,
to feeling proud of myself, the effect determines a priori what the cause
can be. Given the effect, we know that the cause must be a possession of
mine, and that it must be independently a pleasure-giver. The transition,
as Hume presents it, is from the perception of a house as mine (idea of
cause subject) and fine (impression of cause quality) to the perception of
pride (impression) in myself as house-owner
.
37
According to Baier’s reading, although the beautiful house seems to be the
cause, that the beautiful house can cause pride is a priori determined by the effect
which is itself (caused by) a predisposition in the mind. In short, if something causes
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pride, it must be mine. Thus what is ‘mine' is that which causes pride, i.e., a passion i
which I feel a pleasurable feeling regarding my self.
n
Is the relation produced between self and mine engendered by the disposition in
the mind? Hume says that it is through a relation of resemblance that the mind travels
from the idea of mine to that of self. But is this resemblance pre-determined by the
requirements of the disposition? Baier’s suggested explanation of the relation of mine
to pride doesn’t answer the question from whence comes the idea of self. While it
seems that for Hume the idea ‘mine’ and the impression ‘beautiful’ excite the mind such
that self is taken as an object of concern in a prideful way, Baier presents the association
between mine and self as occurring from the effect to the cause. How do we read the
relation between the idea of mine and the idea of self? Is it a relation of resemblance or
of causal connection? Does it make a difference?38 How we answer these questions, or
what answers we can find to them in the Treatise
,
affect what possibilities Hume’s
critique might offer regarding self-awareness. These possibilities include both what
self-awareness would be awareness of as well as how such self-awareness could be
epistemologically possible. The role of the imagination seems to be the same whether
the relation is one of resemblance or cause and effect-in either case, we seem to move
from one idea to the other, connecting them such that, in the end, we take concern in
ourselves.
Baier’s reading of the ‘internal’ disposition of the mind as the effect which “pre-
selects” what ‘external’ objects can excite it, suggests that the relation between self and
mine is (pre-?)determined by this disposition. What constitutes the relation of
resemblance between mine and self is already determined by the structure of pride such
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that when ‘mine' and ‘beautiful’ occur in the same object, pride and self are those tdeas
which the imagination necessarily transitions to. The self is not constituted by its
relation to ‘mine,' but rather ‘mine' is constituted in terms of what is required by the
ongtnal qualities of the natural disposition of pride. This analysis does not provide an
account of the relationship between selfand the structure of pride, however. It seems
that the self is merely assumed by pride. When the origmal qualities are met, then the
self is the object of pride's view. Hume does not provide a positive account of what this
self is.” It doesn't seem incorrect to fill in this lacuna by suggesting that according to
the passion of pride, the self is thus already given to us by nature. Rather than just the
turn towards self being given by nature, what the self is is naturally provided.
Resemblances of Perceptions: The Role of Memory
How the imagination transitions smoothly from the idea of mine to the idea of
my self, accordingly, reflects a resemblance dictated by the nature of the mind. If this is
the case, then it also does not seem incorrect to consider that what counts as ‘mine’
‘reflects’ what the self is that pride is concerned with.40 As Hume writes, “Ourself,
independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing'. For which
reason we must turn our view to external objects; and ‘tis natural for us to consider with
most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us.” (341)
As our analysis of the passion of pride suggested, Hume does begin to offer a
way to conceive of the self as something other than a substance. And, the self as an
object of concern for itself through pride entails s notion of difference between the
notion of ‘mine’ and the notion of my self. My perceptions of beautiful things (and my
99
perception of them as mine) seem to direct my attention to my self in a way that is
productive of what that self is. Thus pnde gives us a way to conceive of the self as an
object of concern for itself without presupposing what that self might be. And as the
disposition of pnde seems to be behind the ‘turn’ we take towards our selves, there also
seems to be a way in which the self as an active subject looking at itself is also gestured
at. What is left unresolved however, is what the notion of mine means. If being ‘mine’
indicates a relation between some thing and me, and yet ‘me’ is not something which
can be positively described, except to say that it is something that we are concerned with
in our (active) feeling of pride, then does calling something ‘mine’ beg the question?
This is critical to Hume's critical method as it relies upon a self that can (1)
examine perceptions that (2) belong to it. As we noted above, Hume is aware that there
is a problem regarding the relation of the perceptions to the self: “After what manner,
therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?” he asks. (252,
emphasis added) As a relation
,
the connection between the self and (its) perceptions is
brought about through the imagination:
The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious
one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and
animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must
proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects. (259)
The operation at issue is that of resemblance: as the different perceptions I have
of this table before me are very similar to each other, the perceptions are related by the
principle of association such that the relation of resemblance is produced by the
imagination, and my thoughts travel easily from one idea of the table to the next. This
does not explicitly answer how such a train of thought produces the idea of identity,
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however. And, it does not explain what the fictitious identity of the mind would involve
as we know that we don’t have perceptions of it which could resemble one another.
As able to be collected together, reflected on as a group, what the past
perceptions can have in common is that they were mine. What the remembered
perceptions have in common is that I had them. I do not have other people’s
perceptions in my mind. When I reflect on them, consider them, compare them, what I
might be tracing over as my thinking progresses, easily moving from one idea to the
next, is their resemblance as my memories. Hume seems to be raising the tricky issue of
the who or what is the I having the perceptions:
But, as, notwithstanding this distinction and separability, we suppose the
whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally
arises concerning this relation of identity; whether it be something that
really binds our several perceptions together or only associates their ideas
in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in pronouncing
concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among
his perceptions, or onlyfeel one among the ideas weform ofthem. (259)
This question of a real bond among perceptions or the feeling of a bond is the
question of what connects the perceptions in general, what is it that makes the ascription
of identity to them possible. As Hume does not want to argue that the objects
themselves cause the perceptions of them to be unified into identity, what seems to be
required for the perceptions to be connected into discrete objects is some act of mind
which does so: “.
. . the understanding never observes any real connexion among
objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examin’d, resolves
itself into a customary association of ideas.” (259-260) Thus Hume tells us regarding
perceptions, “For from them it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really
belonging to these different perceptions and uniting them together; but is merely a
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quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the
imagination, when we reflect upon them ” (260, emphasis added)
But there is the key: what is it that is doing the reflecting? What is self-
reflection, or reflection on our perceptions such that the principles of association are
activated so as to associate the principles in such a way as to produce the feeling in the
imagination that we have an identity? Without a model of what this reflection could be,
it seems that Hume is begging the question. The feeling we have of being a self, of
having an identity, that is produced through the imagination seems to require some act
of self-reflection. Hume does not seem able to problematize what this self-reflection
could be. He does examine the faculty ofmemory in terms of the attribution of identity.
Identity he has told us is a quality we attribute to perceptions “because of the union of
their ideas in the imagination.” (260) Memory is critical to this uniting of ideas in the
imagination as it is in relation to being remembered that perceptions seem to take on a
way of resembling one another that might help solve the problem of personal identity it
terms of how the self can reflect on its perceptions.
The difference between having a perception and reflecting on a perception might
involve the distinction between a perception I am currently having and a perception that
I once had. “[S]uppose we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that
success ofperceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose
that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions; ‘tis
evident that nothing cou’d more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this
succession amidst all its variation.”41 (260) Hume here makes an important distinction
regarding the source of the relation of resemblance regarding identity: the relation of
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resemblance is a product not of qualities that are in the perceptions as a result of the
original perceiving, but rather it is a relation that relates qualities of the perceptions
resulting from a faculty of the mind.
Hume continues,
For what is the memory but a faculty by which we raise up the images of
past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object, must
not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of
t ought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another,
and make the whole seem like the continuance ofone object? (260-261
emphasis added)
What is critical here is that Hume seems to use the word object in two very
different ways. The first “object” seems to refer to perception as an object of the faculty
of memory, while the second “object” seems to refer to an object having the perception,
i.e., a perceiver. Hume continues from the above quote writing, “In this particular, then,
the memory not only discover the identity, but also contributes to its production, by
producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions. The case is the same
whether we consider ourselves or others.” (261) Hume’s states that “an image
necessarily resembles its object” in order to make the point that an image of a past
perception resembles that (original) perception. Thus the “frequent placing of these
resembling perceptions in the chain of thought ’ would make it seem like there was one
continuing object, as he states. But this one continuing object would be one continuing
perception. It is plausible that the resemblance of remembered perceptions is such that
it makes what were successive perceptions seem like the continued existence of one
object; but this is not Hume's point. That memory contributes to our notion of our
personal identity—whether our own or others’—is his claim. But how could resembling
103
perceptions (of past perceptions) produce an easy transition in our thinking that results
in a notion of our own identity, rather than say, the identity of the object perceived?
How memory “contributes to [identity’s] production” is by “bestowing a relation
on this succession [of perceptions] amidst all its variation.” (260) This relation is a
relation of resemblance, and ostensibly what is being compared are the remembered
perception. Two questions must be raised here: what is it that they have in common
such that they resemble one another and what is it that they have in common such that
this resemblance will contribute to the production of our notion of “the successive
existence of a mind or thinking person?” Certainly the perceptions have in common
being perceptions, but that seems trivial. Also, as memories they have in common that
they are remembered. But how could our thought following along the relation of
resembling past perceptions as remembered engender a notion of the existence of a
mind? What is it that perceptions as remembered have such that a notion of mind could
come from the “easy transition of ideas” such resembling perceptions produce?
Part of the answer might involve what the differences are between a current or
present perception and a remembered or past perception. While the obvious difference
has to do with time, a current perception is also a singular perception. As noted earlier,
for Hume a mere movement of the eyes causes a new perception. Therefore, it seems
that current perceptions are only singular, while past perceptions can be compared, can
be related. But this doesn’t directly answer how remembered perceptions are part of the
production of personal identity. The idea of a past perception must involve something
else such that its resemblance to other ideas of past perceptions—when we reflect on
them-produces a relation in the imagination. What is the (quality of) identity that we
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attribute to perceprions “because of the union of their ideas in the imagination” such that
we do not think of the objects of the perceptions as identical over time, but that we think
of ourselves as such?
As Hume presents in the Appendix to the Treatise
,
he was not satisfied with his
presentation of the connection between perceptions. He writes, “upon a more strict
review of the section concerning personal identity
,
I find myself involv’d in such a
labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor
how to render them consistent.” (633) The source of his consternation is his
explanation of how we attribute identity: “when I proceed to explain the principle of
connexion, which binds [perceptions] together, and makes us attribute to them a real
simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective.” (635)
[Perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only be being connected
together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human
understanding, Hume tells us. “We only feel a connexion or a determination of the
thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone
finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a
mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected, and naturally introduce one another.”
(635)
What he cannot render consistent seems to be the fact that (a) we mistakenly
attribute to successive perceptions an underlying identity which unifies those
perceptions and (b) we do the same thing with our selves. This mistake (c) results from
our misplacing onto the perceptions our own experience via the imagination whereby
we think smoothly and continuously from one idea to the next due to their relations.
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But as we are ourselves only a collection of perceptions, how do we (d) “unite our
successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness”? (636) What is it that marks
the difference between just thinking one thought and then the next, and the linking of
them together in such a way that their successive perceptions are united? How is this
connecting possible? Even if it is just afeeling of connection, as Hume contends, if“no
connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable human understanding” then
how can we have a notion of our selves such that we can locate this feeling?
Hume is clearly aware of the demand in his account for a mind that is capable of
reflecting on its own perceptions, such that it mistakes successive perceptions for
identity. We know that the mind cannot be a unified substance, underlying and uniting
our perceptions. We also know that the mind for Hume cannot be separated from its
perceptions as it is constituted by them. Therefore there is no perception of the mind
itself, only perceptions. But, because perceptions are separable and distinguishable, and
because the mind can never perceive a connection between them, how can identity be
attributed to the mind such that it can experience the feeling of connection between
perceptions? Hume's explanation of personal identity presents a mind that is
constituted by its perceptions while it also invokes a mind that is capable of reflecting
on its perceptions. He attempts to resolve what seems to be an aporia of mind in his
explanation of the role of memory as producing a relation of resemblance amongst the
perceptions. How memory contributes to the ascription of identity to objects that are
not us does not help us understand how we might ascribe it to our selves. For it cannot
be the case, given Hume's earlier exposition, that we have any perceptions of our selves,
on which memory could bestow a relation of resemblance on.
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Ike Commonwealth: A Possible Model for Humean Self-awar^oo
Hume has one other analogy to explain the self: that of a political
commonwealth. Here self-reflection, where the self seems split into a viewer and an
actor, is represented as a kind of system. The turn to the commonwealth is a turn back
in Hume's text to the question of self-awareness rather than just personal identity.
Because of his project, his presentation of the mind and its awareness of itself cannot be
separate like that of a distant (and all-knowing) observer watching its perceptions, nor
connected like a mind that corresponds to/is a representation of its perceptions. There
must be a different relation between the mind and its perceptions such that the mind
neither is distant from them nor determined by them. Both pictures or understandings of
the relation between the self and its perceptions would be, by Hume's empiricist method,
rendered meaningless. We can sense here how the commonwealth analogy, for example,
suggests that understanding personal identity is itself analogous to understanding the
system that is our mental activity. 42
Like a commonwealth, the mind has identity yet is in constant flux. The
common purpose of the commonwealth is what holds its identity together despite its
constantly (and necessarily due to the need for generating new members, i.e., birth and
death) changing ‘body.’ This common purpose is its causal connection. But what is the
causal relation between the perceptions? Certainly, we remember our perceptions.
And, as Hume writes, “Memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to
its production.” (261) But how do memories of perceptions (or remembered
perceptions) hold together? “As to causation he writes,
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IT* u i f percept,ons or different existences, which are link'dogether by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce,
destroy, influence, and modify each other. (261)
Causation is the product of the association of perceptions in the imag,nation.
We take impressions that are constantly conjoined as being in a relation of cause and
effect. Hume depicts the movement of the impressions and ideas as having a kind of
force at work such that they “chace” each other. It is this relational movement which
comes from principles of the mind, but yet engenders practices of custom based on
belief that Hume likens to the commonwealth:
In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than
to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united
by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to
other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes
of its parts. (261)
It is not the ties between the members which unite the commonwealth, but those
of government and subordination. At this point in the Treatise we have not been
presented with any analysis of what government might be. But from what Hume
intimates here, it seems that the ties of government are like the principles of the mind:
they are given and structural though evidenced through the activities they engender, i.e.,
relations between members or perceptions. The associations are the stuff of the
commonwealth and the mind both. As such, the content of those associations-the
individual people and the impressions and ideas—are always changing.44
The relations between them—which is the source it seems of their identity
through or despite their diversity-appear to be a kind constant in that they are produced
through the structures of the government and the mind. But positing such a constant is
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problematic for Hume as it could encourage an epistemological claim that we can know
the mind by simply knowing the structures of the mind, echoing too closely the
‘substance’ model he is trying to critique.44 Hume thus continues the analogy by
presenting the government itself as changeable: “as the same individual republic may
not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the
same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and
ideas, without losing his identity.” (261, emphasis added)45 The identity of the republic
is maintained through changes of both its people and its structure, and, correspondingly
the identity of a person continues through changes of both the character of his person
and the perceptions of his mind. I think this marks a critical move in Hume's
development of a new model of self-awareness, for he is here presenting the mind as a
diversity both in terms of its ‘content’ and in terms of its structure. Both have
incomplete identities,’ identities that are maintained despite/through change. While
this does not answer then what identity actually is—how it is maintained through such
change— it does begin to offer a new way to look at the relations or dynamics involved.
It makes, in short, identity no longer conceivable as a one-to-one correspondence. The
relation of the many-to-many that is suggested, however, needs more analysis if Hume
is to have a clear theory of self-awareness, or self-reflection.
Hume’s stress here on the diversity of both the body and the government of the
commonwealth, the perceptions and the perceiver, if you will, returns us to the theatre
analogy. We can now see that the presence of the ‘audience’ in the metaphor of the
theatre suggests two notions of diversity: there is the presence of other persons as part
of the very constitution of the self and the multiple performances of the self through its
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(own) perceptions
.
46
As the commonwealth does not lose its identity through its double
changes, so too Hume says the self does not lose its identity through its double changes.
What can change about the self are both its perceptions and its character. There is
difference assumed in both the body and the structure of the republic, just as there is in
the perceptions and the character or person (doing the perceiving). Here I think the
debates about whether Hume is talking about minds or persons become resolved; he is
talking about both. The I that introspects (who looks inside its self) can change and that
which the I ‘sees’ can also change, and still the person will be considered the same.
To summarize, there is present in Hume's analogies of personal identity is a kind
of doubling of difference, or what I want to call a “double otherness,” to self-
awareness
.
47
Critical to thematizing this double-otherness, is developing a way to
appreciate not only the diversity of perceptions and the diversity of perceivers, but the
relation of both diversities together. While this notion of a double relation is developed
in Hume s chapter on the passions, particularly in the passion of Pride, as we saw above,
it is this double-otherness of sense of difference that is lost in his reliance on a model
whereby how (and what) we perceive our self (to be) is already defined by the structure
in the mind. Although Hume gestures toward the need for a foreign object in order for
the disposition we have towards pride to be elicited, the ‘foreigness’ of this object is
foreclosed by its pre-selection, as Baier says, by the disposition of which pride is the
effect.
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Alth°uSh Descartes does in fact state that the activity of the mind is so reauiredor the idea of any nature outside ofmyselfhe does not make an argument that would
upport this distinction. While I cannot present fully here what my argument is that allideas of natures require the activity of the mind, I do think that Descartes does notprowde a strong argument against including the nature of the self amongst those ideas
t require the mind s activity. Certainly he presents the wax example in a way that
suggests strongly that knowledge of the nature of the wax and knowledge of the nature
of the self have some things in common. He asserts at the end of the Second Meditation
lat the mind is known more easily than physical things, but he doesn’t support this with
any argumentation.
I cannot develop this point here, but, as I allude to in the last chapter, the
achievement of self-knowledge within the paradigm of self-certainty has important
implications for the achievement of the position of objective knower. The limits of the
modem epistemological subject is constitutive of the limits ofmodem moral subject,
especially in terms of the notion of impartiality. While feminist philosophers and others
lave analyzed the construction of the position of the impartial subject in terms of the
erasure of one’s particularity, I think the notion of ‘neutralizing’ the subject-I adds
something important to such analyses. Neutralized, the subject-I’s role as a producer of
ideas, including the idea of itself, is erased so that what it knows passes as non-
subjective. The agency of the subject-I is both maintained and shaped into the form of
the universal rational subject-I through this move. In the next chapter I address more
thoroughly the question of how to address the subject-I’s role in the production of its
ideas (including itself) in a way which does neither denies its agency nor erases (the
effect of) its subjective perspective. The recent debates about agency and
foundationalism have entailed what I consider to be a false dilemma between a free
agent and a determined non-agent in part because I think they have failed to offer a way
to grasp the complexity of the subject-I. I offer that self-knowledge engenders a way to
thematize the subject-I differently.
It is important to be clear here about my terms. I consider self-knowledge to be
knowledge the self claims to have about itself. It is knowledge that is particularly
relevant to the self s sense of itself, of what its ontology is. This becomes important
later in the dissertation as I theorize how the notion of ‘identity’ is a form of self-
knowledge which evidences the self as (capable of) knowing its own nature. Self-
awareness is not a knowledge claim or a proposition, but is rather an epistemic
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elationship in which the self is positioned in relation to itself as a knower It is a
rnetanh^
reh“10nsh 'p that both institutes epistemic possibilities and reflects
aphysica assumptions. Thus, how this relationship is configured ( 1 ) affects the kindof self-knowkdge that can be produced and (2) reflects assumptions concemTng the
relationship between epistemology and ontology. I am suggesting in this chapter thatHume s challenge to metaphysical claims about the self is limited because h/assumes adetermining relationship between epistemology and ontology such that how we know
constitutes what we are. This assumptions thus figures self-awareness as entailing a
subject-I who must be able to introspect its epistemic contents. Thus the split-self is
reproduced and no possibility for a radical self-knowledge is available. It might behelpful to call this splitting self-awareness rationalist self-reflection.
Because part of the problem here seems to be the way in which the seifs
epistemological capacities are assumed to determine its conception of its ontology I
suggest an alternative version of self-awareness must offer a way for the subject to
consider differently the relationship between how it knows itself and what it thinks is(or could be) such that the relationship between thinking and being can be challenged,
n other words, not only should we know that how we know ourselves (and what weknow ourselves as) is not necessarily what we are, but a critical epistemology in line
with a Humean cntique of the metaphysical self should also insist upon the refusal of an
ontology that is identical with an epistemology. I cannot present fully here the
rationalist conception of the relation between knowing and being, but I do suggest in the
following two chapters how such a critical epistemology might be possible. What
Hume does give us, as I develop in this chapter, is the first step to this reconceptualizing
of this relation: he provides us with a problematized notion of the self.
This is where some commentators could connect Hume's position to a more
traditional rationalist one.
8
This two-fold task leads to an aporia such that a knowing self is posited but yet
cannot be addressed. My listing of the two aspects of his task might be misleading as it
leaves out the fact that he gets to the alternative ontology via his critical epistemology.
What thus needs to be reconsidered is how to conceptualize the seifs ontology in a
different way, i.e., not based on what we can know about the self. The next chapter on
Foucault examines one possible way this can happen by envisioning the relationship
between the subject-I and the object-I in ethical and aesthetic terms rather than in
epistemological terms. In the last chapter I begin to discuss the possibilities of a
conceiving an ontology through what we cannot know, though I am not yet convinced
that this can provide the radical model of self-awareness that I am looking for.
In an act of self-perception, the self is both a perceiving subject and a perceived
object. For Descartes, as I have argued, this split threatens the certainty his method
demands, for it suggests a possibility of difference within the notion of self-knowledge.
How can one know for certain that the self one perceives oneself to be is in fact the self
one is if its possible that they could be different? Descartes resolves this question by
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making the self a thinking substance, and thus erasing the (possibility) of such a
vaiiauian rmiusopnicai Keview 14 ISpp 7S)- 401.
p. 251,
aware
There is much discussion in the literature on what exactly it is that Hume is
attacking. Some critics think it is only philosopher’s concept of strict identity, while
others contest that it is all ascriptions of identity. Some consider Hume’s attack is about
the self as person while others, the self as mind. I think that there is much ambiguity inHume regarding this issue, but also suspect that he shifts his attention to different
aspects of philosophical notions of self in order to accomplish his own mission. I will
try to present this line of argument throughout this paper.
1
2
Taken together, these ‘split’ selves make up the subject-object paradigm of
rationalist epistemology, and their relation-the unimpeded knower and the transparently
known-is that which constitutes rationalist self-knowledge.
1
3
Some commentators such as Penelhum consider that Hume holds that any
notion of personal identity is the result of a mistake, while others, consider the ‘mistake’
to be a metaphysical conception of personal identity as strict identity. My position is
more in line with the latter view. Penelhum, ibid.
14
The language of Hume’s comparison here is very interesting, though I am not
sure how much we can make use of it. It is interesting that he does not put bundle or
collection in the plural form, but instead leaves it singular. Mankind is one bundle, one
collection. They are a bundle. While I think this does not suggest that together we
make a bundle, it does seem that Hume is going to some pains to avoid making any kind
of individual ascription of what a person is.
15
Here we can begin to see the tricky bind Hume is in. In many places in the
Treatise he indicates that that the bundle is all we can know and hence we just cannot
assert or claim to know any more than that. In other places he does struggle with
presenting not simply a limit of our reasoning but also a positive account of what the
self is. This attempt to provide a positive account seems to be key to his critical attack
on metaphysicians (it is the strength and the weakness of his approach): he does not
want merely to reveal the weaknesses of their reasoning, as he wants to limit
scepticism’s critique. Thus Hume presents both an alternative epistemology and the
notion of what the self is that could be consistent with such an epistemology. It seems
without the noumenal/phenomenal distinction that Kant’s transcendental philosophy
provides, Hume cannot develop a critical epistemology that would at once allow him to
assert a limit to what we can know about the self that critiqued the rationalist dogmatists
and silenced their scepticist critics.
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My mtentlon ln thls dissertation is not to argue that the relation between the
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perceptl0ns (or any thlns or Ptaelice that mtght be considered constitutive ofself such as ,ts actions, its relations with others, or the social and Poh.“aTposh,o„st assumes or is assigned) is either identical or different. Instead, my goal is to suggesthow such a choice ,s problematic as both claims entail (a) posittng ,
capable of making this claim, and (b) conceiving of the relation between the self andthose practices in a totalizing way. What is critical for Foucault, as I present in the nextchapter ts resisting this impulse to totalization. What I would like to note here is theposs.b'hty Hume offers for theortzing the relation between the self and its pernep, onsdifferently as he presents the self as both a product of its relations a*/ separate ordistinct from them. Hume is unable to theorize this dual relation of identity and non-
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- Whal we need 10 consider <s the way inwhic that construction or constitution of the seif happens such that it is not fullydetermmed by those perceptions, etc., (without resorting to a substance, given, a priori
self). In chapter 5, 1 use the notion of the ‘desire for self-knowledge,” as a way to
approach the constitution of the self through its relations of identity and difference with
its constituents.
Hume is perhaps troping Descartes here as he not only takes on a more
obviously autobiographical tone, but then suggests that he might only be existing when
he is perceiving. “When my perceptions are remov’d for any times, as by sound sleep;
so long am I insensible of myself, an may truly be said not to exist.” (252)
20
According to Traiger, ibid., Descartes' assumptions regarding self-
transparency were widely shared. “Philosophers who did not share Descartes’
rationalism still held the view that we are intimately conscious of ourselves, and that our
awareness of other things enhances our self-awareness, and is epistemically dependent
on it. Butler claimed that our awareness of ourselves was beyond doubt, since to doubt
that awareness presupposes that we already have it. Whenever we ‘turn our thoughts
upon ourselves we have ‘certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment, rises
within us’ of our personal identity.” Pp 46-47. Quote from Joseph Butler’s The Analogy
ofReligion, in John Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1975), 103.
2
1
Hume s argument against the substance self and my reading of it, together,
seem to beg the question of self-reflection in a certain way. While I am contending that
his claim that we are collections of perceptions leaves us unable to do the self-
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exam.nanon that his method of critique relies upon, I recognize that he reaches his claimat we are nothing but bundles through his application ofthis method.
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but it is interesting to note thereume raises the idea ofmy perceptions as mine, as “belong[ing] to self’ but hedoesn t really seem to explain that relation. I suggest that he can’t, that doing so wouldinvolve positing not only a notion of self, but moreover, a notion of knowing that self, aaim regarding self-awareness that he is not able to make without falling back into thevery paradigm he is trying to debunk. h
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e Wlth Hume 's epistemology, neither a relation of identity nor a
rela ion of difference between the self and its perceptions will yield self-knowledge
while also critiquing the metaphysical notion of self. We need thus a notion of self-
awareness a relation between the self and what it knows of itself, that can engender
self-knowledge by approaching this relation as something other than difference or
identity.
I have not yet found any commentator raise the point of why we don’t mistake
the other way and see what is identical as diverse. Certainly Hume writes of our
tendencies to make things easy on the mind, to be epistemologically lazy, and so it could
be assumed that he thinks identity-making is more smooth and easy on the mind than
difference-making. As we shall examine in the next chapter, Baier’s claims that there is
much more behind the principles of association, especially in terms of where they come
from and why they would tend towards identity rather than difference.
There is much to note about the way in which Hume uses the passive voice
and other awkward grammatical forms. He is clearly trying to avoid (or at least raise as
problematic) putting forth an agentic self or mind who does things. Often, the mind is
made to do things or is acted upon. When not presented as passive, its activity seems
encouraged by forces outside of itself. “The qualities, from which this association [of
ideas] arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey ’dfrom one idea to
another, are three... (11, emphasis added) The mind is doubly passive here. Its activity
is a copy, mirroring that of the ideas, and the activity itself seems to move the mind.
The qualities convey the mind rather than the mind conveys the qualities. I contend that
Hume cannot present the mind as so active because his claim is that this mind is made
up of its associations. The self (itself) is a product of associations, indirectly, as we see
in latter section of this chapter on “Of Pride and Humility.”
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The connection between the passions and the self, and pride and the self in
particular, has been a common focus point for those interested in Hume's critique of
personal identity and his presentation of self-awareness. My impetus for exploring the
passion of pride is slightly different. I agree with those like Christian Campolo, who see
a critique of personal identity in Book I and a presentation of self-awareness in Book II.
I disagree with Campolo on his reading of self-awareness in Book II however. His point
is that the supposed contradictory usage of ‘self5 in Hume's Treatise is less controversial
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became it marks a change in usage for Hume. How Hume uses self in Book II for
polo, reflects his rejection of a Cartesian substance self and an acceptance of self-awareness. Gunpolo seems to think that Hume has no problem with self-awareness thathe accepts it without problematizing it. I think that Hume doesn’t immediately accept
self-awareness but is trying to find a way to have self-awareness that doesn’t reinstate aCartesian substance self. I think he considers this necessary in order for him to makeclaims about human nature. He fails in Book II to present such a model of self-
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h anal°gy i" Book I may seem to offer a promising wayto hematize Hume s new paradigm of self-awareness. But I maintain that Hume fails to
realize the potential of this analogy because his project involves grounding his analysisof moral theory and politics on his epistemology. This effects a separation betweeiMheindividual and the social such that thematizing the perceiving mind as a socially-
relational mind seems impossible for Hume. Chnstian Campolo, “Unidentified
Awareness: Hume's Perceptions of the Self,” Auslegung 18 (Sum 1992)- 157-166
Hume follows this distinction between direct and indirect passions saying
This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. I can only observe the
general... It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze this fully, but it is
interesting to note when in the Treatise Hume simply states that he cannot justify his
claims. There are many places throughout where he either states that “‘tis certain” that
something exists and need not be doubted, but there are also these other moments where
he states that he cannot offer an explanation. Both moments mark limits to his system,
though I think they do so in different ways. For example, Hume begins section Book II,
1 .2 stating that he cannot give complete definitions of the passions. “The utmost we can
pretend to is a descnption of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend
them. (277) We can begin to see here how Hume has been considered to be the
‘father’ of logical positivism and perhaps, everyday language analysis. See Stroud on
this topic, Stroud (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York: 1977).
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See Robert Paul Wolff, “Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity,” The
Philosophical Forum 69 flu! 1 960V 294.
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For Hume, ‘"all the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into
two distinct kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas.
. .Those perceptions, which
enter with most force and violence, we may name impression
;
and under this name I
comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions.” (1) Impressions can be further
categorized into original or immediate impressions which are our sensations, and
secondary or indirect impressions which are our passions and emotions. (275) These
indirect impressions are also importantly referred to as impressions of reflexion.
Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original
ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea..
. Of the second are the
passions, and other emotions resembling them.” (275) Hume limits his investigation to
reflective impressions and specifically focuses on the “violent” ones, “the passions of
love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.” (276)
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While I am using the term ‘cause' here, it must be remembered that for Humecausa! connections are connections produced through association. They are relationsproduced through associations in the imagination. We believe that something is the
cause of something else because of the mistake we make regarding their constant
conjunction.
e same qualities, when transfer’d to subjects, which bear us no relation
mfluencenotm the smallest degree either of these affections.” (285) I might feel joy atmy friend s dinner party but I feel pride about my own. It is also not trivial that I do not
teel pride about my self without some other thing through which I relate to myself.
There must be a way in which I take myself as an object of pride if I feel pride in my
self. Thus, there must also be a way in which I assume a position of a subject who takes
herself as an object as well.
33 Hume uses lots of visual metaphors regarding the relation of the passion of
pride and its object, the self. It is interesting that in these metaphors it is the passion
who seems to be the one looking. For example: ‘“tis absolutely impossible...that these
passion shoul d ever look beyond the self...” Sometimes there is no subject of the gaze
and the looking is put into a passive voice: “Here at last the view always rests, when we
are actuated by either of these passions.” But it also seems that we are doing the
looking when we are actuated by the passion: “...nor can we, in that situation of mind
ever lose sight of this object.” (286)
4 As we will see the motion of the foreign object engenders the turn of the
passion s attention, and this motion of the turn engenders the activation of the self.
Thus, it can be said that the foreign object is the ‘cause’ of the self. How to maintain
this foreigness (or otherness) of the self through self-awareness is the goal of this
dissertation. Hume introduces this idea, but fails to create a model of self-awareness
which can address it as foreigness. I contend, though development of this point will
have to wait until the last two chapters, that maintenance of this foreigness offers a way
to move beyond the limits of rationalism’s approach to the self, and it engenders an
ethical way to have self-awareness.
35
It could be argued that it is not obvious that my entire self cannot be my
property—consider Locke’s famous quote, “Every man (sic) has a property in his own
person.... ’ I suggest, however, that a notion of self-ownership still requires a notion of a
self who is doing the owning and a self who is being owned. This self need not be the
individual qua a particular individual, but could be the individual qua the abstract
universal Individual. Being a member of the group of Individuals thus engenders a
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splitting of the self into particular selfand universal self such that the concent of (andperhaps rights to) self-ownership is possible. While I cannot address adequately the
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Both resemblance and cause and effect are relations of association. Such
re ations are made via the principles of association as the imagination follows them like
a shadow, transitioning from one perception to another. According to Hume, the notion
of cause is, like the notion of personal identity, a mistake whereby we ascribe to
separate perceptions which are ‘in constant conjunction’ the relation of cause and effect.
This mistake is a feeling that occurs as the imagination moves from one to the other,
assisted by relations between impressions produced in accordance with the principles of
association. It would seem then that the ascription of ‘cause’ to either the idea of mine
or the idea of self would in effect, be equally mistaken. The question I have concerns
the relation of the imagination to the direction or pattern of the associations. Does the
way we make the ascription affect (or reflect?) the way in which the imagination moves
or transitions from one to the other? Or does the movement of the imagination merely
effect (in the sense of produce or engender) the notion of cause?
39
This absence is critical as it leaves the self in some sense beyond knowing, or
at least, for Hume, beyond experience. This lack of description-which Hume refers to
throughout the Treatise
,
stating repeatedly that such things about the self cannot be
known--can be thematized in one of two ways: as outside beyond our view in a way
which closes its possibilities and in a way which opens its possibilities. When the self is
presented as unknowable or as given in a way that no more can be said about it, then I
argue that it is easy for it to be rendered as identical to the structure through which or in
which it exists. For how do we differentiate between the self and the structure if there is
no way to know or refer to the self? There must be a way to mark the impossibility of
defining or explaining the self while also defining it as different from the structure
which seems to produce it. Within the context of Hume's empirical method, the sticky
wicket of course, becomes doing so without positing an epistemologically privileged
self outside of experience. The last chapter of this dissertation on adopted identity
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attempts to thematize the difference that
unknowable.
is constitutive of the self as both present and
I would like to stress that what is at issue is not only that Hume posits the selfas existing but how is lack of explanation or description of it needs to be addressed Forgesturing toward the self as both present and unaccountable is interesting- what hannenshowever ,s that this lack of address, lack of self-account can easily allow theW
T
get turned into the self of the status quo. How to make the self as aporehc alsodistantto co-optation is the concern of this dissertation.
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Interestingly, Hume does not frame this looking into the self in terms oflooking into one's own self, bu, into the breast of another. This suggests to,here is in
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tating The case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others ” (261) While
this might be true, Hume is definitely skirting the issue of self-awareness here by basinghis example on looking at another. Though of course, the point may be that it is asimpossible to look into his breast as it is to look into my own: bu, by beginning with the
other rather than with the self, Hume’s analysis avoids raising the issue of how it is that
might be able to look at the workings ofmy own imagination.
We return to this point later. Hume’s ‘discovery’ that the activity of the mind
influences the way in which we know the mind is both the strength and the weakness of
his investigation. As I will claim later, he does not know how to theorize this
constructionism other than through scepticism. See Manfred Kuehn’s “Hume’s
Antinomies,” Hume Studies 9 tAp 1QKM- 25-45.
My claim, as I will present below, is that this analogy begins to suggest that
identity is not simply maintained despite change, but because of it. It is the difference
between the perceptions, between the members, and their engagement in their relations
that constitutes the identity. If there was no difference, then there could be no identity.
Hume clearly does not want to posit any kind of unifying substance as the self.
He writes, “.
. .the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely
unintelligible: All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what
is extended or un-extended.” (250) He also resists the positing of any kind of
underlying structure which can be known a priori: “There is no foundation for any
conclusion a priori, either concerning the operations or duration of any object, of which
‘tis possible for the human mind to form a conception.” (250)
5
1 cannot address this fully here, but this claim indicates a certain kind of
agency or volition on the parts of the republic and person that seems odd. Throughout
the Treatise
,
Hume puts his claims in the passive voice such that who or what the actor
or agent of an act is is not clearly indicated. (This will be evident in the section on
Pride.) Here, however, he uses the active voice—a republic may change its laws and a
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I don tfeel that it is necessary to know exactly what I amThe main interest in life and work is to become someone else
that you were not in the beginning.
. . The game
is worthwhile insofar as we don ’t know what will be the end 1
One s way ofno longer remaining the same is, by definition,
the most singular part ofwho I am 2
CHAPTER 4
CARING TO KNOW: DEVELOPING SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS A
FOUCAULDIAN TECHNIQUE OF SELF
Introduction
Philosophers David Hume and Michel Foucault have many interesting things in
common. Both have popularly been thought of as sceptics whose works provide more
negative critique than positive contributions. Though they have radically different
approaches to the notion ofhuman nature, both philosophers center their research on
this topic. Both pursue their philosophical studies using methods which affect both the
style and the content of their investigations. Hume’s Treatise
,
for example, examines
human nature as an empirical phenomenon, while Foucault presents his critique of
philosophy’s assumptions about the self through the writing of history. As such, their
works have not unanimously been recognized as philosophy, and they themselves have
often been considered by their peers social scientists rather than philosophers perse.
Most relevant to our project is the fact that the works of both authors are
motivated by a critique of the metaphysical notion of the self as an identical, unified,
naturally given and rationally knowable substance. Rather than assuming an a priori
self, each puts forth an idea of the unified self as a fiction created through and
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constituted by expenences and practices. Thus each questions the tendencies we have to
ascribe the notion of personal or individual identity, though Hume investigates the
natural activity of the human mind as the souree of such tendencies, and Foucault the
social activity of history and polities. Interest,ngly enough, both Foucault and Hume
have also been accused of inconsistency in terms of their approaches to the self. In the
last chapter we explored the issue of Hume's “two selves" and suggested that the self
presented in Book II of the Treatise can be read as part of Hume's attempt to salvage
some notion of self-awareness. The “concern” we have for the self through the passions
of pride and shame reflects a difference between the selfas subject and the self as
object. We concluded that Hume was unable to grasp fully this implicit notion of
difference and utilize it in the development of a model of self-awareness consistent with
his critique of the metaphysical self. This chapter addresses Foucault's possible
inconsistency regarding the self. In particular it concerns Foucault's “return to the
subject” in his later works in which he presents the idea that the self can have what he
calls an ethical relation of “care” with itself The inconsistency in question is less
with Foucault's presentation of the subject or self and more with his presentation of self-
knowledge.
While his model of “care” seems to offer a positive yet critical notion of the self
as in relation with its own becoming, it is unclear if this relation of “care” also offers a
way we can address this self, and can be aware of it. If it doesn’t entail a kind of caring
epistemic relation, then what the relation of self to itself is, is unclear. Leaving the
epistemic relation between the self and its becoming unspecified seems both to
encourage an undetermined openness in terms of the meaning of the relation the self has
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W,th itself, and to d.scourage a way to thematize the difference between the self and its
becoming. Without a way to mark such a difference-even if it is relative and ever-
shiftmg—the relation between the ‘two selves’ could collapse into one of identity, and
hence hamstring the critique of traditional metaphysical claims about the self that is
paramount to Foucault's work
.
3
I claim that we can draw out of Foucault's analysis of “care” a practice of self-
knowing that would be consistent with his earlier work critiquing such practices. Taken
together in fact, Foucault's genealogical analyses of truth and power and his ethical
analysis of the seifs relation to itself can begin to offer a political efficacious model of
self-knowledge4 which resists the modem demand to know the self as an object of
knowledge and offers a way to thematize the knowing self without assuming a position
outside of the knowing event. While Foucault's notion of the care the self takes in itself
helps to render the self as a kind of on-going aesthetic production, the articulation of a
kind of ‘caring’ self-knowledge I claim, introduces into Foucault's notion of the self as a
“work of art” an insistent re-assertion of difference. The presence of this difference, in
turn, discourages the relation the self has with itself from collapsing (or relapsing
perhaps) into a relation of identity. In other words, rather than culling from Foucault's
work a (totally) non-epistemic model of the subject as some commentators have
suggested as possible, I want to claim a notion of self-awareness which can provide both
a radical notion of the self and a challenging model of self-knowledge
.
5
Having developed throughout his work a critique not only of the self, but also of
the practices of self-knowledge whereby the self renders itself an object of knowledge or
Truth for itself and others, Foucault's turn toward the self has been received somewhat
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sceptically. His elaboration of this notion of care and its political and ethical
tmpl,cations were, of course, cut short by his untimely death. 1 would like to suggest
that for Foucault's return to the self through the tmperative "take care of the self to be
most effective in terms of fulfilling its promise of engendering more posstble ways of
being one's self in contemporary culture, it has to be taken together with a caring way to
know the self. After presenting Foucault's crittque of self-knowledge, I will present his
notion of selfand its possibilities through being in a relation of care with itself. As this
seems to be his alternative to “know thyself,” I will then investigate whether or not
“caring for” the self without some concept of self-knowledge is sufficient for care's
potential as a model of self that enables the self to be concerned with its own
possibilities. 1 will suggest a model of knowing the self that I think is consistent with
(and perhaps required by) Foucault's critique of self-knowledge in terms of Truth. This
new model of self-knowledge, which I argue is implicit in Foucault's notion of care, is
less sceptical than some other models offered as it begins to suggest a positive way to
address one s /^-ability to know one self completely.
^rom
—
Take Care of The Self to “Know Thyself Foucault’s Critique
of the Will to Knowledge
Foucault traces throughout his work shifts in philosophical thinking and cultural
practices away from the imperative to care about the self and others and toward the
imperative to know the self. He calls the force of this latter command, the will to
knowledge, and analyzes it as a disciplinary practice using both his genealogical and
archeological methods. Understanding the term “discipline” as both the enforcement of
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rules as well as an area of knowledge-or what he calls “episteme”-these methods
concern historical practices and epistemological (or discursive) practices respectively
.
6
Both methods question the relat.onship between the product,on of knowledge of the self
and the production of the self or subject
.
7
They each ask what are the conditions which
make self-knowledge possible. The genealogical works look at relations ofpower as
such conditions, while the archeological works look at systems of ideas of discursive
constructions as such conditions. Both methods produce a kind of aporetic or
paradoxical reading of self-knowledge as Foucault claims that neither makes self-
knowledge really possible. Through his genealogical investigations, Foucault shows
how the acts through which the self attempts to know itself (as an individual) force it to
conform to social norms such that acts of self-knowledge are in fact what he calls acts
of normalization. Through his archeological investigations, he presents how self-
knowledge is produced through discursive practices such that the questions that can be
asked about what the self is are already limited by those linguistic practices. There is no
way to posit a self who can know itself outside of the terms through which such
‘knowledge’ is made possible.
In short, we see in Foucault’s works the dynamics of self-knowledge as
involving what I have been calling the split-self, i.e., an I who knows and an I who is
known. In his analysis of practices of confession, for example, as we discuss below, the
self is made into or constructed as a knowing self by producing itself as an object of its
own knowledge. The knowing self is engendered by rendering itself knowable. As this
knowledge is, in Foucault’s analysis, produced as the Truth of the self, it renders the
relation between the two I’s one of identity
,
contracting their difference into a relation
125
Which reflects the dynamics-i.e., social practices-through which that “knowledge” is
rendered coherent. In other words, while the self seems to be produced as an agent of
its own knowing, it is through the practices of self-knowledge as Truth being
determined by the disciplinary requirements to produce itself as such. In the
genealogical works, the ‘resolution’ to the split or difference between the I s comes at
the cost of the knowing or subject-I since the knower ,s in fact made into an object of
knowing through its acts of self-knowing. There is no way to thematize a subject-I
because such an ‘active’ or ‘agentic’ subject position in Foucault’s genealogical analysis
always-already entails conforming to the limits of the power-knowledges through which
such agency is established. Foucault calls this objectification. Through objectification
the subject loses its capacity for agency as it becomes a fixed object by the practices
through which it assumes a purportedly agentic position. In the archeological works, the
resolution that is self-knowledge reflects the limits of the terms through which it is
known. As we will see in the later section on Foucault's move to “care of the self,”
however, the relation between the self who knows and the self who is known need not
be resolved into “identity,” since the difference between the selves not only can be
maintained but must be.
Self-knowledge as Disciplinary Practice through
Obligations to Truth
Performing a kind of Nietzschean transvaluation, according to Paul Rabinow,
Foucault inverts the Weberian idea of the cost of rationality on the self. 8 Rather than
conceiving of a self who must, for the sake of rational and ethical behavior, give up part
of what it knows itself to be, Foucault envisions a self who, before being able to
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renounce what it knows, must first pay the cost ofbecoming a self who can know itself.
According to Foucault, Weber asks,
If one wants to behave rationally and regulate one’s action according totrue principles, what part of one’s self should one renounce? What is the
ascetic pnce of reason?
. . For my part, I have posed the opposite
question: How have certain kinds of interdictions become the price
required for obtaining certain kinds of knowledge about oneself? What
must one know about oneself in order to be willing to accept such
renunciation? 9
For Foucault the question is not what is a self or even what can a selfknow
about itself, but rather how do social, political, and cultural practices through which the
self becomes a self, a human subject, render that subject intelligible. In particular, he is
concerned with the practices through which the self not only becomes intelligible to
others, but it feels required or compelled to make itself so intelligible, especially to
itself. Through his explorations of different institutional practices Foucault’s historical
works reveal that self-knowledge is not something the self can claim to have a priori
self, nor even is it a culturally determined or historically relative version of knowledge
of the self. Instead, his analysis presents how practices of self-knowing are in fact
constitutive of what and how the self can be.
The modem period of European history, Foucault suggests, reveals not a natural
self discovered by philosophy and science, but practices of knowing through which the
self is brought into being as an object of knowledge. In what is considered his
genealogical works, Foucault traces through histories of such institutions as prisons and
mental institutions the practices through which the self becomes an individual capable
of both being known and of knowing itself. In order to participate in the social order, he
claims, one has to produce oneself as a certain kind of subject. “All the practices by
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which the subject is defined and transformed,” he writes, “are accompanied by the
formation of certain types of knowledge, and in the West, for a variety of reasons,
knowledge tends to be organized around forms and norms that more or less scientific.” 10
His genealogies are thus not intended to trace back to the past a present idea or
practice, nor to compare present concepts and ideas and past ones. Instead, Foucault's
intent is to explore how an experience of something became possible, how it our
experiences of our selves (and what experience is theorized as) are different in different
historical moments. Rather than being the free actions or phenomena of a naturally
individual self, “experience” for Foucault in such works as Madness and Civilization
,
Discipline and Punish
,
and the History ofSexuality Volume /, reflects those relations of
power and systems of knowledge which make it possible. In his History ofSexuality, he
writes a history of what seems to have enabled the “experience” of sexuality rather than
a history of sexual activities or of political or social repressions. Madness and
Civilization traces not the history of the mad, but the construction of madness such that
the experience of madness (and consequently of sanity) was rendered possible.
Importantly, he describes experience “as the correlation between fields of knowledge,
types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.” 11 Thus the focus
of undertaking a genealogy of sexuality, for example, he writes, is
to analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their
attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge
themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves
and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in
desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen. 12
Thus his genealogies of madness and prisons involve examining the ways in
which it became possible if not necessary to recognize oneself as a subject of Reason
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and a subject of the Law and/or the State. These genealogical works each in different
ways explore how in these relations of knowledge, normativity, and subjectivity are
enacted by the self in his quest for Truth. It is through one’s participation in these
ascriptions that one is recognized as both knowing oneself truthfully and producing the
truth of oneself for others.
Self-knowledge as Self-discipline: Truth, Science and Confession
Under the force of the “will to truth,” wntes Foucault, “one of the main moral
obligations for any subject is to know oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, and to
constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both for other people and for oneself.” 13
According to Foucault, then, this production of oneself as an object of one’s own
knowledge is double-edged. On the one hand, such a truth practice can be seen as a
means of becoming a (legitimate) subject, as it evidences oneself as a subject capable of
such knowing; on the other hand, because the practice of evidencing oneself as such a
knower is limited by the discourses and practices through which such knowledge was
possible, so the experience one can have as this knowing subject is also limited. The
sense of moral obligation involved in what Foucault calls the obligation to Truth can be
seen in the reliance in Western culture on the practice of confession. “Since the Middle
Ages at least, writes Foucault, “Western societies have established the confession as
one of the main rituals we rely upon for the production of truth.” This establishment
involved a shift away from the practice of an individual as part of a social community,
being “vouched for by the reference of others and the demonstrations of his ties to the
commonweal (family, allegiance, protection.” Instead, the individual “was
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authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning
himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of
individualization by power.” 14
Foucault's point here is that historically self-knowledge has provided one with
neither individuality nor freedom. It has been the promise of such notions that have
been the force by which the subject has been coerced to produce itself as such. The act
of naming oneself as a kind of being, or as a being who has a soul which is its true
nature, its inner truth, is in its conformity to social norms and systems of knowledge an
act which shapes the “individual” and limits its freedom. Acts of confession, Foucault
claims, have become enculturated as part of the Western model of subjectivity:
The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different
points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the
effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that
truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface; that if
it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence
of a power weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at the
price of a kind of liberation
.
15
Identity as a Truth Obligation
Contemporary acts of confession for Foucault, where one produces oneself as
both having a nature to confess and being able to know that nature, can be seen in such
practices as “coming out” as a gay person. When one’s legitimacy as a subject is
produced through the evidencing of what is considered to be one’s inner truth, then
Foucault thinks the freedom of such a subject is limited through this act whereby one
limits one’s relation to oneself through this relation of identity. In an interview
discussing gay politics, Foucault states,
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Another thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question ofhomosexuality to the problem of 'Who am I?’ and 'What is the secret ofmy desire. Perhaps it would be better to ask oneself, 'What relations
mollted
0“0
Th
XUallt
m
Can ^ eSlablished
* invented
' multiplied and
'
du ated? e problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of sex
relationships^
6 SeXUaH 'y he"Cef°rth ‘° arnVe * 3 muldP'>mty of
By producing ourselves through epistemologies of truth whereby we render
ourselves knowable through our "identities ” we are engaging in activities which
discipline us on two levels: we produce ourselves through normative terms-which are
usually duahstic and hierarchical such as straight versus gay, man versus woman,
rational versus irrational, etc.-which limit the possibilities of what we can be, and we
produce the relation we have to ourselves as one of identity. “I am what I know myself
to be” for Foucault, means that I have internalized the disciplinary practices ofwhat he
calls, taking the two systems together, power/knowledges, such that who I am as a
knower is who I am as a known. Because in the genealogical penod of his research,
how I am known (even to myself) for Foucault is (only) through practices dictated to me
through social and epistemological practices, then who I am as a knower is so reduced
to this social construction. 17
Turning towards the Self Through Care: Technologies of the Self
It is this notion of the relation between the self and itself that Foucault struggles
with as he writes volumes II and III to the History ofSexuality. The shift that many
commentators have traced in his work is one which moves from a focus on the relation
between power or discourse and the subject’s engendering, to the relation between the
subject and itself. The Will to Knowledge, as I suggest above, constructs the subject
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within the paradigm of Truth such that its active relation to itself is rendered impossible.
If the subject is active at all in its self-production, as it certainly seems to be in such
practices as confession, then it is so only in so far as it conforms to the disciplinary
practices which make self-knowledge possible. The practices whereby the subject
knows itself are thus constitutive of what that subject can be, engendering an identity
relation between the I who can know and the I who can be known. This “can” is not
defined in terms of its own individual or personal limits, but in terms of what is
intelligible to the social-political structure through which such knowledge can occur.
Thus the possibility of what a subject can be is defined in this paradigm by what the
power relations and systems of knowledge allow to recognized as such.
In what has come to be called his “ethical” work, Foucault still utilizes his
genealogical and archeological method, but in a way that highlights not the power
relations and discursive formations which are the conditions of knowledge, but the ways
in which individual subjects act within and in accordance to such limits. His goal is not
only to show the historical contingency of knowledge and the bankruptcy of the
concepts of truth of the self, but also to present how it is possible for subjects
participating in the cultural practices of their historical moment to develop a concern for
their own beings. And this being, he points out, as it is engendered through actions that
are aesthetic in relation to the production of the self, concern not the seifs being as
given, natural, or truthful, but as a kind of becoming. This becoming is not itself an
unfolding of life or human activity according to a telos; it is the ways in which the self
engages with its own differences through thought. Foucault's call in his later works is
that we must address this history of thought and examine the ways in which the self has
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thought about itself and its own meaning through its thoughtful becoming. As such
thinking concerns the ways in which we can as human beings enact our subject,vity
differently, this is for Foucault, ethical thinking about the self, or care. Describing the
shift in the focus of his work, Foucault says to an interviewer:
Let’s say very briefly that through studying madness and psychiatry,
cnme and punishment, I have tried to show how we have indirectly
constituted ourselves through the exclusion of some other: criminals,
mad people, and so on. And now my present work deals with the
question: How did we directly constitute our identity through some
ethical techniques of the self which developed through antiquity to
now?
From “Normalization” to “Problematization”
The shift of focus in the different volumes of the History ofSexuality reflects a
shift in Foucault's understanding of his project which he at some moments considers to
be a history of truth and at others to be a history of thought. Reflecting on the process
of researching and writing these such histories, he writes that they involve “a matter of
analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies,’ but the
p} oblematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily thought—and the
practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.” 19Foucault’s
historical work on Ancient cultural practices in Volumes Two and Three of the History
of Sexuality, reflects his interest in presenting not a mode of being or living that might
serve as a model for the present, but rather what he calls a “problematic,” a nexus of
practices and attitudes that engender certain configurations and possibilities of what it is
to be a human subject. “Problematics” are ethical in nature for Foucault, as they
engender ways in which subjects can consider the acts they do and the rules they follow
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m terms of the productive effects such practices (askesis) have on their selves. What
interested him most about these practices was that their organ,zat,on was not centered
on self-knowledge or self-understanding, but was instead a “problematic” that focused
on the seifs relatton to its own freedom. Just reflection he calls
“problematization.”
"The proper task of a history of thought,” he writes “is to define the conditions in which
human beings ’problematize’ what they are, what they do, the world in which they
live .”
20
This problematizing is both a sign of their freedom and an enactment of it, as
human beings are not by nature pre-determined in either what they are or how they
think.
Unlike Foucault’s earlier model in which disciplinary practices engender
“docile” subjects who make themselves in the image of the laws they followed, these
techniques of self or what he sometimes calls “arts of existence” open up a space for
subjects to practice their relation to their selves differently. These cultural or artistic
rituals, he writes,
are those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to
change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic
criteria .-
1
The major shift here in the relationship between the self and the processes
through which it is made into a subject is in this notion of problematization. Rather
than evoking a notion of determinacy or completeness, the relationship opened up
through problematization is one ofpossibility. As we saw above, in his genealogies of
power and discourse, the possibilities at stake are those allowed or engendered by
relations outside of the self. They subjected the self and in that way limited the self’s
134
possibilities as such. By focusing on problematizations, Foucault’s genealog.es allow
for a recognition of the ways in which the self participates in its own subjection.
Because such participation is undertaken by the self outside ofa discourse ofTruth, its
purpose or goal is not to produce or to represent to the selfand to others the truth of the
self. Therefore, there is a way in which the self is able to see the pract.ces as techniques
whereby the self, the form it takes, is not an expression of inner self or inner truth, but is
a created product of the seifs labor on itself.
Techniques of Self
What makes these problematizations possible are actions in relation to the self
that open up spaces for acts of self-reflection whereby the self can be in relation to its
own production. He calls these actions techniques or technologies of self. The
technology of the self is furthers the analysis he has already pursued regarding
technologies of domination, of production and of signification. Technologies of the self
he writes, are
techniques that permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain
number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own
thoughts, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform
themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection,
happiness, supernatural power
.
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According to Foucault's Greeks and Romans in the first and second centuries
were engaged in such practices regarding their diets, their sexual activities, their
marriages. This engagement took place through writing in notebooks and letters, and in
public discussion with friends.^ What is relevant to our project here is Foucault's
analysis of these practices as entailing a relation between the self and its being, its
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existence, that is not one of identity, that is not one whereby the self performs its
subjectivity by evidencing its inner truth. Rather, these activities are creative acts
whereby what the self is is made by actions the self undertakes. As not identical to the
self that the self already is, these acts produce the self that the self becomes.
The notion of self-knowledge thus shifts here from evidencing the truth of what
one already is, inside, such that one’s epistemological claims are concomitant with what
one is, to producing what one is through practices of oneself. These practices, though
about the body and its actions, also open up a space for thinking about what one is
according to Foucault. Self-knowledge is thus involved, but it is not static, not certain,
not objective. It serves another purpose which is more speculative. For Foucault, this
historical investigation of ancient practices of self-knowledge broaden both our ideas of
what such knowledge can be and how it can be used. These techniques of the self are,
he writes,
. . . the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization, suggested
or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity, maintain
it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations
of self-mastery or self-knowledge. In short, it is a matter of placing the
imperative to ‘know oneself—which to us appears so characteristic of
our civilization—back in the much broader interrogation that serves as its
explicit or implicit context: What should one do with oneself? What
work should be carried out on the self? How should one ‘govern
oneself by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of
those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the
instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?24
From Subjection to Subjectivation Through Care
The imperative “take care of the self’ Foucault finds implicit in Ancient Greek
and Roman practices as a kind of ethical principle. One was expected to take of oneself,
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to take actions the purposes of which were the cultivation of the self and the
development of relations of oneself to oneself. ‘'This ‘cultivation of the self,”’ he
writes,
can be briefly characterized by the fact that in this case the art of
existence--the techne tou biou in its different forms-is dominated by the
principle that says one must “take care of oneself.” It is this principle of
the care of the self that establishes its necessity, presides over its
development, and organizes its practice. But one has to be precise here;
the idea that one ought to attend to oneself, care for oneself (heautou
epimeleisthai), was actually a very ancient theme in Greek culture
.
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While “subjection” is a process through which the self is constituted in relation
to practices of power and discourse such that, as we will see, it can tell the Truth about
itself, “subject!vation” is a process through which the self is able to recognize the rules
of Truth, the games of Truth through which notions of true and false are produced and,
not escape them, but play with them. Subjectivation opens up a gap between the
constitutive reality of the self, and the self s possibilities for what Foucault considers
“ethical” reflection.
This gap that engenders the possibility of ethical reflection is a conceptual
space between the self as an agent of its activities and the self as a product of those
activities. This space for Foucault is one in which the self can think about its own
production in relation to its actions. This thinking about itself and its own becoming
Foucault calls care and he locates such care in ancient practices of self. “In the slow
development of the art of living under the theme of the care of oneself, the first two
centuries of the imperial epoch can be seen as the summit of a curve; a kind of golden
age in the cultivation of the self.”26 For Foucault, this cultivation of the self was not
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excluding of the community, though it was a relation one had with oneself.
. ,[T]he
principle of care of oneself became rather general in scope,” he writes. He continues
It took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in
ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that
people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to
constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between
individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to
institutions. And it gave rise, finally to a certain mode of knowledge and
to the elaboration of a science
.
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Rather than histories on techniques of domination or techniques ofpower or
discourse, this history of the “care” for the self and the “techniques” involved, he states,
would “be a way of doing the history of subjectivity.
. . through the putting in place, and
the transformations in our culture, of ‘relations with oneself,’ with their technical
armature and their knowledge effects. And in this way one could take up the question
of govemmentality from a different angle: the government of the self by oneself in its
articulation with relations with others.
.
.”
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Freedom, Care, and Games of Truth
In his essay “Subjectivity and Truth,” Foucault begins to explore the notion of
the “care of oneself’ using Plato’s Alcibiades where, he says, care of the self appears “as
the general framework within which the imperative of self-knowledge acquires
significance.’ Starting from this point, from epimeleia heautou, Foucault states that a
history of the “care of oneself’ “understood as an experience, and thus also a technique
elaborating and transforming that experience” can be developed .' 9 We can notice here a
critical shift in Foucault's analysis of the history of the subject. No longer is experience
merely that which is made possible through disciplinary practices, but rather those
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practices can be used in the service of “transforming that experience” the self has of
itself. This is at the heart of the care relationship: without the obligation to know the
self by reproducing oneself in accordance with discourses of truth, the experience the
self has of being itself need not be fixed, given, identical to what it knows itself to be.
Self-knowledge acquires significance, according to Foucault's reading of ancient texts,
within the framework of care. This means that the ‘knowledge’ one has of oneself must
serve the needs of the caring relation one has to oneself. Foucault does not provide a
positive description of what such knowledge would have been then or could be now.
We will develop this below. What is important to note here is that the knowledge one
has of oneself must not limit one’s freedom in relation to one’s care for oneself.
Whereas social, cultural, and epistemological practices are almost exclusively
presented as deterministic in Foucault's earlier works, those practices involved in
techniques of the self in the later works are viewed as engendering a kind of freedom.
This freedom does not mean that the self is free to choose to be whatever it wants to be,
outside of practices and their limits. Rather, freedom is involved in the attitude that the
self has about its production through these practices. This attitude engenders a kind of
self-stylization [which] entails not a kind of freedom outside of history, outside of
rules, practices and norms. It is not from a position outside of what could be called real
that we engage in practices of self-stylization, but in a relation with what is is real .”30
Foucault’s turn towards the subject’s engagement with such practices is not about
escaping the obligation to truth, but rather is about playing the “truth game” differently.
He writes,
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Things being as they are, nothing so far has shown that it is possible tome a strategy outside of this concern. It is within the field of the
obligation to truth that it is possible to move about in one way or another
sometimes against effects of domination which may be linked to
structures of truth or institutions entrusted with truth Thus one
escaped from a domination of truth not by playing a game that was
totally di fferent from the game of truth but by playing the same game
cards^
^ ^ P an0ther game
’
another hand, with other trump
Subjectivation and the Role of Self-KnowlerW
As discussed above, Foucault’s work takes a complicated turn toward the end of
his abbreviated career. Commentators have lamented the lack of development of the
notion of care, though they have pointed out the complexities it raises especially
regarding the role or function of the epistemic subject in Foucault's theory. While it is
unclear how Foucault might have developed his ideas concerning care and ethics, it is
clear that Foucault’s “history of the subject” is a critique of the metaphysical subject
that is figured as a self-transparent, rational substance. It is also clear that his later
emphasis on care, ethics, and what he calls the “history of thought” involves an implicit
re-evaluation of the epistemological subject, at least in terms of its relation to its own
activities as “self-fashioning.” Some commentators argue that in trying to develop a
model of subjectivity that rejects as foundational to the self its capacities as a knower,
Foucault completely rejects the traditional ’epistemic subject.’ I offer that Foucault's
later work suggests an alternative model of self-knowledge or self-awareness. What this
model of self-awareness is however, is implied, but never articulated. I present in the
following section why I think developing such a notion is an important part of
understanding the ethical relation of care, particularly in terms of its status as a relation.
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Resisting the Constitutive Force of Power-knowledges
An oft repeated criticism of Foucault’s work, particularly his genealogical
analyses of power through the institutions of the penal system and psychiatry, is its
purported pessimistic, if not nihilistic, outlook for political change. These critics assert
that power for Foucault, is seemingly everywhere and unable to be resisted politically as
it is inscribed onto our bodies and into our lives not through dominating external forces,
but through the very practices with which make our lives. What is particularly binding
is that since we live in a post-Cartesian, hermeneutic age, dominant (or hegemonic)
subjectivity is both a subject of knowledge and a subject of desire. The achievement of
intelligibility as a legitimate subject thus involves submitting to the compulsion to
interpret our selves and to make our lives meaningful (for ourselves). If Foucault’s
critique is correct, it would seem that how we understand who and what we are not only
use’s dominant discourses through which power relations are established, but it also
constructs or shapes our lives in terms of those discourses. And as those power-
knowledge tools with which we interpret the world seem to bring the world to us as
true, as un-mediated, as ready-made and present to us, then those discursive, historical
practices through which we know the world and ourselves become invisible as they are
incorporated into our very own points of view. In other words, by using dominant
discursive and epistemic systems under the Will to Truth, we purportedly see the world
and ourselves truly. The presence of these systems (by which things are rendered ‘true’
or natural or given) and the power relations they maintain, are erased, as they are
incorporated into what we suppose is our own “objective” point of view. 32
\
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How then can we resist institutions which are repressive, for example, when it
seems that the very way we think, understand, and even experience our lives seems to be
infitsed with power-knowledges? Within the frame of the Foucauldian critique we
cannot even claim that such power-knowledges distort our experiences of ourselves,
alienate us from who we truly are; for Foucault’s analysis of power and the Will to
Truth contends that such a positing of a true or authentic self is a critical tool that tricks
us into practicing such power-knowledges
.
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Is there any way to conceive of a subject
in Foucauldian terms which could be a political agent capable of acting in such a way
that resists what seems to be the totalizing force of power-knowledge?
An Ethics of Care as Genealogy of the Self
While some commentators argue that in his later work Foucault turns to a notion
of the subject that is inconsistent with his earlier work, I contend that Foucault’s nascent
development of an ethics of self continues his development of the genealogical
method . 34 What the above-described criticism regarding the problem of resistance to
power-knowledge has right, I think, is the double-bind the epistemic subject is in under
the Will to Truth. Not only are the ways in which we know the world necessarily
influenced by the means through which that knowledge is made possible; any attempt to
think differently seems undermined by Foucault's analysis, if not outright impossible. If
our thinking differently relies on positing a world (thing, or self) that exists outside of
power-knowledge then we are also positing ourselves as thinkers who are capable of
knowing somehow independently of our historical-discursive constitution . 35 The
intention of Foucault's genealogical method thus has not been to argue that ideas which
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seem to be true, which seem to be necessaty and irrefutable, are in fact false. Instead,
his work struggles with the very methodological problem of presenting how we are
subjects of knowledge; the genealogical method exposes not the real truth of things
such that we can recognize how we have mis-recognized them, but rather it presents
how something we recognize now as true and inevitable was considered differently in
some other time and place
.
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The problem of resistance, of develop,ng a point ofview
which is resistant to the putative naturalness of how we know, think, understand,
experience the world and ourselves, is Foucault's concern in his later work.
While his genealogies of the prison, hospital, etc., focus on the ways in which
the body, for instance, becomes a site of truth for the self, such that the experience of the
body and its ‘health’ or ‘normalcy’ or ‘sexuality’ become problematized, the turn
toward the self-toward the ethical practices of and care for the self-begin to offer a
way to problematize our relation to such earlier problematizations
.
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In other words, the
care of the self is a practice through which we can problematize our positions as
knowers in relation to such histories. Foucault's turn towards care is motivated by the
desire to offer a way to approach the subject as historical
,
that is to present a way to do
a genealogy of the subjective. He is thus asking, how do genealogies which suggest that
our ways of knowing are historically, socially, politically located, affect our positions as
critical knowers? If they reveal to us the truth of our (false) points of view, are they
reciting the very epistemic limits through which our previously ‘false’ points of view
were constructed? How do genealogies differ from power-knowledges? If conducting
them simply results in the suggestion that cultural forces are present in our thinking, but
we cannot discern them really because they are the terms with which we know in the
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firs, place, wha, then? Thus, the force or impact of Foucault's earlier genealog.cal
research is hampered by the problem of the epistemic subject and its capacity for critical
self-reflection “ If there are only these two options-our complete construction by
power-knowledges such that we cannot know ourselves and thus the presence of those
power-knowledges, or the necessary assumption of an objective epistemic position such
that we ‘see' the power-knowledges at the cost ofassuming a position which is itself
normalizing-then resistance does in fact seem futile
.
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I contend that the later direction of Foucault's work is not a “return” to the
subject or a rejection of his earlier critiques, but a further problematization of the work
of genealogy itself. Foucault is trying through his notion of care of the self to articulate
a way in which the self can think about itself, about its own production through
practices, without reverting to either a traditional epistemic position that can stand
outside its own practices of subjection and “see” them, or an impossible, sceptical
position that, because of its own construction through social and cultural practices, can’t
really claim to see anything about itself at all. In short, he is trying to effect a way in
which the self as a knower can be aware of its own contingency, its own historical
locatedness (or historicity), its own genealogy, without this claim being either
inconsistent—by assuming a position external to that locatedness—or incoherent. It’s not
that these positions are in themselves wrong in some sense; Foucault's method precludes
making such a judgment. Both of these options, rather, deny the possibility of doing a
genealogy of the subject, and that is his goal. As Foucault asks, “What is philosophy
after all? If not a means of reflecting on not so much on what is true or false but on our
relation to truth? How, given that relation to truth, should we act?”40
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While Foucault’s focus in the last two volumes of the History ofSexuality is
apparently on the action that a self takes in terms of its own construction, his notions
concerning an “aesthetics of existence” in volume II and a “cultivation of the self’ in
volume III both rely upon and suggest a revised understanding of the epistemic subject,
particularly in terms of how the self is able to know itself to have a kind of self-
knowledge that is not only resistant, but in some sense freeing
.
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Freedom, for
Foucault, is not free from the effect of power-knowledges, but is a means for the
subject to be able to engage in a genealogy of its production, such that it can reflect on
its actions and, perhaps, perform them differently. Developing this present but only
intimated resistant epistemological position, what I call care-ful self-knowledge, is the
work of the rest of this chapter. First, I will argue further why it is a needed component
of Foucault's notion of care, and then I will spell out some ways in which Foucault's
own texts offer what such a kind of knowing might be. As Foucault himself does not
articulate this epistemological relation of the self to itself, I close with a brief outline of
what I think such a relation might look like. The question that remains at the end of this
chapter is, how does the self begin to engage in or activate such care-ful self-knowing. I
address this in the following chapter as I explore the desire to know the self as a means
for opening up the possibility of enlivening the possibilities of care-ful self-knowing.
As I present there, the desire for and the assumption, or adoption of, the position of self-
knower can offer the means for critiquing the power-knowledge practices which make
such “legitimacy” possible.
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The Argument for Care-ful Self-knowledge
Care for the self involves recognizing the seifs practices and actions as part of
its process of becoming rather than revealing or disclosing its already given or natural
self. As we shall see, for such a caring attitude or mode to resist the normalization of
power-knowledges, it must entail a means for problematizing the seifs own self-
making. Without a space in which the self can problematize its becoming, two
questions arise which a notion of care without a ‘care-ful epistemology’ seems unable to
answer: first, how can we articulate the presence of power-knowledges in the self-
constituting practices of the self, i.e., how can we assess the ways in which some actions
of self-making might entail normalizations? And second, how can we address the
subject’s own relationship to its becoming, to its self? How can we judge whether or
not that relation of care involves a kind of knowing (thinking about, remembering,
reflecting, etc.) that does not, in effect, (re-)position the knowing self as a Cartesian
subject? Arguing that there is no knowing relation, that Foucault has in fact outright
rejected the epistemic subject, leaving open the possibility of a present-yet-un-critiqued
knowing self that is made invisible through the assumption of a kind of omniscient
position in relation to itself
.
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The presence of this I, isn’t a ‘bad’ thing which we
should get rid of, however; on the contrary, I argue that articulating its presence is key to
opening up one way for the self not only to engage in practices through which it
constructs itself, but also to problematize those constructions such that it can engender
self-subjectivation rather than subjection
.
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Thus my argument is as follows: Foucault’s notion of care for the self offers a
way for the self to engage in practices which are self-subjectivating rather than self-
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subjecting. This means that, by practicing such acts, more possibilities for being,
experiencing, and thinking are engendered. The major distinction between acts of
subjection and acts of subjectivation is that the latter offer a way for the self to critique
its own actions, to engage in a genealogy of itself. This requires, according to Foucault,
that the self be able to be aware of its actions as self-constituting rather than self-
revealing. This enables the self to move away from a discourse of truth. To be seen as
self-constituting, one’s being needs to be recognized as becoming; there must be a
notion of one’s capacity to be otherwise, to be different. This notion of self-difference
comes from seeing the self as making itself, from analyzing the way in which its actions
effect it. One way to trace these actions as self-making rather than self-revealing, then,
is to see how those actions involve normalization practices. By looking at the ways in
which the seifs self-making entails dominant norms, the self can both begin to unpack
the ways in which power-knowledges are present in and re-circulated through its actions
and observe the ways in which its being, its sense of self or identity is constituted
through its actions (as well as through other practices). Now, this raises the critical
issue for care for the self as offering a way for the self to enact successful self-
genealogy: in the examination of one’s practices of self-constitution, there is a point of
view from which these practices are analyzed. There is a self who is looking at itself, its
actions, its social and cultural contexts. Without a way to get at that position, a way to
somehow analyze that position-which would also not, in effect, re-install the objective
knower position through some epistemological claim-then there is left un-critiqued
(and perhaps un-critiquable) a possibly normalizing subject position. The presence of
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an unaddressable normalizing subject position, I contend, dooms the rad,cal and ethical
potential of Foucault's notion of care for the self.
In other words, as the self engages in the aesthetic project that is its self-
becoming for Foucault, it must analyze its practices in terms of their possible
normal,zations, i.e., how they make him less free, especially in terms of deluding him
that his actions are independent of social, institutional forces. One way I can see that
the self remains in a relation to itself that is one of making and/or becoming rather than
revealing and/or being, is through an awareness of its actions-especially including ones
through which it has a sense of identity-as no
1
purely self-originating. Rather than as
purely self-originating, the self sees these actions as involving the force of power-
knowledges. Thus, if Foucault is right that what makes us free is the unmasking of the
presence of power-knowledges in our own self-making, and if this goal of freeing
subjectivity from the constraints of normalizing (disciplinary and discursive) practices
and institutions is the key to what makes caring for the self “ethical," then I conclude
that the aesthetic project of self-constitution through care cannot be ethical without
some way to address this implicit position of self-knower.
Without a Notion of Care-ful Self-knowledge
In his last works, including interviews and articles, Foucault begins to thematize
experience in a new way. His earlier works frame the limits of human experience in
terms of epistemic and disciplinary practices. These practices render human subjects’
experience of themselves and their lives as, more or less, ‘duped’ into truth practices
under the former, and as “docile” bodies under the latter. The paradigmatic presentation
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of human experience under wha, seems to be the unstoppable and deterministic force of
power-knowledges is the analogy of the panopticon « Under the surverllance of the
ever-present and vigilant centrally-located guard in the round prison, prisoners in the
structure of the panoptreon become self-vigilant, mcorpora.ing the gaze of the guard
mto their very self-consciousness so as to conform their acts according to the rules of
the prison. Human beings under the ‘surveillance’ of social forces and expectations,
according to this analogy, incorporate the gaze of the other, of society, into their self-
consciousness, thus restricting their behavior in accordance with the judgment of that
internalized gaze .
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Hence experience seems, in this analogy, to always-already have incorporated
into its structure the presence of the guard, and this presence, thus becomes ‘invisible’
as it is incorporated into the point of view of the subject. It becomes seemingly
impossible to separate the point of view of the other and that of the subject in whom this
view has been saturated. Actions of the subject/prisoner which the performances of
which are considered free, in this analysis, are especially effective at accomplishing the
will of the other/guard as they mislead the subject into believing it is acting otherwise,
against the system, when it is not. Key to domination, for Foucault, has been the
construction of the notion of the free agent discovering his or her own individual
identity. When we think that the selves we are enacting are our true selves, his
argument goes, we are less likely to investigate how power-knowledges are incorporated
into them. Foucault writes,
. . . the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not
to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of
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individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new
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Problem I: How to Recognize Being as Brmmt™
The two mam concerns in Foucault's notion of care as an ethical practice in
relation to the self involve the turn away from the Will to Truth. Rather than relating to
oneself in terms of discovering or revealing one’s truth, one instead relates to oneself as
a self that is in a process of becoming. And as such a process, one also recognizes that
this process of becoming involves actions which the self performs. What is key in
Foucault's shift towards the idea of the care of the self, then, is not only the notion that
the self engages in acts which are self-constituting, but moreover, that the self should
have an awareness that it does so. “The object [of writing Volumes II and III] was to
learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it
silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently,” he writes
.
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The awareness of
one’s own becoming is correlative with this effort to think one’s history.
The critical move here seems to be the focus on the self as an agent in relation to
its own production. While this shift to the presence of the self in relation to itself is
important, the methodological move Foucault is making needs addressing. As I stated
above, Foucault analyzes in his genealogical works how systems and institutions
involve practices which construct the individual. The project of ethical care shifts our
attention toward how selves both become subjected through these practices and become
subjectivated. The difference between the two relies on the following double
recognition: I am not a substance which I ‘discover’ or ‘reveal’ through knowing
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myself; and, as I am a not a substance, the actions 1 engage in are self-constituting.
Rather than merely resistmg the substance model of self, the call to recognize one’s own
becoming through one’s actions shifts the paradigm away from an
essential,sm/transgression model. According to Foucault, “The demand for identity and
the injunction to break that identity, both feel, in the same way, abusive.”48 As Paul
Rabinow comments,
Such demands are abusive because they assume in advance what one is
what one must do, what one always must be closed to, which side one
must be on. He sought not so much to resist as to evade this installed
dichotomy. One might say he refused the blackmail of having to choose
between a unified, unchanging identity and a stance of perpetual and
obligatory transgression
.
4
}
Thus Foucault's transition from apolitical paradigm of perpetual transgression
by the subject to that of care for the subject depends upon recognizing one’s actions as
not actions which confer or reveal one’s identity. In a relation of care to itself, the self
recognizes that “It is not a substance. It is a form not primarily or always identical to
itself.”
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But how does it recognize itself as such? Certainly recognizing one’s own
self-difference, one s being as historical
,
as becoming, rather than as substantial,
involves more than simply taking an attitude that one is a self-made thing. “If we are
asked to relate to the question of identity, it must be an identity to our unique selves,”
asserts Foucault. “But,” he continues, “the relationships we have to have with ourselves
are not ones of identity, rather, they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation,
of innovation.” 51 This “have to” is critically important. It is not the case that we must
have a unique identity; the sense of imperative, rather, involves how we must regard that
identity. The relationship has to be one of differentiation; our creativity regarding
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ourselves depends upon, it seems, how we address our
.dentities as not identical-to
themselves, to ourselves. Bu, wha, does this mean? Wha, kind of relations!,,, ean be
set up that would establish this, and wha, (or who) would this relations!,,p bring into
relation?
52 And how?
Wlnle Foucault states that “One's way of no longer remaining the same is, by
definition, the most singular part of who I am,” the question he left to us, I think, is how
are we to grasp the self as differential? » The problem of grasping the d.fference of the
self raises several addftional questions. The first two are a. how do we see the self as
continuously becoming, i.e„ how do we mark the differences, d,st,nguish the self so that
we don', (cannot?) attribute identity to it, and b. how do we mark those differences
without assuming a third-person point of view by, in effect, (objectively) viewing our
own lives?
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The latter question raises an additional problem: does seeing ourselves as
becoming include seeing the self doing the seeing as also becoming? How do I see both
my self as an object and my self as a subject as in-process?
Answering a. seems to be easy: we compare, remember, analyze, etc., different
moments of our lives, different beliefs we have had, different attitudes we have held,
etc. We can even, as Foucault does in his earlier genealogical critiques, show the ways
in which institutions of control, domination, persuasion, etc., seem to infiltrate our lives,
shape our bodies, construct our identities. Such historical analysis will suggest the ways
in which figurations of lives, bodies, identities, are historically, socially, and culturally
specific. But this could lead to something like a version of the Humean problem
(aporia?) of personal identity it seems: if what we mistake as personal identity is in fact
multiple perceptions, then who or what is perceiving ‘identity’ as such? Who is this I
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Who is ‘recognizing' her own social construction or political subject,on? How do we
address not only the constructed object that we are, but the thinking subject that we are?
How do we analyze that silent point of view, in a way whtch allows us to examine its
historical production as a historically located point of view?55
Recognizing the becoming of the self, I argue, requires a mechanism through
which the difference of the self (as both subject and object) can be addressed, so that the
identity of the self appears to the self as becoming rather than as continuous or self-
unfolding being
.
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There needs to be a kind of self-differential, i.e., a means of
recognizing the seifs non-teleological becoming, that does not posit an origin. The
goals of an ethical practice of care for the self thus involve creating a possibility and/or
the means for the self to think its own history, to “free thought from what it silently
thinks, and to enable the self through this genealogy of itself, to think differently. The
aim of care for the self is to open up a way for the self to think differently. The key
question is, differently than what?
Problem II: How To Critique Normalization
It would seem that differently’ means differently than how the self thinks as a
docile subject constituted through power-knowledges. Thus, what is at stake is having
the subject be able to think its own history so that the hold of power-knowledges on its
point of view, its way of thinking itself, is loosened. Remember: what is essential for
Foucault in the shift away from what seems to be irresistible forces of power-
knowledges in his earlier genealogies to the possibility of resistance through ethical care
of the self in the later works. What is key is the notion that the self does not think that
153
that it knows its True self. It does not think that through its knowledge of itself, it is
discovering or reveal,ng its true nature (to itself). The turn towards care not only
involves my taking on the attitude that I construct myself through my actions, but
moreover it entails the recognition that the self that I am is not given, is not stable, is not
ever fully knowable since it is always in process. Care of the self thus involves, in other
words, recognizing that the self is not identical to what it knows itself to be.
The question we need to address now is, how do we not just know this or think
this, but in some sense, experience this difference? Foucault suggests that resisting
identity by seeing self-difference needs to be thematized in terms of “experience with.
.
rather than engagement in.
.
.” Experience suggests the necessity of some kind of
epistemological position rather than an embeddedness. This position is not one of
clarity or transparency where one is one’s identity and from that position one speaks
Instead, to claim who one is is not to claim a vantage point from which one can
necessarily see clearly. According to Paul Rabinow, “who one is, Foucault wrote,
emerges acutely out of the problems with which one struggles.
. . Privileging
experience over engagement makes it increasingly difficult to remain ‘absolutely in
accord with oneself,’ for identities are defined by trajectories, not by position taking.”57
Foucault s idea that it is the problems we struggle with that make us who we are,
I offer, assumes that how we struggle with those problems matters. We must take
positions in relation to these constitutive problems, and see the history of our lives as
productive of experience in order to change our relationship to systems of domination.
Our identity is not given or natural for Foucault, as that would make it be unchangeable.
Instead, who we are comes from the problems with which we struggle. Doing a
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genealogy of the self thus requires seeing those problems and experiencing them ax
problems. Practicing an ethical relationship with the self, then requires that the self
problematize its life, including its own point of view on that life. Without
problematization, that point of view can, by assuming its own natural, ‘view from
nowhere,’ end up practicing normalization which undermines the seifs caring actions
.
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Thus we come back to question b. asked above: how do we mark those
differences without assuming a third-person point of view by, in effect, (objectively)
viewing our own lives?-comes not from rejecting (the existence of) that point of view,
but from its problematization. In order to see the self as a differential relation, and resist
seeing it as an (originary) identity, the self must see the ways in which power-
knowledges affect not only the self s being as an object, but also the seifs knowing as a
subject. As the self cannot go outside of itself to see itself objectively, it must also not
assume that it can clearly see the ways in which social, cultural forces affect its way of
seeing. The problem of a genealogy of the subject thus becomes loosening the grip of
power-knowledges on the subject, not so the subject can see exactly what systems are
constructing it and how; but so the subject can begin to think about its relationship to
those systems, differently.
In order to begin this loosening, the self must recognize that power-knowledges
affect what it is as an object. As it begins to understand that the self is not a natural,
self-presenting, essential thing, it is necessary to see that the assumption of any such
natural, self-presenting subject position entails power-knowledges. Thus, the self, in
relation with itself, must recognize that its own way of seeing itself, of understanding
how social and political systems affect it, for example, includes those systems. What is
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critical for the self to recognize in order for it to rests, the total,zing effect of power-
knowledges, is that power-knowledges can become invisibly incorporated into the seifs
point of view. Keeping vigilant about that point ofview thus necessitates unpacking the
ways in which power-knowledges are present in our practices of self-cons.itution as an
object of the self s own knowledge. As Foucault writes,
We have to dig deeply to show how things have been historically
contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not necessary. We
must make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness, anddeny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from filling all
possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question:
what can we make work, what new game can we invent?59
The self can encourage a practice of self-critique, a genealogizing its own point
of view, by keeping mindful that normalization can occur at the level of self-knowledge.
This mindfulness can take place by seeing the ways in which the object is constructed
through practices. Recognizing the presence of power-knowledges in our acts of self-
constitution does two things: a. it reminds us that one effect of power-knowledges that
is critically important for their success is their incorporation into our points of view such
that their status is ‘natural’ and invisible, and b. this incorporation occurs as we take on
what we see, know, feel, understand, as independently our own. Thus it is critical to see
the ways in which power-knowledges are present in our self-constructive acts in the
world, and from this recognition to begin to acknowledge how they are present in our
ways of knowing ourselves, especially when we are assuming the position of the self
who can and does know itself.
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Problem III: How to Address the Knowing Snhj^t
As a self relating to itself through care I see my actions as self-making, and
included in that self is the “I” that is doing the seeing. While it is easy to see how we
might see ourselves as objects which are made through practices-we eat less and we
lose weight, or we go to college and we become part of the middle class-it is much
more difficult to see how we might recognize ourselves as subjects which are made
through practices. How do I recognize that my thinking is constituted through my
practices, that my point of view through which I experience myselfis constituted
through my practices, such that it is possible for me to think differently? “In the labor
of thinking one’s own history," writes Foucault, “one can enfranchise thinking from
what it thinks silently."60 Clearly it is through this problematization of our point of
view that we can loosen the hold of power-knowledges, we can create new ways of
becoming. But how do we do it? Commentators like Palmer polarize the aesthetic and
the epistemic, thus leaving no room for a positive critique of the knowing subject.
According to Palmer,
Foucault offers the notion of the care of the self as a non-epistemic
model of subjectivity. The care of the self replaces the primacy of the
traditional epistemological relation in subject formation with an aesthetic
relation whereby our lives are to be viewed as works of art, to be
transformed in a continual process of creation
.
61
The problem here is if care of the self is a non-epistemic model of subjectivity as
Palmer claims, how do we address the knowing self, the subjective self in a way that is
caring? In other words, if engaging in self-making is aesthetic to the exclusion of
epistemic
,
how do we dig deeply into the historical contingency of the knowing or
thinking I such that it does not remain invisible, threatening the project of genealogy?
157
How do I think the history ofmy thinking self? How do I think that h,story differently,
which means refusing to see my own thinking as the natural (unquestionable, given,
etc.) thought of the thinking self, the thinking-I, but rather seeing that thinking as
coming from an I which has a history, is influenced, is shaped, is constituted? How do 1
make the proverbial shoe no, fit ofmy own thinking? Any attempts to think my though,
as, for instance, influenced by social norms, could still posits a subject thinking this
thought who is considered outside of or free from this norm. 62
The problem of a genealogy of the subject is the problem of addressing
genealogically this self who is the subject thinking, the subject whose point of view is
seemingly made invisible in his experience of his own life as his. To recognize that one
is not identical to oneself is to recognize that this subject-I itself is constructed, is not
identical, is not invisible even in relation to one’s own self. Raising the issue of how to
thematize this possible difference in our very thinking Foucault wntes, “Maybe the most
certain of all philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and ofwhat we
are in this very moment. Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but
to refuse what we are in this very moment.”63
It is this investigation of what we are in this moment that Foucault's notion of
care begins to address. The question that he leaves (or left, unfortunately) unanswered,
is how this critical analysis is to take place. Care as an aesthetic project through which
we make ourselves an objet d\art, does not supply the mechanism through which we can
address this thinking self such that we can see it as a construction, without
simultaneously positing a thinking self outside of this thinking self. In order for
Foucault's notion of care for the self to engender a way for the self to refuse itself, there
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must be a mechanism through which that refusal can take place, a way to appreciate the
self as a self becotn,ng« The difficulty of this appreetatton is how to keep the
appreciating self, the thinking self seeing itself, from collapsing into the self that is
thought. In other words, the act of refusal needs to no. reify the posit,on of the refuser
as itself a given position, outside of problematization.
Care-ful Self-knowledge
If, as Foucault contends, the relation of care is an ethical position whereby the
self is in a problematic relation with those practices which engender it, such that a
conceptual space is opened up between the self as a practitioner or self-fashioner and the
self as a product of its actions, then, what is the experience of this relation between
these selves? If Foucault's critique of disciplinary practices presents a self whose self-
knowledge reflects not its freedom but its limits as constituted by forces (which bring it
into being), does the model of care offer an alternative notion of self-knowledge?
What seems to be the critical difference between what we have been considering
as Foucault’s earlier and later works, is this issue of self-knowledge (and its relation to
freedom). In his genealogical analyses the relation the self has to what it claims to know
about itself represents its lack of freedom. The production of self-knowledge under the
Will to Truth or the Will to Knowledge represents the subject’s being subjected by
power/knowledges. Key to the force of technologies of domination for Foucault is their
powei to limit the subject s ability to know itself otherwise; by engendering it through
the logic of Truth (what Adorno calls the logic of identity), the epistemological actions
of the self as a self-knower render it identical to the means through which it knows
159
itself. Thus, self-knowledge is a tool not only of the institutions Foucault analyzes, but
of Foucault's analysis itself.
From what we can draw out of Foucault's ethical works, however, the self is still
brought into being through practices, but it is in some sense able to be aware of itself as
participating in those practices. As self-knowledge was a heunstic representing the
subject’s subjection through disciplinary powers in the earlier work, this awareness of
itself as a self-making self seems to be the heuristic representing the seifs
subjectivation through care. As this awareness seems to be at the heart of the difference
between practices ofsubjection and practices of subjectivation
,
it cannot be based on an
awareness of the self or knowledge of the self under the limits of the Will to Truth. In
other words, this awareness must involve a different epistemic relation between the self
and itself. It seems that the awareness the self has of itself through a relation to itself
comes not from its identifying what or who it really (truly, naturally, authentically, in its
soul, etc.) is. This awareness, rather, seems to entail practices of identifying what the
subject is not (or at least need not be) through the relation of problematization. Thus we
can begin to see how such a caring awareness is a form of Foucault's notion of refusal.
“We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of
individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries,” he tells us . 65
The critical issue of problematizing our own thinking, thinking critically about
our own way of thinking is raised here. How do we think our own history such that we
free our thinking from the invisible structures through which thought has been possible?
The trick here is to think in such a way as to engender new ways of thought which
necessarily includes a traditional epistemic point of view, but does so in a problematized
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way. The key to the problem is in the notion of eare itself. What is paramount for
Foucault's notion of eare is that it is above ail else, a relation. It is a relatton of the self
with itself. What part.es partic.pate in this relat.on, however, needs to be thematized.
This I think can happen through self-knowledge. The relation that is most conducive to
reproducing the terrain or field through which care can happen, that is through which
the self can interrogate its own subjective point of view, is a relation of self-knowledge.
But how to approach this relation requires taking Foucault's suggestion to “refuse who
we are” seriously.
Rather than seeing refusal as only an act of negation, I think we need to unpack
more deeply what it could offer as we construct a way to do a genealogy of the subject.
To refuse who we are does not mean to say that all is relative. Much stronger than
sceptical indecision, this refusal cannot come from a relativization of all points of view.
While refusing what we are obviously challenges the Will to Truth where we claim to
know what we are, it also does not lead to an incoherent position such as that entailed in
I cannot know my self as my point of view is determined by power-knowledges.” The
latter clearly maintains an invisible knowing-I who makes the claim. Thus actively
refusing to be identified with any specific I seems to allow for a way to acknowledge
a subject-I position while simultaneously disrupting the force of power-knowledges to
define (completely) what the content of that position might. While the sense of negation
in the refusal seems totalizing, there is a way in which such a refusal, in its enactment,
preserves a positive space about the subject. If I refuse an identity by saying “that is not
me” I am claiming an epistemological position. There is an I that is assumed, an I that,
even though it is not positing what it is, is positing what it is not.
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This I gives us something to work with. In relation to the tssue of self-
knowledge, the assumption of a knowing I, that specifically refuses to be identical with
the ontological positions or descriptions assigned to it by others as well as by itself,
offers us a way to approach care more fully ethically. In the act of refusing what we are
not, we are doing two things: we are positing that there is an I that we are and we are
refusing to render that I as completely knowable. By not rendering a positive account of
what the I is, but still assuming it, I contend that we are playing the game of identity
differently, and thus playing the game of self-knowledge differently as well. We are
neither claiming that we know the self nor claiming that we do not know the self, but
are rather using the position, or perhaps better, the authority of, the epistemic I as a
means of resistance. The assertion of the status of the knowing I and the simultaneous
refusal to identify with that status recites the structure of the traditional epistemological
subject, but it does so differently.
What this difference, as a kind of positive act of dis-identification, enables is a
way for the self to be a knowing self in a relation with itself as a known self. The two
elements of Foucault's theory of care for the self that figure it as ethical involve both the
notion of refusal and the notion of relation. As I suggest in the next chapter, this
relation is like one of family adoption-it is a relation through which the parties are
related, but different. The relation of the self to itself through care is one of both
identity and dis-identity. Because they are not identical, the knowing self can examine
the known self, and problematize it through genealogy critique as a product of power-
knowledges. Because they are related however, the known self reflects back to the
knowing sell that who it is is also constituted by practices of power-knowledge.
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^^ °f P°lltlCal USefulneSS of Foucault's ideasoncerning the self. There is certainly much debate over the implications Foucault's
rejection of foundationahsm. Some such as Taylor believe that Foucault's critique of
oral and epistemological foundations leave him unable to make any normativejudgments and as such, render his work politically impotent. See Charles Taylor
Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” Political Theory 12 (May 84): 152-183. I agree with
readers such as Sawicki and McWhorter that Foucault can be used to develop political
theories of resistance. In particular I am attempting to use his notion of care combined
with his critique of truth to develop a politically useful idea of self-knowledge This
notion is more fully developed in the following chapters.
Of course I realize that this seems to run counter to the flow of Foucault's
work. Foucault, having critiqued the modem imperative to make oneself an object of
knowledge for oneself and others, presents through his analyses of ancient practices of
se
-mastery etc. a model of self that is outside of the model of the “epistemic subject.”
I am suggesting that without some model of self-awareness or self-knowledge, what we
get through care is this on-going becomingness which, as it has no implicit mechanism
through which difference can be introduced or recognized, runs the risk of engendering
a self who is (must be?) immanently present to itself. I think that a more radicalized
"
notion of self-knowledge that can be consistent with Foucault's critique of self-
knowledge is possible, and that its articulation satisfies the need for a difference-
producing mechanism. What I think is still left unanswered, however, is a question
concerning self-knowledge and desire. In Foucault's work prior to what is called his
ethics period, Foucault claims that we are compelled to make our selves subjects
through these practices of Truth whereby we make our selves objects of knowledge.
Why are we so compelled? Is it merely coercion or is there something more, something
that is more intimately compelling than the force of law? What is the desire to do this
self-objectification? And does “care” have a desire for self-knowledge in it? The
question of how could our desire for self-knowledge be addressed without making
objects of ourselves and thereby limiting our freedom is addressed in the next chapter. I
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All of Foucault’s works can be understood as pursuing the relationshipsbetween knowledge, knowledge of the self, and the self as knower. As is reflected inis published lectures for example, Foucault used writing and teaching philosophy in anxpenmental way such that he was always pushing his ideas, abandoning some
methods, exploring others. The distinction I am making between his archeological,
genealogical and ethical works reflects the received notion that Foucault's work can be
so penodized. U use of this division, however, only as a tool for explication. As such, Iam presenting ideas concerning his genealogical works first, though according to his
periodization, these works come ‘second.’
7
The distinction between subject and self for Foucault is both important and not
consistent. In general, a subject is a human being whose meaning as human being has
een through a nexus of social, political, and cultural practices has been both inscribed
and assumed as intelligible to and through those practices. More than simply a political
agent, a subject is an historical agent and as such his or her self is constituted, given
shape, force, etc., through the relations of power and systems of discourse available
within his/her historical moment. A “self,” on the other hand, seems for Foucault to be
a more personal being, it is for instance as we see later in the chapter, that about which
we care. Our self and its possibilities are what at stake in practices of subjection.
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Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals,” in Technologies of the
Ml, eds Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst, Malcolm-
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). While Foucault often makes the point of
stating that his histories are neither to be read as locations of the origins of current
conceptual frameworks nor as proscriptions for healing contemporary ills, there are
moments such as this one where he does suggest that his project involves tracing
practices of the present through the past. Here he states his work as asking “How did
we directly constitute our identity through some ethical techniques of the self which
developed through antiquity to now?” What is critical to understand is that Foucault is
not using the past as a heuristic for the present, such that the present can become clearly
present to us. While I cannot fully examine Foucault's notion of “historical ontology”
here, it is important to stress that the present is always historical for Foucault. If there
are analogies or connections to be made between the present and the past, the then and
the now, they are always secondary to the larger point: the subject is always, in its
being, histoi ical such that its knowledge of itself is always as an historical knower.
Foucault s histories present past knowers as historically located as a means to suggest
without reliance on a transcendental argument, that all such knowing is historical. I
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I do not have the space here to discuss in any depth Foucault's analysis of
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- He h,mself states many <™es 'hat he undertakes such projectsot as an h.stonan, but as a genealogtst. His aim is not to secure the origins of an ideaor a practice, not to locate a practice which can be “imported” to the present. Foucault’sputpose rather is to locate places of tension, where “the subject” (though there is no
unified ^stance or structure as such for Foucault) is engaged in an historical momentdunng which a shift or tens,on is present. Foucault's histories are produced to revealbo* the ways m which “the subject" is itself a historical production, not a substance,
Th , m T" T ,he re 'ati0n of ,he subJect t0 ils own is itself historical,hat the self has known itself, cared about itself, thought about itself differently during
different histoncal moments for Foucault is critically important. By presenting these ashistones suggests not only that such thinking changes but that such thinking is itself
historical Cntical to Foucault's oeuvre is this notion of the historicity of the subject.How we know ourselves is through our historical moment. We will return to this later.
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Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in Ethics: Subjectivity anH Tmth
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press, 1997), 87.
25 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. Ill: The Care of the Self,
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 43.
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Foucault's example par excellence, of course, is that of sexuality In history of Sexuality VohimeJ, for example, he traces the ways in which sexuality as anobject of study was created. He and others such as Katz, present howt constmetTonof the category (and use of the term) “homosexual” came years before that ofheterosexual” Wh„e these tenns seem like
-natural' opposites, thdr Invemions cameat very different times and were utilized in very different ways.
Sexualitv
S
Vnf T
6
TTl
6
’
P°UCault 'S cntlc
lue of the n°h°n of repression The History of
199
0^.1ity Introduction
,
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vm^^T
This position is also held by C. Colwell in his/her article “The Retreat of the
ubject in the Late Foucault,” Philosophy Today 38 (Spring 1994): 56-69. S/he argues
at those critics are mistaken who “.
. . take Foucault as saying in the later works that
there is the possibility of the onginary subject taking an active role in its constitution as
opposed to its merely passive role in the earlier works.” (65) This mistaken
“interpretation represents a fundamental misreading of Foucault. It is a misreading
because it fails to recognize the relational mode of power/knowledge and in doing so
ails to see that the form of the self in the volumes 2 and 3 of the History ofSexuality is
not fundamentally different from the form of the subject in the first volume and in
Discipline and Punish:' (65) The critics this response addresses in particular are Peter
Dews and Thomas McCarthy. See their respective articles, “The Return of the Subject
in the Late Foucault,” Radical Philosophy 51 (Spring 1989): 37 -41
,
and “The Critique
of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School,” Political Theory 1
8
n 990V
437-69.
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35 One of the ways in which power-knowledges have been effective (since
Descartes) has been through the constitution of the self as a subject of knowledge who
believes he is capable of such independent, autonomous thought. The Cartesian turn
toward the self effected both a sense of the internal, knowable self and the objectively
knowing self. Foucault traces this paradigm ofmodem subjectivity as itself the
grounding of the human sciences. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
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Foucault's genealogical method is not to be confused with a kind of
anthropological project which aims either to show the relativity of claims to truth, to
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show the universality of such claims. While the reasons his project does not entail thelatter are obvious, the reasons why it is not the former demands a few words Firs thehistonca! and discursive practices through which we construct ourselves are not relativehe sense that they are highly determinative to who we are. While Foucault doesclaim that normative values are culturally contingent if not accidental, their effects onsubjects are not to be minimized. Second, Foucault’s genealogical method does notassume a neutral or objective point of view. There is no way genealogy could
accommodate the assumption of a point of view which compared multiple cultural orleal practices as if its own point of view was neutral. His critical point is that weways see from our own points of view, but history can show us not what others’ points
been TT''
‘he
f
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static, naturally-given have
considered differently. The point is not to make us believe in nothing, but to
re ect further on the practices which go into establishing something as naturally-given
°Ur own c°ntext And thlrd
.
hi * histories specifically focus on cultures and/or
moments which are both different from our own (his intended audience of late Capitalist
uropean/American readers) and yet like our own enough to achieve some kind of
recognition of resemblance.
While some commentators consider care for the self a mode of self-relating
that excludes relations of self-knowing, I do not. 1 do agree with those such as Daniel
Palmer who view Foucault's turn to the subject through care as a positive alternative to
t e traditional epistemic subject. Foucault makes several references throughout his later
interviews, for example, that the Ancient Greeks he studies do not oppose the call toknow thyself and the call to take care of thyself. Knowing and caring are not so
exclusive. Part of the shift in Modem philosophy and culture he says is to a prioritizing
of one-knowing—over the other-caring. I believe that Foucault's larger project is not to
reject the subject in general or the epistemic subject in particular, but to problematize
the relation between thinking and knowing. His critique of the ways in which subject
formation has taken place under or through the demand for Truth is that the ways in
which the subject knows itself becomes that which the subject is as a static object. His
ethical project is to theorize ways in which the subject can be differently, can engage
with the world such that experience can be different. Because ours is a modem world, a
world which was bom through the Enlightenment-socially, politically, economically-
rejecting practices of knowing in favor of some kind of acting or being free from
practices of knowing would be naive at best, and a reconstituting of the very
epistemological framework he is trying to resist at worst. Foucault's project is thus to
work with both practices of being and practices of knowing such that their relationship
can be problematized, such that subjects can reflect on their own experiences in ways
that allow for actions that are self-constituting in ways that allow for further different
kinds of self-reflection and self-constitution. While there is the problem of course of
offering no normative system by which a subject can judge which particular actions and
which particular understandings are better than others, there is a clear imperative here to
know and act in ways which promote both more options for examining the subject’s
relation to the historical moment in which it dwells and, through such examinations,
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I think that it could be useful to call this the “
problem.”
epistemic subject’s ‘so what?’
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s of thls epistemic problem certainly cite those positions taken inwhat has been called the debate over foundationalism. The mam point of this chapter isto suggest that with an explication or development of its implications for a critical
epistemic subjectivity, Foucault's ethical notion of care of the self can offer an
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“The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and
7~~’ The f^
ential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
Flurley, et al (New York: The New Press, 1997), 321.
Foucault's challenge to liberal political theory is complex and critically
important. I am only able to begin to suggest here the implications his notion of care
has for a critique of liberal notions of freedom. I cannot develop fully here the political
implications of the alternative notion of self-knowledge that I am offering in this
dissertation. I begin to gesture towards these in the conclusion. For analyses of
Foucault s work specifically in relation to the issue of freedom and liberal politics see
such authors as James Bemauer Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight (London, England:
Humanities Press International, 1990); Thomas Dumm
, Michel Foucault and the Politics
of Freedom (London, England: Sage Publications, 1996); Lee Quinby, Freedom.
Foucault, and the Subject of America (Boston, Malcolm: Northeastern University Press,
1991); and John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy (New York,
’
NY: Columbia University Press, 1985).
As I noted above, this position is supported in readings by such commentators
as Daniel Palmer in his “On Refusing Who We Are: Foucault's Critique of the
Epistemic Subject,” Philosophy Today 42 (Winter 1998): 402-410.
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Subjection, as discussed above, is the means through which the self becomes a
subject, an agent in the world, a political being, through its conformity to and
recognition by hegemonic norms. (As “conformity” here is short hand for the myriad
processes through which the subject is constituted by its successful participation in
various legitimating practices such that it can act as a subject in that system, any notion
of self-conscious ‘choice’ that conformity connotes should be disregarded.)
Subjectivation is the process through which that conformity becomes an object of
critique for the subject such that she can question and resist or practice differently those
constituting actions. I am suggesting here and developing at the end of this chapter the
idea that rather than attempting to create the possibility for subjectivation through the
eradication of the Cartesian I position, we should fully embrace that knowing subject,
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tranS ‘ Alan Sheridan (New York: Vinlage Books, 1995), esp
The analogy Foucault makes between humans in societies constituted by
power-knowledges and humans living in the literal structure of the panopticon has been
appropriated by many feminist philosophers and critics. What the panopticon model
allows for is an analysis of the ways in which the actions of subjects which seem to be
of their own ‘free will’ are acts which enable them to conform to and be recognized by
society s rules. One of the first scholars to take on Foucault for feminist purposes,
Susan Bordo, for example, uses the notion of the panopticon in her ground-breaking
work on anorexia-bulimia. She argues that women internalize the male/patriarchal
notion that equates women’s thinness with moral virtue such that women practice
thinness through eating and exercise rituals so as not only to be thin
,
but to be morally
accepted subjects. See her book, Unbearable Weight: Feminist, Western Culture and
the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) and her classic article “The
Body and the Reproduction of Femininity,” in Gender/Bodv/Knowledge: Feminist
Reconstructions of Being and Knowing
, eds Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo New
Brunswisk. Rutgers University Press, 1989). What is critically important about such
work is how it allows a way to examine how power-knowledges are systems which
oppress (and repress) individuals, but which also produce them as certain types of
subjects. Foucault's critical work on the production of types of sexuality has had a huge
impact on sexuality and gender studies. For a Foucauldian analysis of sexuality as a
socially constructed category, see Ladelle McWhorter’s, Bodies and Pleasures.
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Michel Foucault, “Afterword,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics . Second Edition (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216.
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The Essential Works of Michel Foucault;
voh 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press, 1997),
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' Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth
,
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans
Robert Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press, 1997), 166 emphasis added.’
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“ As I develop in the next chapter, I wish to explore the notion of “being
related” as a way to approach identity that is itself always in relation-with itself, with
its history, with others, with social and normalizing practices.
53 Quoted in Paul Rabinow “Introduction,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press, 1997), xix.
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The assumption of this position would be a practice that would (still) render
the self docile for Foucault, as it would involve assuming the position of the Cartesian
knower. The practice of knowing the self from this position would, under the Will to
Truth, limit the self in terms of its possibilities for resistance. I am suggesting implicitly
here and explicitly at the end of this chapter that we can use this position more
creatively than is immediately obvious. Within the context of performing a genealogy
of the subject (or self-genealogy), the assumption of the ‘knowing I,’ the legitimate
“knowledge-claiming” I, can engender the differential needed for ethical self-knowing,
and it can open up a space in which we can critique the means for achieving such
“intelligibility.”
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C. Colwell counters those who think Foucault relies upon a notion of an
originary self by arguing that the self for Foucault is always a differential self: “The key
term here is differential. What this denotes is that there are no positive or originary
elements of power or of the subject. Both arise within a field of relations. This means
that the subject arises, or emerges, as a relation, a relation between itself and knowledge
of itself (and other things), a relation between itself and those who have knowledge of it,
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a relation between itself and those who coerce it or are coerced by it. What we need tosee here is that tt is possible for the subject to have a relationship to itself, one of selh
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cWhorter regarding the idea is becoming without telos in her
In
dies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Polities of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington
. Indiana University Press, 1999). I wonder how we resist the seduction of a
teleological approach to ourselves. How do we resist reading our own lives as thedevelopment of who we (really) are, of our ‘promise,’ especially when exhibiting our
ability to make sense of ourselves is a critical component to social intelligibility and
legitimacy. An interesting example regarding what we might call ‘compulsory
teleology’ could be the medical ‘normalization’ of ‘transsexuality.’ See Sandy Stone’s
article, The Empire Stnkes Back: A Transsexual Manifesto” for an analysis of the
ways in which pre-operative transsexuals have historically be required to describe their
conditions as being “bom in the wrong body” in order to receive the surgeries they
wanted. Stone, Sandy. “The Empire Strikes Back: A Transsexual Manifesto,” in
Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory eds. Katie Conboy,
Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) 337-
Paul Rabinow, “Introduction,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth . The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et
al (New York: The New Press, 1997), xix.
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See, Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere
.
(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986.
Foucault, Friendship as a Way of Life,” in Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966-
84), ed. Sylvere Lotringer, trans. John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 209.
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Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. IE The Use of Pleasure ,
translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 9.
Daniel Palmer, “On Refusing Who We Are: Foucault's Critique of the
Epistemic Subject,” Philosophy Today 42 (Winter 1998): 409.
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~ One of the reasons Foucault most passionately criticizes psychoanalysis,
regards just this problem: in his view, psychoanalysis both revels in a Will to Truth,
where the subject ‘discovers’ his true inner self, and lets off the hook of real analysis the
I doing the discovering.
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Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
,
Second Edition
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(Chicago, IL: Un.vers.ty of Chicago Press, 1983), 216. Foucault makes this commentsof course, ,n reference to Kant. The influence of Kant on Foucault cannot be
overestimated. While I cannot develop this fully here, I would like to note that anexplication of the Kantian critique of reason in general, and of the transcendentaldeduction in particular is a key element for the further development ofmy project ofdeveloping an ethical’ way to address the knowing subject
J
Enlightenment?”:
'he qU°te^ ah°Ve ' F°UCaU" Kant ' S famous "What is
When in 1 784 Kant asked, Was Heisst Aufklarung?. He meant, What’s
going on just now? What’s happening to us? What is this world, this
penod, this precise moment in which we are living? Or in other words-
What are we? As Auflddrer
,
,
as part of the Enlightenment? Compare this
with the Cartesian question: Who am I? I, as a unique but universal and
unhistoncal subject? I, for Descartes is everyone, anywhere at any
moment? But Kant asks something else: What are we? in a very precise
moment of history. Kant’s question appears as an analysis of both us and
our present. I think that this aspect of philosophy took on more and more
importance. Hegel, Nietzsche... The other aspect of “universal
philosophy” didn’t disappear. But the task of philosophy as a critical
analysis of our world is something which is more and more important.
Maybe the most certain of all philosophical problems is the problem of
the present time, and of what we are, in this very moment.
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What is critically important here is that this refusal is not a refusal based on a
mis-recogmtion. It is not the case that what we are is being misunderstood or limited or
repressed. There is no alternative self or being behind the refusal. It’s danger and
riskiness lie in that fact. It is through the act ofrefusal
,
where the self actively dis-
identifies with what is thought to be that a space of possibility is opened up. The act of
refusal engenders a space of problematization where the self engages with its own
production as a production rather than as a process of revelation.
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Foucault, “Afterword,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
. Second Edition (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216.
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Foucault originally planned to write a volume of the History of Sexuality on
practices regarding the family and reproduction. He did not, though the end of Volume
I does make some mention of the topic. Such issues would come under the notion of
bio-power for Foucault. Although I cannot go into this topic here, it would be most
interesting to connect Foucault's later writings on friendship-there are several important
interviews on this topic-with his re-evaluation of the relation of the self with itself
through care. There are many important writings on the notion of the self as relational,
including those from psychoanalytic points of view (see Jessica Benjamin’s work, for
example) and feminist philosophical points of view (see Diana Tiejens Meyers’ work,
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effect, we live in a legal, social, and institutional world where the only relationspossible are extremely few, extremely simplified, and extremely poor.f.
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‘mp0Ven *hment of the relati°™l fabric. We should secure recognitionr relations of provisional co-existence, adoption.” “Of children,” confirms tlufinterviewer. Or-whynot? Of one adult by another,” replies Foucault. Foucault “The
Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth
. The EssentialWorks of Michel Foucauh; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley, et al (NewYork: The New Press, 1997), 158.
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CHAPTER 5
BEING ADOPTED. A MEDITATION ON IDENTITY AND THE ‘DESIRE
TO KNOW’ DIFFERENTLY
Introduction
As we discussed in the previous chapter, in what is considered his later or
“ethical works,” Foucault describes his project of analyzing the subject as involving the
analysis of techniques of domination as well as what he terms techniques of the self.
These he defines as “techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means,
a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own
thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves,
modify themselves.
.
”2
Foucault suggests that in order to analyze the genealogy of the
subject we must examine these techniques together, “to take into account the points
where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to
processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely,” he continues,
we have “to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated
into structures of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals are
driven [and known] by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can
call, I think, government.” 3
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It is this place of contact where the will and knowledge of others is connected to
the ways in whtch we conduct ourselves that is the focus of this chapter. 1 wish to focus
our attention on how the modem demand to make oneself an object of knowledge and
the contemporary desire to know oneself through the 'discovery of one's identity' come
together and “govern” the subject. This government of the subject can be theonzed,
analyzed, resisted, as we discussed, through Foucault's notion of problematization. A
set of practices and concerns which engender individuals capable of experiencing
themselves—and thinking about that experience-in specific ways, a problematic can be
resisted by "making it an issue” for our selves. What we make issues for ourselves are
things we can think about, question, and ultimately practice differently.
While the trope of secrecy and the concept of “illegitimacy” no longer have
much direct currency in contemporary culture, I want to suggest that the popularized
notion of the adoptee’s “searching” for her birth family can be a very useful “contact
point” through which to analyze the production of the subject. As a desire to know the
self through narratives of bodily identity, I want to present the adoptee’s “desire to
know as both a desire which can be “integrated into structures of coercion” as well as a
desire which can resist such coercion, and instead offer the self a self-practice that is in
Foucault’s terms, ethical. What resisting such structures of coercion requires, I propose,
is a consideration of both how techniques of domination may be present in the symbolic
or discursive practices of searching
--i.e., how “searching” can be a disciplinary
practice of subjection—and how such practices can be reconceived.
This move away from knowing the body as containing the truth of self and
toward a more ethical way of knowing echoes Foucault’s work on shifting the meaning
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of ethics. As Margaret McLaren presents, Foucault is critical of traditional ethics’
reliance on a scientific paradigm rather than on an aesthetic one. The “work” on the self
Foucault calls ethical is aesthetic work; it is work by which one's life becomes one’s
work of art. According to McLaren,
work on the self involves the intensifications of relations to oneself; this
intensification of relations is characterized by self-mastery and self-
knowledge. Work on oneself and the correlative intensification of
relations to self contribute to the formation of ethical subjectivity..
..An
aesthetics of existence is thus an ongoing project that requires ethical
work.
If the self is not given to us, not to be discovered by the self and presented to
others, then what is it? Again McLaren writes, “[Foucault] rejects the notion that there
is a true self, or deep self, to be discovered. He says, ‘[fjrom the idea that the self is not
given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence; we have to create
ourselves as a work of art .’”5
In order for the seifs desire to know” the self through the searching process to
be considered an ethical practice then, we need to see how a self might practice the
“search” in a way which resists techniques which coerce or dominate. We need a search
(for self) that does not subject , 6 Hence, my project is to suggest how a search for “self-
knowledge” can be a means of caring for the self. Foucault offers that the Ancients
practiced techniques of the self through the care of the self. This self care was markedly
different from practices of and demands for self-knowledge that came with Christian
and Modem Enlightenment thinking. However, as ours is a Post-Cartesian, (Post-)
Christian culture, the Ancient practices cannot simply be imported into our world; if we
are to have ethical practices of the self caring for itself in these Post-Cartesian
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times, then these practices cannot exclude practices of self-knowledge. On the contrary,
we must confront practices of self-knowledge and, as it is the concept of identity that
functions as the contemporary trope for self-knowing, it is our practices of self-
knowledge via identity (includmg the search for, right to, and claims of identity) which
must be transfigured. Thus I want to suggest that by examining the discourse
surrounding the adoptee’s desire to know via the trope of the search we can begin to
outline the possibilities for an ethical way to engage the seifs desire to know itself,
especially in terms of the body.
By presenting my own meditations on (and actions motivated by) my desire to
know my self, I hope to offer a way to approach self-knowledge that avoids the
problems and dilemmas we have thus far explored which result from the demand for
self-certainty. As should become clear, I focus on my desire to know myself rather than
on what I know or even what knowing one’s self is, because I consider the act of
desiring to know one’s self useful in two ways. First, the notion of desire suggests the
notion of incompleteness: there is something that I want to know that I do not (yet)
know. And second, in my desiring to know, I am a subject engaged (with herself); I am
active in some way in relation to what it is I want. In a way similar to, but more
productive than, Foucault s notion of refusal, desiring to know offers the self a means
with which to engage in its own practices of subjectivation. Like the act of refusal, the
desire to know the selF offers a way to thematize the self as an agent without the
requirement that the self have certain knowledge of itself. Unlike the refusing subject,
the subject who desires to know itself is already engaged in a relation of with itself, as it
wants to know who or what it is. While both refusal and desire connote lack, I think
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that the relationship between the subject-I and the object-I that desire’s lack entails (1
wan. to but do not (ye.) know my self) makes the quest,on of“why should we care
about who we are?” more possible to answer.
AMeditation on Being Adopted and A Philosopher
Ever since I can remember, I have been someone who identified herself as
adopted. I have, in fact, always had a difficult time answering the common questions of
when and how I was told about my adoption, as my memories of and stories about being
myselfhave always included my being adopted. It was as if coming into my own self-
knowledge included, and perhaps was even constituted in relationship to, the knowledge
that my parents were not always my parents, that I was bom, I later came to think,
before they knew that I existed. My claiming of ‘being adopted’ as an identity has thus
included claiming the contingency and ambiguity such a grammatically awkward
statement involves. The meaning ofmy self of who I was, I thought, could always have
been different. That my parents were my parents was accidental, while the fact that they
could be (and hence might not have been) my parents was determinative to who I was.
While being raised by my parents from infancy certainly affected many aspects ofmy
identity-formation including my understandings of myself through religion, class, race,
and ethnicity, my identity as adopted was produced by the fact that these identifications
could have been different. They were, in short, constitutively arbitrary.
Being adopted for me, then, has not been an identification with an unknown lost
family; it has not been a marking of myself as scarred or damaged or as having less
knowledge than others who are bom into their families. Instead, being adopted has been
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an identity ofpossibility- it has been a way to make sense of the tensions produced by
being both at once the product of one’s environment and someone whose meaning
always exceeds that env.ronment. 7 I, has been a way to understand family as both a
place from which one comes and a place for which one is always looking. Bemg an
adopted self has encouraged me to imagine the self as both known and unknown, as
bom as well as produced, in short, as more than either natured or nurtured.
Crucial to my sense of the possibility of adopted identity, I think, have been the
ways in which I have been able to approach ’being adopted’ as a position from which to
investigate the problem of identity in general. While having been adopted left the
meaning ofmy identity open, it was not the case that the act(s) of adoption left me
without an identity, left me missing something, or in a position in which something was
hidden from me. My concern with my identity has thus not been defined by attempts at
resolving some particular ‘identity issues’ or overcoming some senses of loss or
inadequacy. But rather, because adoption involves social, cultural, and historical events,
and because taking having-been-adopted as the basis for an identity necessarily evokes
the idea that social practices are intimately involved in one’s own identity, my concern
with my identity as adopted has propelled me to think about the ways in which identity
in general is more than either essence or construct. Thus, my philosophical
investigations ofmy identity as adopted have engendered certain aporias which, I have
come to believe, are not specific to having been adopted.
There is an intended slippage throughout this paper then, between my narrative
descriptions ofmy experiences of and struggles with claiming for myself an identity as
adopted and my use of ‘adopted identity’ as a term applied to the problem of identity in
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general. Thus, like the meaning ofmy identity as adopted, I want to encourage the
multivalent potential of ‘adopted identity’ as I want the phrase to suggest the possibility
of claiming an identity based on the history of the production of one’s identity, i.e„ that
one was (literally) adopted, and the idea that identities are neither bom nor made but are
adopted.
While the difference between the notions of ‘bom’ and ‘adopted’ in this context
may be obvious, it is the difference between ‘made’ and ‘adopted’ that is critical. While
both ideas refer to the notion that identity (itself) and individual identities do not come
from some essence of self but are instead the products of social, cultural, and historical
forces, the notion of an adopted identity, as I am exploring it, also refers to the
historicity of an identity. I am here exploiting the double meaning of ‘adopted’ as both
to have been adopted (as someone else’s) and to adopt (as one’s own). Connoting two
different sets of practices (and, importantly, two different temporal locations of self),
these different meanings of adopted together generate a liminal space where the subject
is positioned as that which is subjected to/by social practices and that which is the
subject of such practices (in both senses, as content and agent, perhaps). Such dual
positioning, I claim, entails both a sense of opacity about the ways in which the subject
submits to adopting an identity, and a sense of agency by which the subject is involved
in her own identity. Thus, as adopted an identity is the position from which one
attempts to understand one s own history. An adopted identity is both essential to who
one is and historically produced at the same time . 8 How identity, when considered as
adopted as such, at once cannot be known in some transparent sense, but yet can be
evoked, claimed, and articulated, is the question of this essay.
181
Wh.le such paradox-producing notions regarding adopted
.denttty did not give
rise to an overtly problematic chtldhood or an overly rebellious adolescence, they did
perhaps direct me toward the path ofbecoming a philosopher. Phtlosophy as a
discourse of Truth has interested me not in terms of what it provides arguments for, but
in terms of the tensions within such arguments which cannot be erased. Philosophy’s
concerns with truth, objectivity, knowledge, and certainty have called to me as a scholar
as such concerns also suggest notions (and, perhaps, fears) of falsity, relativism, fiction,
and uncertainty. There has been an interesting tension for me, sometimes acknowledged
and sometimes only recognized through feelings of anxiety and even melancholy,
between my knowing myself as adopted and my encountenng philosophical texts.
I think my reaction to much philosophy, and especially to writing
philosophically, has involved assuming the position of the outlaw, the one on the
margins who critiques the normative discourse of philosophy, who names the ways in
which such discourse might contribute to the marginalization of the other. What has
been so difficult in writing this essay, then, has been the complexity not only of
including the personal within the philosophical, but of working with the different voices
that each of those styles demands. Finding a way to be (in the space writing offers) both
an adopted self and a philosopher has been the task of this essay, the unexpected journey
it has taken me on. Negotiating the tensions between these two voices or author(iz)ing
positions has involved reckoning with not only my insecurities as a writer, but my
insecurities as a knower.
I have wanted to write an essay from the point of view of being adopted-an
essay which would counter philosophy’s obsession with knowledge and clarity with my
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own (foundational) post,ion of contingency and ambtguity.
, have wanted to present a
critique of the traditional demands for epistemological certainty as clearly oppressive in
their denial of difference. But, the truth is, 1 have always wanted to know. My identity
as adopted has always involved a “desire to know...” such that my being adopted, my
experience of myself as an adopted person, has been defined by and in relation to this
desire.
9
Wh,le my “desire to know.
. has been of personal import to me, the concept of
knowing is key to the cultural signification of adoption as well. As the practices of
adoption in the United States over the last fifty years have changed, shifting from closed
to open, and the social attitudes about adoption have moved from those of shame to
acceptance or even celebration, the issue of ‘knowing’ (through such metonyms as
finding or ‘searching,’ for example) continues to be an important part ofhow adoption
is made sense of. I have for example, almost always been addressed by questions about
what I know when I tell people that I am adopted. “How long have you known?”
When did your parents tell you?” “What do you know about your biological family?”
“Do you know why you were given up?” Is the usual litany of responses. Interestingly,
the last or seemingly most important question is always the same and involves not only
what I know, but what I want to know: “Have you ever searched?” “Do you want to
know.
. .? Sometimes the question really does have a sense of an ellipsis in it, as if
what I might want to know cannot itself be named. No matter the time and place, my
identity claim as adopted is almost always addressed within the context of self-
knowledge. My claiming of adopted as an ontological position, or one about being, is
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re-inscribed in such dialogues as an ep.stemological claim, or one that is essentially
about knowing.
This reinscription not only shifts the weight ofmy claim, but importantly it
raises an issue about the status of knowledge in relation to identity. Rather than merely
asking me what I know, such interrogations address both the object of knowing and the
sublet of knowing. The questions (and perhaps the questioners themselves) assume not
only that there is something to know and that such information is important, but that I
can know it and it is important to me to know. While both the issues of knowing and of
desiring to know circulate in the cultural imagination about adoption, what I want to
begin to address here is how the figuration of desiring self-knowledge can itself be
productive of a certain kind of self. How my desire to know has been made sense of,
how it has been possible and impossible to articulate, involves how / have been
interpolated as such a self or subject (who is able to claim an identity). What I want to
suggest here is that the ways in which the “desire to know.
.
” has been both denied and
(mis-)recognized in terms of adoption reveals the ways in which the what of self-
knowledge is intimately tied up with the who of self-knowledge. This project is thus
driven by the following questions: if I am going to claim my “desire to know.
.
.” as
fundamental to my identity as adopted, and, further, ifmy identity as adopted is
somehow a different kind of identity, do I need to present my “desire to know.
.
differently? How can I know my “desire to know.
. in a way which allows me to
claim being adopted as an identity? And how might philosophy’s claims about knowing
and my experiences of being adopted come together to make such a presentation
possible?
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Issues of knowing and desire were paramount to me as a child. I was the
adopted child who both knew and accepted herself as adopted, and yet always ineluded
in that narrative a desire to search. Importantly, the first lie I remember telling was a
denial of this desire. It occurred when 1 was six. My cousin had told her mother who,
of course, then told my mother that I said that when I was eighteen I would search for
my birthmother. I sensed that admitting to this desire (and to its articulation to someone
in my mother's family) was impossible, and regretted having, in a rather bragging kind
of way, spoken my intentions outloud. Despite my saying "no” to my mother when she
asked me about my cousin's story, the fantasy of ‘knowing...’ or of ‘finding...’ was an
important part of my imagination about being an adult, a grown up Kim Leighton. My
parents were always concerned that I should notfeel adopted, which for them meant
feeling abandoned or inadequate or accepting as true the cultural stereotypes associated
with the trope of 'illegitimacy.' While having been adopted was not something I should
be ashamed of, they assured me, I also sensed that being someone who wanted to know
was a dangerous way to be.
I now believe that making public my ‘desire to know.
.
.’ by speaking my
intention to search, while it exhibited my six-year old senses of curiosity, will, and even
determination, it also, more poignantly, exhibited me as adopted. The reason I think I
lied, perhaps, was because I sensed that not only was I not supposed to feel adopted, but
I was not supposed to really be adopted. I lied out ofshame, perhaps—not the shame of
being adopted, but the shame felt from breaking some implicit rule. My parents (with
the best of intentions, I do feel) considered me as just the same as my cousins who were
not adopted, and, as such, I was never referred to as adopted, nor was I ever (that I knew
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Of) treated differently. My brother and I got the same gifts from our grandparents that
my cousins did. We were seemingly loved and teased in the same ways that they were.
I grew up feeling that what people liked, loved, and found annoying about me had
nothing to do with my being adopted. And in many ways, of course, this was good.
While the sensitivity my family felt about my being adopted meant that I was
seemingly treated the same as those children who were not adopted in my extended
family, I also felt an unspoken imperative present in such practices, a commandment
which was not addressed to my aunts, uncles, etc.: they were who they were (i.e., not
adopted), but I had to be the same as they were, (i.e., not adopted). My being like them
was in some ways an achievement. Most clearly, my following this command of
likeness took the form of limiting which ‘family’ language games I could (and could
not) participate in. Obviously, I could not talk about being adopted-I could not refer to
myself as adopted or discuss how it felt to be such. I could definitely not refer to my
parents as “adoptive” nor could I could muse outloud about my birth family or wonder
about whom I looked like. In addition to being silent during some conversations, it was
also important not to make logical mistakes which would raise the spectre of adoption.
I could not, for instance, compare myself to members of family in ways which didn’t
make ready sense. I could be “just like” my father or grandmother in a general kind of
way, or in a way which could (if necessary) be explained as a product of socialization. I
could ‘have’ my father’s “gift of gab,” for instance, or my grandmother’s stubbornness.
But I could not say I had their legs, their eyes, or some other particular feature that
seemed too close to the body.
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My silence around my body and its relation to the bodies of others not only left
unspoken the fact ofmy adoption, but moreover, it helped invest in the narrative that I
was just like those who were not adopted. The markings ofmy bodily identity could,
without being talked about, be ‘read’ as ifthey had the same meanings, the same
(imagined) history as those bodies ofmy relatives. I do not mean to suggest that bodily
markings are in some sense ‘real,’ that they reflect some natural meaning (or identity)
which exists pre-culturally and is then ‘expressed’ through language. The notion of
bodies as meaningful containers of signs of relation, I am suggesting, is a notion
constituted (in part) by spoken language games of family resemblance and silent
language games based on assumptions and on habits of association. 10
While it is not my project here to do a philosophical analysis of the relationship
between the cultural constructions and meanings of the body and the politics of the
family, it is important to note that the two themes here of “being just like” the non-
adopted and being silent about the body or the bodily are key to understanding the issues
I am raising about the desire to know. 1
1
I was silent about my body so that my body
could be considered as part of the body ofmy family, so that it could reflect
(constitutively) the identity that such inclusion engendered. This practice of making a
body seem to be ‘naturally part of the family was not particular to my own family, per
se. I was able to be silent about my body, able to live without its difference always
already being spoken, in part, because my adoption, like many others during the
1950’s and 1960’s, was (probably) conducted in a way such that no such ‘difference’
would (seem to) exist.
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The dominant ideology regarding adoption at the time during which I was
adopted involved policies which, when implemented, would in fact limit anyone's
cbility ,0 know that a child was adopted. This was done in terms of both htdtng actual
informal,on whteh pertamed to the ‘difference’ of the eh,Id and the process by which he
or she was begotten-sealing records, changing birth certificates, etc.-and ‘hiding’ those
bodily markings by which a child’s difference might stand out. In order to clear the
child (and the family) from the stigma(s) of adoption, it was thought that child’s
physical appearance should ‘match’ that of the adopted family. While most clearly
(and comphcatedly) about racial likeness, the policy of ‘matching’ included other
features thought to be tokens important to (creating) family likeness. As contained in
the euphemism of "background” such issues as class, education, and interests could
become themselves morphological, or thought of as having some connection to the
bodily identity and identification of the family
.
12
So, while my family’s sensitivity was in many ways helpful, it did promote the
idea that ‘being adopted' was not something to be talked about, let alone something
which could be claimed as an important part of my identity. I was “a Leighton.” And
that was that. I was not different, it seemed, and there was nothing “to know.” To
articulate a desire to know.
. . then was as illogical as it was improper. Hence my
musings about my desire to know, were, like my musings about my body-something to
be silent about, something to wonder about alone. To articulate them and make my
desire known, it seems, was to disown my identity as a Leighton, a rejection which was
as painful as it was impossible
.
13
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The manipulation of
‘difference’-especially through the figurations of the
‘body’- as a means of creating identity is not unique to the practices of adoption.
.
[A]s consciously constructed and scripted kinship,” writes Judith Modell and Naomi
Dambacher, “adoption reveals fundamental premises about birth, blood, and contract,
which themselves reflect ideologies that in Western societies enshrine the dichotomies
nature and culture, fictive and real .” 14 To construct any collective identity as if it is
unified—culturally, politically, historically, ethnically-for example, can involve
practices which deny the importance of difference, or even place the marker or sign of
difference onto others who are then considered outside the main group. Such
formations of unity also often rely on a notion ofsameness based on something
naturally given rather than socially or legally constructed. This sameness gives the
cohesion and unity of the group formed a kind of facticity that is beyond questioning.
Borrowing a term from Theodore Adorno, Iris Marion Young refers to the means
through which a kind of ontological sameness as a kind of being is created as the “logic
of identity. The logic of identity,” she writes, “tends to conceptualize entities in terms
of substance rather than process or relation; substance is the self-same entity that
underlies change, that can be identified, counted, measured.” 15
Hence, the logic of identity engenders the possibility of having a nature
,
a
something which can be one’s essence. Such an essence, this logic contends, can then
be transmitted to others, assuring that, like property itself, the property that is the
identity will continue on. This construction of identity as a kind of natural essence
which is transferred through practices of inheritance-both reproductive and legal,
perhaps-but is not constituted by them is not unsimilar, I want to suggest, to the kind of
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‘as-if-the-same’ construction involved in a traditional, historically ‘closed’ adoption
such as mine. According to anthropolog.st Barbara Yngvesson
,
‘the family- is
consmuted as a location and source of identity through the s.multaneous denial of and
re-inscription of the ‘natural.’ She wntes regarding
.rational closed adoptton:
American adoption laws circumvented the common law ‘repugnancy’ to
reating chi dren by act’ with a kind of legal sleight-of-hand in which
the films nullius [the concept of the child as ‘nobody’s child, a child
without filiation] could be incorporated into the new (adoptive) family by
erasing the old (biological) family; this ‘old’ family then became the
Y
covert mode! for the new one, in the ‘biological’ space made available
through the law’s erasure of ‘original’ blood ties. In this way the ‘blood
institution (Shaley 1 989: 1 1 ) that is central to the concept of family in
nglo-American culture and law was simultaneously eradicated and
affirmed.
As a kind of simulacra then, the adoptive family is reproduced as the ‘natural’
through the denial of bodily details and traces in the family who ‘passes’ as if it was not
produced by law. As the* as the natural family, the adoptive family can transfer the
essence of its own identity to its kin. In order to have an identity, then, a requisite for
cultural participation, I not only had to be a Leighton, but I had to be ‘bom’ and not
adopted, i.e., without ambiguous or fabricated or un-natural origins. I had to perform
not only the language games ofmy particular family, but the language game that is
identity. Being able to take on my name meant being someone who could trace her
heritage, who could trace through the logic of patronym the lineage of her family. The
cost of not being marked as “adopted” (i.e., as not a bastard in some important historical
and epistemological senses) involved adopting a model of identity that celebrates
sameness, is founded on nature, and believes in essences. 17 In such adoptions where the
fact of adoption is erased, being adopted thus involves not only being treated just like
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those who were not adopted, but moreover, it involves denying taking or claiming
being adopted" as an identity.
It is not only the institutional practices of the State and the family which perform
such “sleight-of-hand” acts-acts which, as Modell and Dambacher describe, make
possible “[t]he slide from appearance to essence.” 18 Part of the ongoing construction of
the fiction of ‘naturalness’ in general and the natural essence that is the morphological
connection of the family-i.e., its identity
-in particular, depends upon the constant
reiteration of the logic of identity through the everyday. 19 Having an identity thus
entails being addressed as a certain kind of subject who both is and knows her identity in
particular (normative) ways. I, like most adoptees (as well as others who come from
non-traditional families), have had to face the awkwardness involved in doing the 7th
grade family tree, or filling out ‘medical histories’ at the doctor’s office, or simply being
told “you look just like your parents.” Such instances evidence the assumption and
expectation of the ability to perform an identity in a certain truth-ful, non-ambiguous
way. Other everyday practices show how such expectations of identity involve
disciplinary practices. Many times in my life, for instance, people have responded to
my telling them that I was adopted by saying, “No, you’re not. You couldn ’t be. You
look (are, act, etc.) just like your Dad. Such denials indicate not only the assumption
that I am like them (biologically related to my family), but an additional assumption that
likeness comes from a kind of biological essence, a kind of naturalness. Together these
assumptions eradicate the possibility (in a most literal way) ofmy claiming a position of
difference. This position of impossibility, where my difference could not be articulated
because of the assumptions of others continued through much of my life. I was
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constantly addressed as not adopted, and such acts of interpolation, such readings of
being just like the non-adopted, not only rendered my adoption invisible; it made my
responses to such addresses impossible. How could 1 answer their address as someone
they seemingly could not recognize?
In middle school, I simply decided to ‘fake it’, ‘drawing’ my family tree as if I
was not adopted. Because I knew that the assignment assumed this tree was a tree of
biological lineage, a tree of ‘begetting’, I knew that what I wrote was not exactly true.20
I remember having deliberated about how to proceed with the assignment, and that I had
made a ‘choice’ to take the path of least resistance. (This was not an issue I brought
home for discussion, mind you.) I also remember that my humanities teacher wrote
under the A-minus that she gave me that I was “lucky” to have so much information
about my family, as I managed to include in the project facts about several generations
ofmy parents’ families. Simultaneously her comments were directed at me and yet
completely missed me. She did not know that I knew this ‘lineage’ was a fabrication,
that I had, in a sense, plagiarized, having copied down another’s family tree as my own,
having chosen to write what I could claim to know rather than expose that what was
critical to who I was was what I didn ’t know (and in some sense couldn’t know). I
wonder now what she thought was the import of such knowledge, such that I was
“lucky.” What did she think it gave me?
Later, through high school, I confronted my own feelings of forgery and
complicity, of ‘passing’ as a ‘lucky’ one, and the assumptions of such institutional
practices by deliberately writing on all requests regarding medical information and
“family history” (which were surprisingly many) in big bold letters on a diagonal across
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the page: “ADOPTED.” I was old enough to fill out such forms by myself, and so
without the presence of my parents’ imagined gaze, I took this step of marking myself as
not the same as biologically-reproduced subjects. Interestingly, this self-ascription or
marking was usually met with a kind of lacuna: upon learning ofmy adoption almost
all medical personnel would not (and still often don’t) ask any family history questions,
either about my adopted or about my biological families, skipping right along to the
individual history portion of the inquisition. They read “ADOPTED” as indicative, it
seems, of the position of someone incapable of answering such questions. Perhaps they
assume that if I knew my biological medical history, I would have not have made such a
statement, and would have just simply checked off the appropriate diseases and filled in
the corresponding lines left blank next to “relationship .”21
While the demands of a “matching” ideology in traditional adoptions-including
the legacies of shame and secrecy-made it rather impossible to speak my “desire to
know.
. . earlier in my life
,
the new age of “openness” regarding adoption has had its
own issues which make such an articulation of desire difficult to perform. What is
similar for me in both paradigms involves the tendency towards being read as just like
the non-adopted, such that my “desire to know.
.
.” is still understood (and
misrecognized) as normative, that is as being what ‘normal’ subjects would (or
wouldn t) do. Being just like the not adopted or ‘as if not adopted while growing up
meant that my desire to know could only be like theirs as well. While adoption itself
has become a more public phenomenon of late, the greater access to information and
more open discussions of adoption have made it more possible to talk about my desire
to know, but not necessarily more likely to have such desire understood. What is still at
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issue in both of these contexts is the need to address what we think the presence or
absence of such information means, what it gives or takes away from one’s notion of
having an identity.
Just as I could not answer the question “when were you told you were adopted?”
I am unsure if I could answer the question “why did you search for your birthmother?”
Unlike the ubiquitous questions I have been addressed with (how old were you, what do
you know, etc.) this question of why has never been asked. Its inarticulation makes me
nervous, as I often feel when I start telling my ‘story’ that there are unspoken
assumptions about the meaning of my search, including misunderstandings about the
desire to search, the meaning of the body, and the understanding of and importance of
identity. Two common notions evoked reflect what is at stake in such a misrecognition.
First, many people often express their belief that it is ‘natural’ to want to know
.
22 And
second, they extend this claim of naturalness to (or perhaps even base it on) their own
imaginings of what they would want to know if they were adopted. The tropes involved
here are something like “Of course, it’s natural to be curious” and “Well, if I were
adopted I would definitely want to know.”
In both of these tropes we begin to see that what is involved in claims of self-
knowledge, in claims about “desiring to know.
.
.” oneself, is not only the establishment
of the object of knowledge, but of the subject of knowledge as well. More than being
about what is known, responses to my ‘coming out’ as adopted almost always invoke
articulations about desiring knowing, articulations which assert a who who is desiring.
While I used to think this was just an interest in what / desired to know, that it was
natural to be curious about me, more recently I have begun to consider how others’
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articulations regarding their own desires to know reflect an insecurity (or anx,ety) that
adoption invokes in general. Th.s insecurity opens up a way to see how the fantasy
involved in knowing (or, conversely, in not having reason to des.re to know, no. having
reason to not know or even to doubt oneself) which elides into a kind of being (one
doesn't have to know, one just is an X) is a fantasy that establishes the self with its
coherent, natural, and unquestionable identity, as capable of being a legitimate knower.
While 1 am no longer quiet about being adopted, especially when I am mis-read
as biologically related to my family, I am still uncertain how to speak about my adopted
identity: either my being adopted is ‘forgotten’ or I am constructed as the ‘lucky’ one. 23
Having, as an adult, searched for and found my birthmother, I am cautious about how I
respond to the responses of others when they leam ofmy ‘successful’ search story, for I
have often felt like it was easy to have my desire to know (and my understanding of
what 1 now ‘know’ or what 1 ‘found’) appropriated and misread. Similar to the false
identification I felt when 1 ‘passed’ as not adopted, I often feel uncomfortable when
people respond to my story with a kind of empathy about what it means to be adopted
and how great it must be to know my birthmother.
Thus it seems that haunting the articulation of the desire to know, when
recognized within an identity discourse—i.e., the logic of identity—is a kind of
ontological un-certainty, an uncertainty relieved by the presumption of an
epistemological power. That such knowing is less about the information known and
more about the (cultural) legibility or legitimacy its having offers (and its absence
denies) the knowing subject became more apparent to me when, several years ago, after
mentioning to a colleague that my birth mother was coming to visit, I was invited to tell
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‘my story' to a local group of adoptive parents
.
24
It was the first time that I had ever
presented my narrative of adoption in a public forum and I did not know what to expect.
At first the audience was quite interested in my experience of being adopted-when was
I told, how did that make me feel, was I teased by others-but later their interest shtfted
as the parents became very engaged with my story of searching for and finding the
woman who gave birth to me. After outlining the details ofmy search, many of the
parents began to offer their own stories of what they did not ‘know’ about their children.
It became apparent to me that this not knowing was of crucial importance to them.
Several parents lamented that they did not or even could not know the details of their
children’s backgrounds. They wished they could have names, dates, places, stories—an
infinite list of items regarding information they seemed to think critical to their
children’s identities.
At this point in my presentation I began to become uncomfortable as it was clear
that such lack of knowledge was a lack more crucial to these parents than to their
children. I was being constructed by the audience as “lucky” (again), as full of
information, as somehow more whole than their children, or maybe more whole than
they. As a group, the parents seemed to suggest that not knowing all of the details of
one’s past, of one’s life, made one less than a whole person.
I wondered, sympathetically, if the parents weren’t transposing their anxieties as
both parents and as adoptive parents onto their children, though I also wondered,
resentfully, transposing my own anxieties, perhaps, ifmy parents felt this way when they
were raising me. I began to wonder what it was they thought such “information” would
give them. It was during this presentation of mine and the audience’s response that I
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really considered not what I did know about my birth family, but how such knowing did
not solve all of the identity issues that 1 had. Rather than resolving my questions about
‘who 1 am,” ‘finding' a new family complicated my identity, problematized some ofmy
relationships, and encouraged all kinds of re-def,n,tion ofmy family and its identity.
Knowledge" ofmy birth family has indeed made the impossibility of definitively
answering the question “who am I?” ever more clear.' 5
Anxious and slightly frustrated in the face ofmy audience’s implied assumptions
(and misunderstandings) about the status of knowledge in the context of adopted
families, I asked the group if any of them were themselves adopted. No hands went up.
I then asked if any of them had in the last ten years or so (all were between 35 and 50,
1
thought) found out something new about their own families and histories, something
they had never known or even something that contradicted what they had believed to be
the case, maybe even something startling. Many of them groaned in response, raising
their hands, rolling their eyes as they considered the changes in what they knew about
who they and their loved ones were. I suggested to them to consider in relation to their
adopted children s histories how such ‘knowledge’ in and of their «o«-adoptive (i.e.,
biological or natural) families circulated, changed, was revised such that a true
definitive narrative of their family and identity was itself an ideal, if not a fiction.
To underscore the complexity of their desire to know, of our (Western modem)
culture s imperative regarding the knowledge of the self and the failure to meet such an
idealization, I offered a story from my own search for and failure to find the (imagined)
truth ofmy identity. Like other agencies in other states, the Catholic organization
through which I was placed offered me “non-identifying” information when I presented
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myself to them at the age of nineteen. Among other details the social worker there
offered that I had been named “Mary Kathleen.”26 The parents in the room were audibly
moved when 1 relayed my knowledge ofmy (non-identifying ongin-al) name. To know
the name, the original name of their child seemed so important to them, as it had been to
me.
I finally met my birth mother when I was 27, so for over eight years, I carried
that name around as a secret and magical key which carried me back towards a past
which had been hidden and forward towards a future which might have existed. The
name was an important part of my imagining a life I did not have. It was a gift, a
shining ring, the stone of which represented the truth of who I was, a secret true me, the
self whom I would have been had I not been adopted. I would have been, I thought, a
Mary Kathleen not a Kimberly Jean.
After several conversations and meetings with my birthmother, I raised the issue
of “the name.” In a casual voice, perhaps unaware of the investment I had made in
those two words, she responded, saying “Oh, I had forgotten about that.” The audience
gasped. This was almost as “bad” as saying that she had forgotten the actual date of my
birthday, it seemed. I asked my birthmother why she chose that name and her response
both silenced and relieved me: “I’m not sure. I think I had an aunt named Mary and a
friend at the birthing home named Kathy. I thought it was a pure sounding name.
Something to give you as a good-bye, knowing that you certainly wouldn’t keep it.”
There was a pause. She continued in a voice hesitant and sensitive: “But, I never would
have named you that, though, if I was going to keep you. It was a name to leave you
with...” The emphasis here, as I heard her words, was on the leaving not on the with.
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There was now a tension in the room with the adoptive parents, and I felt like I
had done something wrong. Something really wrong. I had not only perhaps broken
some unspoken rules (of hierarchy) about the relationship between adoptees and the
people who adopt them, but I had also broken a key rule about the role of the speaker in
such a forum. As I re-read this event now, I think that on a meta-level I was asked to
speak to the group about how I had searched for and found my birth mother, a
metonymic object that stands in for my self. I was to present to the audience my “desire
to know” my history, my biology, my self, and the means by which I satisfied that
desire. My narrative was to legitimate the parents’ “need to know” (to show them that it
was the same as mine, not something odd about them as adoptive parents) by showing
them how I had constructed my own need to know as natural, as morally right, as
justified by the happy ending.
As I had presented my search narrative to the audience, replacing the simplicity
of a happy ending with a kind of aporia, however, I had challenged the demand in
Western culture to present oneself as an object of knowledge to oneself and to others, to
satisfy the demands of such knowing by rendering myself as an object free of ambiguity.
I had, in short, aroused but resisted the demands of the logic of identity. My narrative of
searching and finding did not end with self-knowledge in a traditional sense, but instead
left open (in an unclose-able or aporetic way) what the meaning of the knowledge I
found was.
While the adoptive parents’ desire to know seems to be very different from the
refusal of the desire to know within the paradigm of matching and silence, there is
something they have in common in terms of the production of identity. Both contexts
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involve knowledge (about the child, the families, the bodies, etc.) being thought to
provide theforce of identity. In the paradigm of silence, this knowledge was produced
through an erasure of details which might contradict what could be read or seen about
the body; whereas in the paradigm of openness
,
it is not the bodily details per se which
are at issue, but the power they seem to hold as unknown. The adoptive parents’ desire
to know involved making the unknown of their children known; like the desire to erase
bodily moreness in ‘matching,’ their desire to know involved, I think, a desire to erase
the otherness that haunts the construction of identity. Again, as Iris Marion Young has
presented, difference when seen as otherness is a threat to the construction of identity.
She writes:
Through the logic of identity thought seeks to bring everything under
control, to eliminate uncertainty and unpredictability, to spiritualize the
bodily fact of sensuous immersion in a world that outruns the subject, to
eliminate otherness. Such a subject is conceived as a pure transcendental
origin, it has no foundation outside itself, it is self-generating and
autonomous
.
27
Such otherness, it seems, might be acceptable when the identity in question is
not one produced through adoption; it might in fact be merely difference. But the
passion involved in the parents’ desire to know involved more than just getting more
information, more details or stories they could offer their children. It seemed they
wanted to know such information because they wanted to eradicate the uncertainty to
the establishment of identity that not having it (themselves) evoked. The issue of truth
here is complicated; for clearly, these adoptive parents wanted to know their children’s
biological information not because such knowledge was the truth of their children’s
identities, a truth they and their particular cultural values and practices could not
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compete with, evidence that there was no eompetit.on between nature and nurture
because nature had already won out. Rather, having such information would give the
adoptive parents, in some way, the power invested in such knowledge, power that seems
to deepen (and to threaten) when such knowledge is absent.
Aware of the ever-changing narratives of family definition and the uncertainty
present in any intimate organization, the parents in my audience implicitly were still
appealing to an ideal of self-knowledge, to the possibility of knowing with certainty the
origins of individuals.' 8 Despite their own uncertainties of their own families, these
parents still believed in (or were strongly imagining) both the possibility of such
knowing and the importance of it. They were in their desires to know citing the ideal
knower of the Western political and epistemological subject, an agent capable of
knowing his own self-origins. Despite their obvious care about and investments in the
families they were making, these parents were treating knowledge about the ‘others’
(and the otherness) in their families in a way similar to the ways in which Western
philosophers have considered knowledge-its status and power-for several hundred
years: as discernible, knowable, capable of certainty, and of, paradoxically, providing
the answers to one’s identity. My intuition here is that rather than having the bodily
(itself, in some sense) be the morphological substance through which identity is
established and transmitted, this example suggests that knowledge of the bodily can
itself when known be that which is the morphological ‘source’ of identity. While it is
not exactly sameness that is here at issue, there is something about knowing without
impediment, some romance with (biological) information giving it the status of Truth,
that will supplement the adoptive family, allowing it a sense of normative identity. In
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other words, what is known is still thought to be able to render identity, but rather than
it being the facts themselves which evidence identity, it is the having of them which—as
unified, transparent, unambiguous, etc.—engenders identity.
So I learned that the parents’ desire to know was not the same as my desire to
know. I had, in the telling ofmy tale, not only presented my desire as different, but I
had questioned the purpose of their desire. I had put into relief the issue of the
naturalness of the desire to know, making it a desire more connected to the cultural,
the social, and even the political. There is a paradox of sorts involved in the desire to
know within the logic of identity, especially in the context of knowing the self through
family. The desire to know as natural, as something ‘anyone’ would want to know
seems to be about connection, about relation, about one’s intimate ties to others. As
such, what is known could never be complete. If how one becomes ‘who one is’ is
linked to the lives of others and the meanings of their lives, then an ad infinitum quickly
develops. But what if according to the logic of identity, identity doesn’t become
;
it is.
How does the notion that an identity is, has being, is substance affect what we consider
to be relevant information about our identities, especially in terms of the family?
I do not want to go too far, but I think that there is, borrowing from Naomi
Scheman, a paranoid logic at work in the construction of identity as a substance . 29
There is a way that information about the self, when constructed as knowledge, has to
be patrolled for otherness, such that its status as identity-knowledge can be secured.
There is a tension for instance in the adoptive parents’ desire to know the ‘facts’ of their
children’s lives. On the one hand they want to know of this information as that which
reflects their children’s connections to others—other people, cultures, languages,
202
ethnicities, and even other names. But if they want these details to be facts, then the
details, once known, must become finite and complete. As knowledge they have about
their children, the facts can be used within the construction of the new life, the adopted
identity of the child. For me, I wonder if having such information doesn’t make their
children s identities less adopted, less about being adopted (which the parents were not),
less a different kind of identity than they themselves believe they have. But yet, when
asked, the parents knew that there was no way that information about themselves and
their identities was constant, secured, without change or ambiguity.
In order to construct the fantasy of identity it seems we want to believe that self-
knowledge is possible, that we can in fact not only know the facts about someone else’s
identity, but that we can know them about our own. That such a fantasy involves the
fantasy of self-transparency is suggested by the other common response to my speaking
my adopted identity. “Oh, if I were adopted, I would definitely want to know.
.
.” The
(non-adopted) person who says that she would definitely want to know is referring to
her experience as a non-adopted person, it would seem, as she asserts that she would not
want to be without the knowledge that she has. She could not imagine not knowing.
(The exact predicate here, what it is that must be known, is necessarily left incomplete
or even unstated. The ellipsis involved in “I would definitely want to know. . .” is not
my shorthand. It is in the statement itself, indicating that what it is that is being known
is less important than the act of knowing (imagined or otherwise).) This inability to
imagine not knowing (...) would seem to indicate that the content of this knowing is so
important to her identity that she could not imagine (being) herself without it.
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But how to make sense then of her imagining herself as adopted? The second
part of the trope is “I would definitely want to know,” but the first part is “If I were
adopted,” Those who “would definitely want to know” are imagining that they would in
some sense be the same person with the same desires and needs around their identities
even though in their thought experiment, they are imagining themselves in a very
different life. In other words, these subjects at once assert a sameness over time of their
desires and of the I who would want (to know), and simultaneously raise the spectre of
having totally different familial, cultural, class, etc., positions. While the notion of
identity we have been exploring has been that which maintains a kind of self-sameness
between (and among) family members, the desire to know articulated here suggests that
this establishment of self-sameness transcends the familial. Such an articulation of the
desire to know' both relies upon and constitutes a notion of identity as .ve//-sameness
over time that is foundational to the status of the individual subject. What this suggests
is that the desire to know (one’s family), paradoxically, can be a desire which asserts,
constructs, and even confirms one’s autonomy (from family). The naturalizing of the
desire to know’, then, I want to suggest, recites and perhaps re-enacts the paradigm of
identity as autonomous, particularly as it posits the existence of the self as knowing his
way through his own identity—a movement which reduces the complexity of
‘relatedness’ to the singularity of identity
The desire to know for both the adoptive parents and for the interlocutor who
imagines herself as adopted, as I have explored it thus far, involves a desire for
certainty. As both parties invoke the model of identity as substance, they construct
knowledge of that identity as finite and suggest that the having of such knowledge itself
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performs a legitimate identity. The desire in fact, is a desire which exhibits the
subject's (desire to be able to know with) certainty, and thus is a desire which asserts the
existence of the subject (and his identity) as real. The exhibition of such desire to know
functions as (or becomes metonymical with, perhaps) the idea that such a desire to know
can be satisfied (by the subject itself). According to historian and social critic Michel
Foucault, knowing oneself was a requirement for modem subjectivity. In the modem
era, he writes, “.
. .one of the main moral obligations for any subject is to know oneself,
to tell the truth about oneself, and to constitute oneself as an object of knowledge both
for other people and for oneself.”30
That the exhibition of such self-knowledge is part of this moral obligation means
that the obligation is doubly required: To satisfy this moral obligation is both the work
of the subject and evidence or proof of one’s subjectivity. In other words, to be
recognized as a subject it is required that one have such self-mastery and that one
performs it for others. I think that the exhibition of the “desire to know.
.
.” in this sense
performs one’s status as subject, and thus attempts to secure one’s position as (socially
and politically) intelligible. Critically then, there is a paradox here, for as “desire” this
(exhibition of the desire to know) is necessarily a performance that at once entails both
the capacity for knowledge and the absence of knowledge. Being through desire, even
if a desire for knowing, opens up a space of vulnerability. Working through this
dialectic of vulnerability, of certainty and lack, is the heart ofmy project in developing a
notion of adopted identity.
Intelligibility, i.e., the erasure of the desire to know as desire, as that which
alludes to lack, comes at a cost. In one sense, the cost is a kind of schism in the subject,
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a kind of impossible position. In another sense, the eost is a limiting of relations (and
their meanings) with others. Discussing the ways in which philosophy, having shaped
the standards of knowledge, has affected this schism in the subject, Naomi Scheman
highlights how the maintenance of epistemological certainty might result in a kind of
splitting. As the subject has to secure his own certainty through a process of
estrangement from that which is uncertain—such as the body, relations to others, the
unknowable of the self—those parts of him which thus impinge his claiming of, what
Scheman calls ‘epistemic authority,’ must be denied. This denial, she explains,
engenders a subject (both the individual subject and the subject of philosophy) severely
divided. This division leads to a kind of paranoia, as a subject (who can pass as
authorized, who can pass as bodiless) feels he must choose between the legitimate status
of epistemic authorization and the il-legitimate status of being too closely associated (or
identified) with the body. Scheman writes:
Such a self, privileged by its estrangement from its own body, from the
external world, and from other people, will, in a culture that defines
such estrangements as normal, express the paranoia of such a stance not
only through oppression, but, more benignly, through the problems that
are taken as the most fundamental, even if not the most practically
pressing: the problems of philosophy.
. . Such problems are literally and
unsurprisingly unsolvable so long as the subject’s very identity is
constituted by those estrangements. A subject whose authority is defined
by his location on one side of a gulf cannot authoritatively theorize that
gulf away.
' 1
My project here is to approach the ‘desire to know’ within the narrative of
adoption in a way which does not re-invest in such a paranoid logic, and which would
allow for an articulation of such desire without disciplining the subject according to the
norms of epistemic authority. As the paranoia of which Scheman writes seems to come
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from the very dichotomies by which western philosophy is compelled, any attempt to
develop a philosophical subject who/that escapes the costs of such paranoia must escape
also the logic of ‘splitting’ endemic to it. For an adopted subject to resist the dangers of
such paranoid logic, I contend, the ‘desire to know’ must not be a desire that strives for
resolution, for unity, for oneness, as such (imaginary) singularities will demand the
splitting off of that which is inconsistent, incoherent, unable to be assimilated. As such,
I want to suggest a way to explore the moreness of adopted identity as a means to
achieve a way to articulate a kind of (aporetic) self-knowing without paranoia.
Naming my own ‘desire to know’ is thus a risky business for me. I have come to
believe that being adopted, assuming ‘adopted’ as an ontological position, is about
always recognizing that the complexities of “who one is” are produced by and
negotiated through multiple social practices and relationships. As these practices are
always changing, always in discursive flux, and depend upon repetition for their
production, so too who one is is always in process, in relationship with others, and in
need of re-signification. Claiming being adopted as an identity thus involves
appreciating the fact that identities in general are socially constructed and that the
appearance of solidity, of substance or essence, is itself an effect of such construction.
While I believe this to be true, I also recognize theforce the desire to know, to
fill in the gaps, to flesh out my story, and yes, even to “see my face in the face of
another,” has had in my life. There has been an affective or emotional place constituted
where the trope of ‘being adopted’ as the story of my identity and the trope of ‘being
adopted’ as the story ofmy body intersect. It is here in this intersection between the
narratives of identity and of body (which are, perhaps, the limits of the metaphor of
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adoption), that my desire to know becomes both announced and felt. As a liminal
space, however, I cannot claim (to know) that this is its place of origin. My
philosophical and political explorations of what being a(n adopted) subject means to me
have produced this ‘desire to know' as a kind of epistemological excess: I neither
believe that the self is transparent to itself, such that its desires can be explained, nor
that the subject can be an object of knowledge (for itself or for others) such that its
status as in-process and citational is limited. As I cannot explain (away) this desire as
socially or biologically caused, it is a kind of remainder which points to a moreness of
my self. As such it is neither a desire for certainty, for knowing my own essence, or
truth, nor is it an abandonment of the search for authority. It is a felt desire, particular to
me and my history, but not an explicable desire based on some discernible feeling of
lack. It is a desire not to know my self as an object of knowledge, but to experience my
self as a subject outside of the limits ofknowing with certainty. It is a desire to be a
subject who has authority without abandoning as foundational to that authority the
pleasures of uncertainty.
In order to be able to speak my desire to know, I have to articulate that desire as
not a desire for privileged, normative, intelligible identity. In one sense, of course, this
is impossible. My desire to know (differently) has necessarily been produced in
relationship to this desire for (legitimate) recognition. My relationship to my desire to
know, in fact, has shifted in my life in relation to how I have desired, received, and
resisted social and cultural recognition and/or legitimacy. What I have tried to present
here in the space that is engendered by exploring adoption philosophically, is how,
having been interpolated as an epistemologically legitimate subject, i.e., a subject who
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can claim the status or privtleged position of (self-)knower, I have been ,,,-able to claim
a position as adopted. My recognition as someone who can know herself has come, in
fact, from the mtv-recogmtion of me as not adopted. These (repeated) acts of
misrecognition have, throughout my life, made the articulation ofmy desire to know—
its specificity, its difference—quite difficult. Even when my claim of being adopted as
an identity position seems to have been recognized, the ways in which my ‘desire to
know.
. has been understood has suggested that my difference as adopted has not
really been appreciated.
This essay, then, is a (partial) account of those practices which have denied my
difference. It is also, however, an articulation of that which has not only resisted such
denials, but has desired through them. I cannot argue, in short, that the ways in which I
have been addressed as not-adopted, the ways in which I have ‘passed’ as someone who
would never have been referred to as a ‘bastard,’ are not part of the very reason I have
been able to claim my desire to know. But neither can I deny that my sense of
difference, of possibility, of being adopted by rather than born into my family and its
identity, didn’t give me the strength to resist the seductions of such an offer of
legitimacy. In other words, if being adopted did encourage me to become a philosopher,
as some might want to think, it is not because philosophy offered me the position of
being-in-the-know that I lacked as an adoptee. Philosophy, as a field engaged with such
questions as what is knowledge, what is identity, and what is desire, has instead been a
location where my ambivalence as a knower can be explored, where my desire to know
as desire can find home. If I am to speak that desire in this home, then I cannot, like the
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logic of identity might demand, separate from it the means by which it has become
known to me.
To have an adopted identity—which is for me an identity based on the desire to
know—is thus to include in that very identity the ways in which it has been denied. To
be adopted then, involves including in being those processes of becoming which not
only affirm who we are, which not only give us the means with which we can assume an
identity, but which also make the articulation of an identity impossible. As adopted
then, identity evokes both the past through which our identities have been assigned,
interpolated, and determined, as well as the present through which we claim imperfect
positions of knowing ourselves. By exploring the trope of identity in general through
the metaphor of adopted identity in particular, it is my aim to transcend the dualistic
framework of lack and certainty that drives the subject toward both the need for
epistemic authority and the dis-ease that is paranoid logic. Approaching identity as
adopted engenders the possibility, I want to claim, for locating a positionality of the
subject in relation to her own desire to know (herself). By re-placing or shifting the
emphasis in the ‘desire to know’ from knowing to desiring, it is my hope that we can
engender a subject position which involves both a recognition of and resistance to the
(limiting and oppressive) social and political systems of identity-ascription and their
corollary authorizations of epistemic privilege and a recognition of and movement
towards the personal ways in which a subject is concerned with knowing her processes
of being and becoming. By reading the trope of identity as necessarily impossible to
(thoroughly) know, I am not claiming that it is necessary to give up on identity. Instead,
I am offering a way to re-read identity as adopted as a way to highlight that identities, as
210
objects of our desire, can be seen as both locations of subjection and places of potential
freedom.
Conclusion
Foucault, Freedom, and Curiosity: An Ethical Desire to Know hh*
In order for “searching” to be an ethical practice it needs to be a practice which
engenders more opportunities or possibilities for ways of being, more ways in which
one can make the self, and live one’s life as a work of art. The desire to know the self, I
want to consider, is not on its own an ethical or unethical desire. It is the practice we
engage in regarding this desire that we must consider in terms of ethics, for it is
Foucault s basic claim that practices of self have moral content in the sense that it is
through them that a notion of the self (its possibilities, responsibilities, desires, etc.) is
constituted. How we engage the desire to know through search for self-knowledge the
self thus needs to be evaluated in terms of its ethical possibilities. For Foucault this
means knowing the self in a way which opens up possibilities for change, for political
change and political action. His project is to
ask which techniques and practices for the Western concept of the
subject, giv[e] it its characteristic split of truth and error, freedom and
constraint.
. . This would be a theoretical analysis which has, at the same
time, a political dimension,
.
.
[i.e.,] an analysis that relates to what we
are willing to accept in our world, to accept, to refuse, and to change,
both in ourselves and in our circumstances. In sum, it is a question of
searching for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical
philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our
possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the
conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of
transforming ourselves .
32
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Freedom and the Cult of Identity
From our previous discussion of Foucault and the above meditation, it would
seem that within the paradigm of the Obligation to Truth, freedom becomes defined as
the following: I am ‘free’ only by ‘discovering’ myself as I ‘truly’ (and already) am. I
am enacting my freedom through this uncovering ofmy true nature which I am then
able to produce (to myself and to others). Foucault considers the contemporary desire to
know the self as a kind of “cult of the self [where] one is supposed to discover one’s
true self, to separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth
thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell
you what your true self is.” He claims that this cult of selfand the ancient care of the
self diametrically opposed.”” It is not the outright desire to know oneself that
Foucault sees as most troublesome as he writes that, “Taking care of oneself requires
knowing oneself.”34
It is important however, to highlight this connection between “freedom” and the
cult of authenticity, especially if we are going to be able to pursue self-knowledge as an
ethical practice of care of the self. In Foucault’s terms, the history of the subject needs
to be located in a history of ethics, “a history of ‘ethics’ understood as the elaboration
of a form of relation to self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject
of ethical conduct. It is this form of relation that is crucial to our project, for the
question becomes what relation(s) are engendered or made possible by our practices of
self-knowing? If I am correct that within the modem paradigm of truth obligation the
basic relation one has to one’s self knowing is through the search for “True Self’ then
this does not offer an opportunity for relation of the self to itself at all. Instead it merely
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has the self subject herself through the logic of self-identity motivated through the
ideology of authenticity to think she is enacting her freedom. But this is not an act of
freedom.
For Foucault, “Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the
considered form that freedom takes.”36 Thus, for acts of self-knowing (or those
responding to the desire to know) to be practices of care rather than of those of
subjection, such acts of self-knowing have to be ethical. This involves ridding from our
practices of self-knowing both the notion of the true nature of the self and actions which
construct this natural self, this essence (of our individuality) as our political goal. The
need for this becomes clear as Foucault writes,
I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation,
because if it is not treated with precautions and within certain limits, one
runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature
or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social
processes has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by
mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is
required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man will be
reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact with his
origin, and reestablish a full and positive relation with himself. (The
Ethics p282)
So what of the relation between freedom and self knowledge? I would like to
suggest that based on Foucault s work, a notion of self-knowledge that could be ethical
needs both to have an ethical notion of self and an ethical notion of knowing.
Regarding this change of self, he writes:
Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its
positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self or the
positive foundation of the self. Maybe our problem is now to discover
that the self is nothing else than the historical correlation of the
technology built in our history. Maybe the problem is to change those
technologies. And in this case, one of the main political problems would
be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves. 37
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Curiosity and Ethical Self-knowledge
In order to change the technology of knowing, of the knowledge production of
the self, I think it is useful to analogize this knowing with an ethical version of the
adoptee’s search for identity. Such an ethical search is at once a recognition of the
hiSt°riCal praCtlCes throuSh whlch one’s identity was produced and a recognition of
one’s own individual desire concerning oneself. I would thus like to end with the idea
of appropriating from the discourse of adoption the notion of “curiosity,’ for while
‘curiosity’ about identity is certainly naturalized by contemporary discourse on
adoption, I think it can also be used in a practice which does not necessarily lead to a
natural and finite answer. As presenting us with a practice that remains open, that is
less about finding an answer and more about a way of being, curiosity offers us a way to
desire ourselves, to relate to ourselves as not completely present to ourselves. Thus, to
act upon our “desire to know” ourselves in a way which encourages the ethical relation
of the self to itself, perhaps keeping curiosity alive in the desire could be a way to put
relationality into (even) the body itself.
Psychologist and adoptee, Betty Jean Lifton is widely known for her articles and
books on adoption as well as her activism concerning the rights of those in the adoption
triangle, i.e., adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents. In her introduction to her
book Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness
. Lifton writes of her own
curiosity as an adoptee. Naturalizing her curiosity, she views the shame and secrecy of
adoption as effectively “repressing” it. She describes her life as a ‘good daughter’ who
repressed her “natural need to know”: “By denying my natural curiosity about where I
came from, and my grief for my lost birth parents and for the child I might have been, I
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was shrinking my emotional space to the size permitted by [the adoption] system ”38
For Foucault, however, curiosity "evokes ‘eare’; it evokes the care one takes of what
exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one that is never
immobilized before it; a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd...I dream
of a new age of curiosity. We have the technical means; the desire is there; there is an
infinity of things to know...”'9 As an ethical practice, a care of and for the self, such
curiosity encourages the aesthetics of existence such that desiring to know who we are is
necessarily a life-long project.
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“‘What Ca" 1 I" on Archaeological-Geneaological
History, The Journal of Philosophy 82 (Oct 1985): 542.
Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: TwoLectures at Dartmouth,” Political Theory 21 (May 1993): 203
i ^ The, added “tand kn°wn]” comes from a different version of the samelecture. I have included it as it is relevant to my argument.
XIV „
4 M ‘u:garet McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (AlbanyN Y : State University ofNew York Press, 2002), 70.
5
Ibid., 70.
Kelly Oliver s work on post-subject(ion) is relevant here. See her Subjectivity
without Subjects: From Abject Fathers to Desiring Mothers tLanham. MO- Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998).
7
1 hope that this essay will make clear that the notion of ‘possibility’ as I am
exploring it here is not a kind of pure freedom entailing the idea that one could ‘re-
invent oneself. I am also not suggesting that having a sense of one’s identity as
arbitrary means that one can simply change it, nor am I proposing that adoption offers a
way to see identity as constructed and therefore not real. What I am offering is that as a
paradigm (or metaphor) for identity, ‘being adopted’ opens up a space of non-identity
(or non-identicalness) between the self as a subject and the self as an object such that
one cares about the processes (social, historical, cultural, political, and relational)
through which one has come to be. It is through this relation of care, or what I want to
call desiring knowing’ (but do not explore as such in this work), that one can undertake
(the pleasures and pursuits of) self-knowing in a way that engenders a recognition of
self-difference (i.e., that the self one is (and can be) is not identical to the knowledge(s)
of it).
gAs such, I want to propose that an adopted identity is (necessarily) incompatible
with a notion of complete self-transparency. While this incompatibility gestures toward
the constitutive presence of social and historical forces in the production of identities, it
also, I want to stress, allows for an assumption of an ontological position which, though
not outside of such constitutive forces, is not thoroughly available as (an object)
explained by them. This chapter is part of a larger project that explores the relationship
between such (ontological) opacity and the notion of possibility that adopted identity
implies.
}
Importantly, I want to leave my ‘desire to know...’ open and undefined. This
essay, in its meanderings both personal and philosophical, is an attempt to present in a
legible way stories through which I know (and have experienced) myself as adopted. As
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should become clear, there is no real object which 1 desire to know nor is there someessence of being adopted which I am trying to convey. Instead 1 am elai • ,i.
ffthauh
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* there >s something to be engaged with that is always there to be desired a kindof moreness, (b) connected to the very ways in which ,t has been mis-rceo^ zed and(c) (re-)produced through the failed attempts to erase it.
^
I put the “desire to know” in quotations because, while I am claiming it as mvdesire, it is also an important trope in the signification of adoption. My use of thePhrase is thus also a citation of this trope. As I raise later in this paper when 1 tellpeople that I am adopted I am almost always addressed with others’ curiosity about what
I know. I am presenting my desire to know within the context of how 1 have been
addressed as a knower in order to suggest both the ways in which this address has
p aced me in a certain position as a knower (and as a kind of legitimate subject) and theways in which I have resisted this address.
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n of (essentiahzed) family likeness, see Charlotte Witt’s forthcoming essaym The View from Home (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
I am making a slight distinction here between body and bodily, by “body” I
mean the physical fleshiness of a person and by “bodily” I mean the ways in which that
flesh is perceived, understood, and read as meaningful. So for example, how the body is
t ought to represent or contain family-relatedness is part of how it is bodily. It is part of
my larger project to find a way to discuss the ways in which bodies are conceptualized
(and experienced through such conceptualization) without falling into a kind of
idealism. By expanding the grammar of the body into the bodi
-ly I am trying to create a
space of action which both affects the subject and, once (necessarily) taken up by the
subject, affects the world.
1
2
“
“The refinement of matching attempted to render adoption invisible. The
adoptive family could fade into the woodwork, as it were. No one had to know about
the origins of the family, not even the child himself. For the sake of the child, adoption
was kept secret and the Active quality of the relationship covered over by the real
that is, perceptible surface resemblances between members.
. . During the two post-
war decades, adoption practices locked a genealogical model of kinship to historically
situated class and race distinctions. Judith Modell and Naomi Dambacher, “Making a
Real Family: Matching and Cultural Biologism in American Adoption,” Adoption
Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1997): 17.
1 ^
The choice of verb here is very difficult for me both theoretically and
personally. To write that I was given an identity feels very painful. I grew up watching
a lot of television, particularly shows of the Norman Lear variety. In one episode of All
in the Family Mike, the son-in-law, argues that he doesn’t want to have a child
biologically because there are so many needy children ‘out there’ who need families.
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Archie is furious and, as usual, dumbfounded. While watching the show at ten or so Ihought that 1 was one of those ehildren, that I was taken in because I dlVhave aamtly, that there was a sense of doing something good for me by giving me a name.There is a sense of an impossible choice present in my dilemma: either I snokemy desire or I had an identity. More than simply having a name, having an identity inthis sense means having an ontology, being an X. On the one hand, it was through my
successful subjection (my successfully becoming a person capable of having her ownmgs ideas, sense of self) that I could have my desire to know, while on the other
and, articulating my ‘desire to know’ was an act which would undermine the very
means through which 1 gained a sense of being in the world. Not only did it feel in
some wayungrateful’ to want to know, but it felt like I would lose my access to
Rowing by speaking my desire. To give up being for knowing was not a fair trade.
Judith Butler explores this kind of impossible choice as itself constitutive ofmodem
subjectivity. See her (The Psychic Life of Power: Theones in Subjection ts.mHWH
LA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
14
Modell and Dambacher, “Making a ‘Real’ Family,” 7.
15
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1990), 98-99
Barbara Ynvesson, “Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in
'Open' Adoptions” Law and Society Review 31 . no 1 (1997): 43.
While I am supportive of any adoptee’s desire to know, I do question how the
right to know is formulated in a way which reifies the notion of the naturalness of
identity. Adoptees are necessarily in a position from which they can claim that family—
its importance in one’s life and sense of self—is not decided by blood. It seems critically
important to me not to sacrifice this knowledge in order to accomplish political and
legal change.
1
8
“The slide from appearance to essence is characteristic of American adoption
policy and stems from a deeper tendency of western culture: utilizing biology as the way
of constituting and conceiving human character, human nature, and human behavior’
(Schneider 1984: 175). What a person looks like signifies what a person is and becomes
an indicator of ‘biology, in an American scheme.” Modell and Dambacher, “Making a
‘Real’ Family,” 24.
This ability to have an essence that is something connected to others and
independent of them is crucial I think to the conceptualization of individualism. For an
analysis of the discursive formation of the Individual, see Joan Wallach Scott, Only
Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights ofMan
.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1996).
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Even if the assignment was articulated as a tracing of ‘cultural’ heritage mvrgument is that because it involved the assumption that one individual had one treehat there was a way to know and to trace one’s production through a re-produceable
line of facts, it still would have caused me as adopted to feel uncomfortable. (It wouldhave left no room for me to be what I am calling an adopted knower.) Knowing thatthere were whole parts of me that I was leaving out, huge things about me that I didn’tknow and hence couldn’t include in such a ‘tree’, suggested to me that any version I did
ot my family tree was a construction and that such narratives of identity were
themselves constructs. In other words, what was problematic wasn’t just that the
assignment assumed we were all from families constructed through biology; more
critically the assignment assumed that becoming (a self, a person, etc.) was a product of
a traceable (knowable) lineage, that how one was produced could be evidenced such that
what mattered about the being of a self was what could be known. Because this
knowability became evidenced through the metonym of the body, the assignment
importantly collapsed together the facticity of being bom, or biological reproduction the
social-epistemological requirements for recognition, or socio-political reproduction.
’
Interestingly this metaphor of the form (as a site of truths about the self) raises
the complexity of taking “adopted" as an identity in a culture which doesn’t really have
different words for relations which are biological (or kin) and relations which are social
(or created through family practices). The biological becomes the truth of identity here
as what is relevant in such documents as medical forms is the kin relationships. So
while I could check off “cancer" on such intakes (as my birthmother’s mother died of
multiple cancers), I couldn t really, in truth, check off “grandmother.” My
grandmothers died of pneumonia and strokes. But checking off vascular disease or lung
disease didn’t seem ‘true’ either.
22 When my some members ofmy extended (adoptive) family found out that I
had searched for and found my birthmother, they addressed my (adoptive) brother upon
seeing him in terms ofmy search. They asked him not if but when he was going to
search, expecting without doubt that he would want to. I wonder about this expectation
of his desire, about how they were reading it in relation to mine, and how they were
constructing us as siblings. I involves reading what some might consider to be cultural
as natural: he would want to search because we were both raised by the same people or
because we were both adoptees.
23 r->Even amongst friends who know that I am adopted, it is a common experience
for me to listen to others talk about their families and their relationships with and
attitudes toward them without them realizing that their experiences etc. are very much
based on their (assumptions about) being from a biologically-constructed family. This
is most common, of course, around body talk, including ‘looking like’ and disease
discourse. It is often uncomfortable and even a bit hurtful when such exchanges turn
toward a kind of celebration of (the morphology of) a kind of bodily likeness. I liken
this to a kind of ‘family romance’ and have seen it particularly arise when friends (who
do not have children) discuss their (biological) nephews and nieces.
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While I am relying here on an actual event which I participated in I also
readily admit that my reading of this event is wholly my own. I am using this event toelucidate some of the complex and often unspoken assumptions about the meaning ofmformatmn regarding the family and the individual. I do not mean in any way to
assert that the interpretations I make of the adoptive parents’ concerns and articulations
re true of either all adoptive parents or even of those parents in the room with me As Ihope is clear in this project, I think it is important to use experiences of the everyday as
a means of analyzing the ways in which subjects are constituted and performed. My
un erstanding of the Truth of identity as an impossibility, however, also extends to the
meanings of those events of the everyday. In short, my interpretations of the desire toknow as presented by the adoptive parents should themselves be considered as
speculative, though perhaps instructive as well.
25
Since both giving this presentation and beginning the arduous journey of
writing this essay, the dynamics ofmy family have changed considerably, changes
which reflect the ongoing impossibility of finding a true self or ‘becoming whole’-
lllusions promoted I think, in certain adoption literature. While the death of a close
family member engenders huge and painful shifts within the identity and identifications
of a family, the (sudden and unexpected) death ofmy birthmother’s husband has caused
shifts I did not expect. In particular, as he was not my father, but was the father ofmy
birthmother s other three children, I have ended up feeling more of a ‘bastard’ than I
ever felt when he was alive. (This word, in fact, continued to present itself to my mind
at his funeral. It never had before. This was in part due to his unquestioning acceptance
of me into their lives.) This feeling of being a ‘bastard’ after he died was a reversal of
what might have been expected, viz. that when he was alive I would have felt more
acutely the sense of being somehow an outsider, not his, put up for adoption, without a
father, illegitimate. It is my alienation from my half-siblings’ grief that has engendered,
in part, my feelings of otherness. This alienation includes both my inability to talk
about the man who died as “my father” and my inability to and discomfort at talking
about anyone as ‘my father” when I am with them. Since my relationship to these
siblings is based more on a kind of biological essentialism than anything else (the
sibling issue has been THE most complicated part of searching/finding) in that it is
based on the fact that we (problematically) ‘share the same mother,’ I am left without a
father when I am with them. And my fatherlessness is, in this moment, of course, so
very different from theirs. Perhaps there is a way to approach this feeling of being a
bastard that can help me reach them in their grief. I have not yet figured out how, but I
do wonder if the ‘bastard feeling’ is not a part of the difficulty I have had in mourning a
man who was not my father but whom I loved. There is no name for who he was in my
life, as I discovered when I tried to get time off from work for the services, and as I
acutely felt when meeting strangers at the funeral (who kept crying as they said “I’m so
sorry about your Dad”). I tell this story in part to show the complexity not only of the
family relationships within the context of adoption, but also of the complexity of the
shifting terms with which we make sense of such relationships. That the term ‘bastard’
could appear for me in the context of death suggests that its force continues in my life as
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an adoptee, while it also suggests that its
be maleable in some creative way.
meaning as shifting and unpredictable, might
Ironically, perhaps, my name was not considered to be ‘identifying
information
. There is much political sedimentation in the meaning of this
perfonnative, as it says that the name given to me is always-already unavailable for mv
,den,,nca„on
;
Wh„e the rules for non-identify.ng informa,ton are constructed to pZctthe other parties involved, calling my given name non-identifying raises questiontfabouthow much cultural force is needed in order for a name to be considered a means of
identification, to be an effective interpolation, and how included in such force is thepower of patronym. My ‘name’ was non-identifying, i.e., not able to give or lend
b
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e 11 lacked a ‘ sir-name.’ Although this lack of a(ny) last name sites bothhe ack of my birthmother’s name and my birthfather’s name, the history of adoption in
e US as a means for white middle-class young unmarried women to hide their
pregnancies suggests that the weight of these absent last names in terms of their abilities
to identify was not the same. It is here that the intersection of non-identifying and il-
legitimate needs to be unpacked.
27
Young, Justice
. 98-99.
28
I am uncertain of their class positions, but it was my reading that most if not
all of those present were middle to upper-middle class and were white. As the
organization through which I was invited to speak brought together those parents who
specifically adopted internationally, many of the parents present had adopted non-white
children and most if not all had adopted children from “under-developed” or “Third
World countries. It is outside of the scope of this essay to analyze the complexity of
such adoptions, but it is important to admit that I am making the suggestion that it was
in part due to the parents’ positions as “First World”, white, middle-classed US citizens,
that they were seemingly easily able to assume the position of hegemonic
epistemological subjects.
29 Naomi Scheman, “Though This Be Method, Yet There is Madness in It:
Paranoia and Liberal Epistemology,” in Feminist Social Thought: A Reader , ed. Diana
Tietjens Meyers (New York: Routledge, 1997), 342-367.
30
Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in The Politics of Truth , ed.
Sylvere Lotringer (New York: Semiotexte, 1997), 177.
Scheman, “Though This Be Method,” 356-357. Emphasis mine.
32
Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning,” 224, n.4 (emphasis mine). It is this
notion of ‘indefinite’ that I consider crucial. Freedom involves such indefiniteness. By
ridding the discourse of self-knowledge of the normative expectation of complete and
transparent knowledge, we can open up a space for the self to know itself differently,
that is for what the self is to be not definite and therefore more possible. This
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indefiniteness, I offer opens up possibility because it defers the issue of certainty orcompleteness t.e., of knowing oneself ‘clearly and distinctly.’ Without this deinand forcertamty, the knowing I and the known I can be different from one another As suchthey can be in a relation with one another. ‘Becoming oneself thus can be refigured
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a 'ready 15 (or has been) t0 the on-going relationship betweenhe I o is knowing and the I who is known.
Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in
Progress in Mies: Subjectivity and Truth
,
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trans
- Robert Hurley> * al. (New York: The New Press,
7), 271. contend that rather than ‘psychological’ sciences, it is those sciences
“U
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rt t0 reV6al the hldden meanin§ of the body—via genetics, in particular, but
health discourses in general-that have captured the general imagination in terms of
pursuing self-knowledge as Truth. This turn towards reading the body as a site of truth
via genetic ‘pre-dispositions’ also entails a shift in our notion of Truth Obligation. How
we choose to know or not know our genetic makeup-especially as potentially child-
bearing-might reflect a sense of moral obligation not only to believe in such
information, but to consider such information the right of others-i.e., our children-to
know.
34
Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern,” 285.
35 Mlchel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure
, trans.
Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 985), 25 1 ; quoted in McLaren,
Feminism. Foucault
. 67-68.
36
Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of
Freedom,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Works of Michel Foucault;
vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley, et al
.., 281-302. New York: The New'
Press, 1997, 284.
37
Foucault, “About the Beginning,” 223.
38
Betty Jean Litton, Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness
.
(New
York: Basic Books, 1994), p. 128.
39
Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth
. The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley, et
al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 325.
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